# Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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# PREFACE

*Arms Control & Disarmament* attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

## Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

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| Hebr | Hebraic Section |
| Japan | Japanese Section |
| LL | Law Library |
| Newsp | Newspaper Reading Room |
| Nr East | Near East Section |
| P&GP RR | Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room |
| Sci RR | Science Reading Room |
| Slav Rm | Slavic Room |

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# I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

## A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

924
AGGRESSION. Twentieth century, v. 175, autumn 1966: 5-25. AP4. N7, v. 175

Partial contents. --Disarming smiles all around, editorial by Michael Wynn Jones. --Defining aggression, by M. B. Nicholson. --Were we wrong about Dulles? by Paul Breslow. --Suez: could it happen again? by David Tribe.

Looks at several different general and specific aspects of human aggression and war. Michael Wynn Jones, in his introductory editorial, takes a rather dim view of the achievement potential of the Geneva disarmament negotiations. Various analyses of the causes of war are assessed by Nicholson, "the reader in Conflict Studies at Lancaster University," who defines aggression as "the tendency to seek a solution to international problems by violent means, irrespective of who initiates the violence." In Paul Breslow's view, aggression is variously defined depending on the individual or nation involved. He cites American policy during the Suez crisis and currently, in Vietnam, as examples. Whether Britain will ever again carry out an aggressive adventure on the scale of the Suez invasion is the question posed by David Tribe, whose answer is "No."

925
Beaufre, André. [1966--A PIVOTAL YEAR] 1966--année charnière. Stratégie, no. 11, Jan./Mar. 1967: 27-33. U162. S78, 1967

Many strategic changes occurred during 1966. Americans became aware of the contradictions between their Atlantic policy and their efforts toward East-West détente, and they adjusted their strategy to the new concept. Germans realized that American protection would not solve their problems and approached France and Russia. The new French strategy evidently aims at abolishing the division of Europe established at Yalta and creating conditions favorable for German reunification. The East European states clearly desire to resume their prewar contacts with the West, and Russia, pressed by political and economic factors, seeks détente in Europe despite its traditional fear of Germany. The transfer of American strategic priorities to Asia is evident, but the Vietnamese War frustrates all efforts for East-West détente and European and German unification. Therefore Russia might favor an honorable compromise in Vietnam so long as China does not profit. China undoubtedly became a major factor in international strategy. Its "tactical prudence" induced it to take the offensive indirectly (as in spreading communism in the Third World) and the defensive directly. Its nuclear strategy will be deterrence. But China's pride, isolation, and internal chaos may render it the principal troublemaker of the next decade. The most important change is the transformation of bipolarity into a tripolar strategic situation. Although some experts expect the Sino-Soviet conflict to dominate the next decade and give the United States great freedom of action, the Vietnamese War might easily lead to a Sino-American confrontation that would exercise a definite influence on American-Soviet relations. Nevertheless détente in Europe opens promising prospects for European and German unification, and it would be unfortunate if this evolution were impeded by a prolonged crisis in Asia.

926
Brutents, K. THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT TODAY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 19, Feb. 22, 1967: 24-25. D839. C87, v. 19
Condensed from Pravda, Feb. 1, 1967, p. 4-5.
Slav Rm

The national liberation movement, developing today in the former colonies, receives the unrestricted support of the Communists and of Soviet foreign policy. Chinese attempts to damage this Soviet program are mostly abortive. But the imperialists' efforts to counter anticapitalist development and foster neocolonial economic penetration of these nations poses a serious threat. The imperialists also attempt to tie these countries to the world capitalist system through industrial trusts that invade them and support the developing bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Although this pressure is formidable, some native governments have shown a capacity to preserve independence. Intervening boldly in property relations, they are advancing the national interest of their countries and their peoples. Unfortunately these governments are meeting violent opposition from domestic and foreign reactionaries. Subversion and coups d'état are being organized everywhere. In order to counteract this the progressive and revolutionary forces must unite; their cohesion must serve as a motivating force for revolutionary development. In this effort they can follow the abundant examples set by other Communist states in organizing countries' economies and public, state, and party life. Their policies must be flexible, and they must closely cooperate with the world revolutionary forces.

927
Editorial Research Reports. EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON WORLD AFFAIRS. [Editor: William B. Dickinson, Jr.] Washington, Congressional Quarterly [1966] 182 p. D414. E3

Contents. --Foreword. --World food shortages. --China and the West. --Religious rivalries in South Viet Nam. --Thailand: new Red target. --American forces in Europe. --Middle East enmities. --Soviet economy: incentives under communism. --War powers of the President. --Future of the United Nations.

A collection of reports published as separate Editorial Research Reports in 1965 and 1966 on important issues of current interest.

928
Frankel, Max. CAN WE END THE COLD WAR? New York times magazine, Jan. 29, 1967: 20-21, 52-53, 58, 60, 65, 67-68. illus.
AP2. N6575, 1967

If, as is likely, a Vietnam settlement proves imperfect and expensive to both sides, it may end the cold war. Such a settlement will have demonstrated "not only the folly of indirect military intrusions--by both sides--but also the menace of ideological passions." What was originally a conventional power struggle between two superpowers has been distorted by these passions and transformed into a global contest for the loyalties of all men. In one sense the cold war began 50 years ago with proselytizing by both Washington and Moscow of their rival ideologies. Democracy and communism anywhere were supported emotionally at first and physically later by the two nations. After the Second World War the clash over Europe, whether real or imagined, could not be settled in terms of a "sordid power balance." Later Korea broke the barriers of normal power politics in Asia and "became for many Americans the final proof that a single Communist conspiracy, centered in Moscow, was hell-bent on conquest of the entire world, with hundreds of millions of Chinese now prepared to march on its signal." Every world issue was seen as the expression of that conflict. Yet neither side was prepared to risk all-out war. The restraint demonstrated by Washington and Moscow in 1956 might have begun the end of the cold war, had not the Soviets suddenly acquired the intercontinental missiles with which they were to threaten the world for the next 5 years. Only after the 1962 Cuban crisis did the two nations seek tentative accommodation. For their part the Americans discovered they could live with Communist Cuba; that not all nations asking aid from the Soviet Union would become Communist themselves. The Soviets, on the other hand, were forced to acknowledge strategic inferiority. Even now, however, the cold war is warmed and kept alive by such things as the threat of Communist China, the continued arms race, and the war in Vietnam.

929
Gurr, Ted. NEW ERROR-COMPENSATED MEASURES FOR COMPARING NATIONS: SOME CORRELATES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE. [Princeton, N.J.] Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1966. 126 p. (Princeton University Center of International Studies. Research monograph no. 25)
HM278.G8

Draws a model of internal national violence that "accounts for illicit violence as a response to intensely felt deprivation for which there is no apparent remedy." In this study the author attempts to isolate and quantify the variables whose existence or lack figures in occurrences of civil violence: the central government's economic performance, the exclusion of groups, the efficacy of labor unions, and the relative size of internal security forces. Gurr also explains the statistical tool he used to minimize error in reporting aggregate data--"the optimum interval."

930
IMAGE AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS. Journal of international affairs, v. 21, no. 1, 1967: xiii-xvi, 1-140. JX1.C6, v. 21

Contents.--Editor's foreword.--The learning and reality-testing process in the international system, by Kenneth E. Boulding.--Cognitive dynamics and images of the enemy, by Ole R. Holsti.--The social myths in the "cold war," by Reinhold Niebuhr.--Perceptions, reality, and the Franco-American conflict, by Stanley Hoffmann.--China and America: the burden of past misperceptions, by John G. Stoessinger.--The Maoist image of world order, by Benjamin I. Schwartz.--Perception and action in the 1914 crisis, by Robert C. North.--Misperception of aggression in Vietnam, by Ralph K. White.

Explores "the gap between appearance and reality" in international politics. The authors emphasize the importance of the subjective dimension in international conflict for understanding how and why one nation's images differ from those of another, and for improving perception by elimination or recognition of the biases of nationalism. Schwartz, Stoessinger, and White suggest the solution is "empathy," and relate this factor to the present conflict in Asia. Neibuhr, Boulding, and Holsti deal with the difficulties of a single nation's perception of reality, and of man's built-in biases toward stereotyped images.

931
Kohler, Foy D. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: SHAPING A STABLE WORLD. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Jan. 2, 1967: 6-11.
JX232.A33, v. 56

Speech "made before the Florida Department of the American Legion at Orlando, Fla., on Dec. 11," 1966.

Urges improved East-West relations. Mr. Kohler (currently Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs and formerly U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union) first discusses the military aspects of the confrontation between democracy and communism and finds reason for optimism in "evolutionary developments in the Communist world," specifically the splitting of the monolith. Although in his opinion things are not all rosy with the East European and Soviet states, ideological passions are waning, and the United States should "take advantage of every opportunity to develop closer contacts and wider relations with them in order to shape a stable world."

932
Lorenz, Konrad. ON AGGRESSION. Translated by Marjorie Kerr Wilson. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World [1966] 306 p. illus.
QL775.L6813

"A Helen and Kurt Wolff book."
Translation of Das sogenannte Böse.
Bibliography: p. 301-306.

Explores aggression--"the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species." From "simple observations of typical forms of aggressive behavior," Lorenz discusses its function in species preservation. He treats the "physiology of instinctual motivation in general and the aggressive impulse in particular," which explain "the spontaneity of the irresistible outbreaks which recur with rhythmical regularity." Ritualization, he declares, becomes independent impulse. He demonstrates that evolution has "invented" mechanisms that channel aggression harmlessly through ritual and, in man, standards of morality. In this discussion of the neutralization of aggression Lorenz posits four types of social organization to be found in animals (including man): the anonymous crowd, family and social life based solely on territoriality, tribes characterized by "exemplary" intratribal relations and great hatred in intertribal confrontations, and lastly the "bond of love and friendship between individuals which prevents the members of the society from fighting and harming one another." To Lorenz this analysis aids in understanding "many of the ways in which aggression in man goes wrong." "Militant enthusiasm," which can serve

either high ethical values or absurd wars, is "an instinctive response with a phylogenetically determined releasing mechanism." Its control requires knowledge of the stimuli that elicit it--threat from outside the social unit, the presence of a hated enemy, an inspiring leader figure, and the presence of many individuals experiencing the same emotion. All is not hopeless, however. Humor and knowledge, with the chronologically more remote aid of evolution, are the potential saviours of mankind.

933
Luard, David Evan. CONCILIATION AND DETERRENCE: A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN THE INTERWAR AND POSTWAR PERIODS. World politics, v. 19, Jan. 1967: 167-189.
D839.W57, v. 19

Many factors account for the contrast in approaches to world politics after World War I and World War II: the multipolar structure and lack of formal military alliances in the interwar period, contrasted with the emergence of two superpowers after 1945; a world scene largely dominated by European affairs, replaced by new nations from new continents after the war; changes in military technology and advances in the field of communications; differing concepts of the causes of the conflict immediately preceding the period; and the nature of the settlement following the conflict. The belief after 1918 that war might have been averted had nations been more willing to negotiate is replaced in 1945 by a determination to demonstrate firmness and bargain from a position of strength. Lack of stable alliances, which diminished the feasibility of deterrence between the wars, was replaced by a bipolar world. The widespread lack of confidence in the fairness of existing frontiers in the interwar period was replaced in 1945 by the wide acceptance of the status quo essential to a firm deterrence policy. Deterrence is best employed to prevent change, not impose it. Its relative benefits depend on both how far the existing order is thought to be just and stable, and the assumed motivations of the other actors involved. To show determination to an opponent with a real sense of grievance is as dangerous as to concede to an opponent whose ambitions are unlimited. Deterrence assumes rationality on the part of the antagonist and a desire to avoid the risk of war. Comparison of the interwar and postwar periods suggests that neither deterrence nor conciliation alone is sufficient; the best policy must draw on both options. If nations, like individuals, are partly rational and partly emotional, national policies must account for both rationality and emotion. Armed strength may induce realistic assessment of the consequences of arbitrary action while peaceful dialogue examines basic issues, uncovers grievances, and resolves the causes of the dispute.

934
McLellan, David S. THE COLD WAR IN TRANSITION. New York, Macmillan [1966] 149 p.
D840.M2

Traces the course of the cold war during the 20 postwar years, beginning with the transition from alliance to animosity at the end of World War II, through the power vacuum and eventual emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as dominant powers, the years of bipolarity and its gradual breakdown, the Kennedy years, and the present prospects in international relations. While nations have gained little in this period, "in a real sense the past twenty years have been a monument to man's tenacity to survive and to the blending of responsibility and power in a nightmarish setting."

935
MYSTERY OF RED CHINA: A REAL BLOWUP COMING? U.S. news & world report, v. 62, Jan. 2, 1967: 46-48.
JK1.U65, v. 62

Turmoil in Communist China has produced extensive outside speculation about Peking's fate. Some China watchers think a big blowup is in the offing, perhaps leading to civil war, a breakup into regionalism, or a takeover by the Army "and a reuniting of Communist China and Soviet Russia after a blood bath on the Chinese mainland"; others downgrade the significance of the current strife. All agree that Communist factions are struggling, and that communism will not end in China as a result of it. A U.S. News & World Report survey of various parts of the world shows the experts agreed on some main conclusions. Conflict on the mainland is too nearly full-blown to wither away, and the trend appears to be running counter to Mao Tse-tung, his chief aide Lin Piao, and their fanatical Red Guard movement. The pivotal role in the conflict is held by the Red Army. At the moment its sentiments are not definitely known, even by Lin, its Commander in Chief. Premier Chou En-lai has attempted to maintain a position of neutrality and may end up on top in the power struggle. Whatever happens--and the possible outcomes are numerous--the strife has already inflicted grievous harm, with factories and schools shut down for months.

936
Nielsen, Walter. [PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES OF SECURITY (I)] Probleme und Prioritäten der Sicherheit (I). Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Apr. 1967: 197-206.
D839.A885, v. 18

Contends that existing "political structures"--states, groups of states, or international organizations--experience insurmountable difficulty in coping with the security problem, due to the rapid development of modern technology and the gradual loosening of the bipolar security system. The very concept of security is vague and probably never will be adequately defined. The hierarchy of values determining an order of priorities differs for each level of political structure.

937
Rumpf, Helmut. [THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Jan. 1967: 16-23.
D839.A885, v. 18
Bibliographical footnotes.

From its very start the international relations theory, a relatively new branch of political science, became ideologically engaged with pacifism and cosmopolitanism. A reaction to such "naive, world-betterment idealism" began during the Second World War with the school of political realism under the leadership of Hans J. Morgenthau, who considered the realities of power politics in international relations and stressed the irrelevancy of pacifist idealism to the task of checking aggression. Since the advent of the Soviet-American nuclear stalemate, however, Morgenthau's "political realism has drawn close to idealism as far as his new emphasis on peace is concerned." But, due to semantic differences between the English terms--"people," "nation," "state" for instance and their German translation--"Volk," "Staat," "Nation"--a different content is likely to be attached to the discipline in Germany. With their different historical

background, the Germans do not need to copy the American delineation of the theory, but may define and develop it differently. Unavoidable methodological syncretism exposes the theory of international relations to a constant danger of ending either in dilettantism or in sheer compilation of facts. German theory must try to shun such extremes.

938
Schreiterer, Manfred. [THE NATURAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES IN TODAY'S FOREIGN POLICY] Die Natur- und Ingenieurwissenschaften in der heutigen Aussenpolitik. In Verein deutscher Ingenieure, Zeitschrift, v. 109, Jan. 1967: 7-12.
TA3. V5, v. 109

The power factors in foreign politics have changed fundamentally during the last few decades. The paper tries to analyze the reciprocal effects developing between the natural and engineering science potentials and foreign politics of up-to-date industrialized states. (Abstract supplied)

939
Smoker, Paul. NATION STATE ESCALATION AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 1, 1967: 60-75.
AS9. J6, v. 4

A model of world affairs is defined which identifies two interacting systems. The first system is called a nation state system, in which nations are the only actors. The second system is called an international system, in which there are many actors, from individuals to nations to international organizations and corporations. The world system is defined as the amalgam of these two. Within nations, the four functional requirements of Parsons are used to identify the economy as representative of the adaptation subsystem, the culture as representative of the integrative subsystem, individuals and families as representative of the pattern maintenance subsystem, and government as representative of the goal attainment subsystem. An internation system is then specifically defined as interaction between the goal attainment subsystems of nations. A similar procedure is adopted for the international system. The three arms races are then interpreted in the light of the model using the idea that the international component has been greater in each arms race than in the previous one. In this way it is possible to interpret the differences in behavior in each of the arms races in terms of the model. It is also found that the linkage between trade and defense has increased in each successive arms race. It is suggested that future analysis of world affairs should take into account other actors, such as international organizations and international corporations, as well as nations. Further, the importance of the integrative system is stressed and some suggestions for strengthening it are put forward. (Author's summary)

940
Speidel, Hans. [SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS] Wissenschaft, Technik und Politik. In Verein deutscher Ingenieure. Zeitschrift, v. 109, Jan. 1967: 2-6.
TA3. V5, v. 109

The knowledge that politics and science cannot exist side by side living separated from each other--they rather have to complement each other--has at the present time almost gained the upper hand. Particularly, for the formation of opinion in foreign politics, too, the collaboration of different branches of science proves to be more and more necessary. The armament control, the problems concerning the alliances and the European Economic Community stand as examples therefor. The technical development is even capable of suppressing the ultimate consequences of politics by trying to avoid a war of extermination in favour of political conflicts. Therefore, the applied sciences--apart from the basic research work--should be given more support in the Federal Republic of Germany than they have been given so far, and this just in the State's interest alone. A first possibility towards a beginning collaboration may be seen in the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik". (Abstract supplied)

941
Streuffert, Siegfried, Susan C. Kliger, and Carl H. Castore. TACTICAL AND NEGOTIATIONS GAME FOR ANALYSIS OF DECISION INTEGRATION ACROSS DECISION AREAS. Psychological reports, v. 20, Feb. 1967: 155-157. BF21. P843, v. 20

An experimental simulation is described as a method for measurement of integration and response patterning in group decision making and strategic perception. The method employs a simulated game including tactical, negotiation, economic, intelligence, and other potential components. Similarities to a previously described game as well as the advantages over that game are discussed. (Summary supplied)

942
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 79 p.
JX1255. U5

Testimony by three psychologists who are specialists in the field of international political behavior: Dr. Jerome Frank of Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Charles E. Osgood of the University of Illinois, and Dr. Brock Chisholm, former Director General of the World Health Organization. Dr. Frank's statement explains the relationship between group or individual behavior and national behavior, the role of perception and expectation in conflict, and the need for ideology in the human makeup. He goes on to discuss the Vietnamese War in terms of its ideological character and mentions the need for providing incentives to cooperation in the international and human spheres. Improving relations with mainland China, in Dr. Frank's view, is presently a compelling necessity. Dr. Osgood's testimony deals with both escalation and general U.S. policy toward the Communist nations. Traditional "conscience values," according to Dr. Chisholm, are now outmoded and must be revamped if mankind is to survive. All three men responded to Committee questioning over a broad variety of topics.

943
Virpsha, E. S. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 12, Feb./Mar. 1967: 36-43. illus. UA646. F5, v. 12

Studies southern Africa's strategic importance through its geography, which the author asserts predominates in determining its policy and strategy. In the context of global strategy southern Africa looms large. Any future war will probably see Suez denied to the West with the Cape of Good Hope passages thus essential to seapower. Moreover the Southern Atlantic can best be defended from Africa, and the Indian Ocean area around South Africa will be a major battleground.

944
Zuckerman, Sir Solly. SCIENTISTS AND WAR: THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS. New York, Harper & Row [1967] 177 p.
Q175. Z83, 1967

Outlines the major constraints on the selection of goals in scientific and technological activity and its potential risks of unpredictable social repercussions. Decisions made in the fields of science and technology today will determine the tactics, strategy, and politics of tomorrow. While the scientist cannot always foresee the repercussions of his discoveries, Sir Solly feels he must take responsibility for deciding what facets of research should be encouraged and applied.

## B. FOREIGN POLICIES

945
Akahata, Tokyo. THE MODERN REVISIONISTS' THEORY OF WAR AND PEACE AND THE JUDGMENT PASSED BY HISTORY. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966. 82 p. D847. A353
"Article in AKAHATA, Organ of the Communist Party of Japan (August 14, 1965)."

A lengthy discourse on various aspects of international relations, emphasizing the need for unity in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The article devotes considerable attention to condemning the partial nuclear test ban treaty and defending China's nuclear development program. The final sections deal with the effect of "peaceful coexistence" on the national liberation struggle and with means for winning the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism.

946
[THE AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT] Le rapprochement américano-russe. Perspectives, v. 23 Feb. 11, 1967: 3. HC10. P4, v. 23
Separately paged.

American-Soviet relations are growing closer notwithstanding the Vietnamese War. On January 27 a treaty on the peaceful use of space was signed in Moscow as a continuation of the 1963 ban on weapons in space. This, undoubtedly, is a further step toward arms control. In Europe the East-West détente and the disappearance of the danger of war has awakened a growing desire for independence from the two great powers. Thus Secretary Rusk tried in vain to extend the responsibility of the Atlantic alliance to the Far East, while in the Communist camp the Soviet warning that German revanchism was reviving did not prevent Rumania from establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany. And while Western Europe tries to improve its relations with the East European countries, the latter are refusing a Soviet-proposed conference to excommunicate Mao for fear they may again fall under Russian hegemony. Because of the existence of East Germany, differences in regimes, and growing nationalism, a united Europe is not yet in sight. But in spite of political obstacles, economic, commercial, and industrial relations between the Eastern and Western European countries are expanding substantially. Europe is afraid of a U.S. economic hegemony. As the technological gap between the United States and Europe deepens, both Harold Wilson and Premier Kosygin recommend a joint European effort to counter it.

947
ANY ROLE FOR BRITAIN? Socialist commentary, Mar. 1967: 3-4.
HX3. S74, 1967

Today, when a thaw in the cold war seems a real possibility, two formidable obstacles stand in the way. The first is the Vietnamese War; although negotiations and compromise are bound to come, agreement between the superpowers is being delayed to the detriment of world security and prosperity. A second issue, of even greater international importance, is the arms race, with its two immediate aspects--the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty, which seems close to fruition, and the question of antiballistic missiles, on which agreement is still very far off. In discovering its role in these great international issues, Britain must take into account its limits and potentialities: its very real and continuing contraction in power; its involvement in a whole network of international relationships, from the Commonwealth, NATO, and the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee to its special relationship with the United States; and its unquestionable interest in peace. Britain's new role, in keeping with these realities, is most appropriately that of conciliator--"a man with no great power himself, but capable of great service to the powerful, in helping them settle their disputes." Britain has contacts, experience, and resources of diplomacy that few other nations possess and that can be used to good effect in the interests of world peace.

948
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [THE MEANING OF GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY] Vom Sinn deutscher Ostpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Feb. 1967: 65-68.
D839. A885, v. 18

With the advent of the Kiesinger government Bonn's policy toward East Europe has attempted to achieve mutual détente. But détente as such must not be pursued to the detriment of such German national interests as German reunification. Therefore Bonn does not renounce the Hallstein Doctrine. Bonn is, however, ready to modify it with regard to the East European states. The official Communist policy recognizing two German states serves Soviet interest in deepening Germany's partition and killing East German Communists' hopes for German reunification under communism. The Soviet Union learned from its experience with China that it would not pay to have a new Communist giant on its western flank. Prague, Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia desire to normalize relations with West Germany. Poland, for the sake of its own interests, demands that Bonn recognize "the German Democratic Republic's boundaries" on the Elbe and Oder-Neisse lines, assent to an atom-free zone, and renounce any German participation in nuclear arms matters, all as a prerequisite for normalizing its relations with Bonn. The Kiesinger government also aims at resuming and improving relations with the 10 Arab States that have applied an "Arabian Hallstein Doctrine" to the German Federal Republic since Bonn established diplomatic relations with Israel. The Federal Republic's cooperation with countries that "come into consideration as producers of nuclear weapons" will bring "mutual exchange of opinion as to those nations' security in connection with a proposed nonproliferation treaty." The greater the identification of German interests with those of other countries the better are the chances for the realization of German national goals.

949
Boisdé, Raymond. [CHINESE LIGHTS AND SHADOWS: THE CHINA OF TODAY] Lumières et ombres chinoises; la Chine d'aujourd'hui. Paris, Société d'édition d'enseignement supérieur, 1966. 184 p.
DS777. 55. B63

Traces the traditions of a millenial history and their influence on the national character as it appears in China's contemporary society. Boisdé analyzes the Sino-Soviet dispute, Sino-American relations, and the development of the Communist society in China, and tries to find an answer to the imminently important question: Will China seek war or peace in the foreseeable future?

950
Budzislawski, Hermann. SECURITY--BUT HOW? GDR review, v. 12, no. 1, 1967: 38-40.
DD261.G2, v. 12

European security--itself an overriding issue of our era--is dependent on the world situation. Existing conflicts elsewhere tempt West German leaders to settle international problems by war. West Germany's refusal to renounce the use of force against the German Democratic Republic, Bonn's dreams of restoring a former German Reich, its claim to all German representation, and its militarism constitute a threat to all European countries. The German Democratic Republic, in alliance with other Socialist nations, by its "very existence and growing strength prevents frontier revisions" and thus contributes to peace in Europe.

951
Bundy, McGeorge. THE END OF EITHER/OR. Foreign affairs, v. 45, Jan. 1967: 189-201.
D410.F6, v. 45

The end of 1966 finds the United States not only embattled in Vietnam, but in the middle of a social revolution at home and deeply involved with continents and countries abroad. Basically Americans still pursue their own interests and this must be reflected in their foreign policy. At present the general policy of engagement and the recognition of complexity replaces the isolationism, moral globalism, and either/or policy of previous generations. Undoubtedly the most important problem today is the Vietnam War. Politically most vital is the pacification of South Vietnam under a non-Communist government. The United States is willing to negotiate, but the Communists have apparently decided to negotiate only if they can achieve their objective, which is the takeover of South Vietnam. Maybe a solution similar to the one achieved in Greece, gradual action and counteraction without any formal agreement, would be more acceptable to North Vietnam. But even a victory for Hanoi would not necessarily mean a communication of all Asia, nor its defeat the end of the pervasive threat of China. The United States is perfectly able and determined to continue its other economic and military efforts. The economic aid is too low to serve its interests, and will be subjected to extensive debate next year. In Europe the United States faces a fight against nuclear spread, while maintaining the Atlantic partnership and the commitments it has honored for 25 years. Furthermore, since the costs of the Vietnamese War are in fact quite manageable, there is no reason why the United States should abandon social programs at home, or choose between Vietnam and social progress.

952
CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THREE APPROACHES. International organization, v. 20, autumn 1966: 653-723.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

Contents.--China, the United States, and the United Nations, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.--Communist China's changing attitudes toward the United Nations, by Byron S. Weng.--China, the United Nations and United States policy: an analysis of the issues and principal alternatives with recommendations for U.S. policy: report of a National Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the United States of America.

Bloomfield examines America's most feasible future policy alternatives, past U.S. attitudes toward admitting Communist China to the United Nations, and the effect admission of Communist China is likely to have on the functioning of the United Nations. Weng traces Chinese attitudes toward the United Nations through five periods, from a vague yet relatively favorable and naive attitude, to a more pessimistic, sophisticated, and antagonistic attitude, to a soft-line play toward the Afro-Asian nations, to hard-line boldness and arrogance, and finally to an approach reflecting its search for a substitute for the United Nations. While its report recognizes the difficulties Communist China's membership would entail and anticipates no early moderation in Peking's policies if seated, the National Policy Panel of the U.S. United Nations Association nonetheless recommends a change in U.S. policy toward the seating of Communist China, if only to encourage that nation's participation in international political life.

953
Dacier, Michel. [THE "BEAUTIFUL AND GOOD ALLIANCE" IN ACTION] La "belle et bonne" alliance en action. Écrits de Paris; revue des questions actuelles, Jan. 1967: 5-12.
AP20.E355, 1967

A bitter attack against General de Gaulle, accusing him of breaking Western alliances and preparing a dangerous entente with the Soviet Union. The General resented the U.S. unwillingness to help him develop the French nuclear bomb, Dacier reasons, and consequently started his pro-Russian policy, which will end in disaster. Dacier deplores this error and asserts that the Russians just pretend to take De Gaulle seriously because he serves their interests; they will throw him overboard as soon as he becomes a burden. De Gaulle fails to realize that Russia is much more interested in the United States than in the small French hexagon.

954
Davies, Rodger P. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST. National Jewish monthly, v. 81, Jan. 1967: 8-9.
HS2228.B4N3, v. 81

The foremost U.S. strategic priority in the Middle East is preventing domination or takeover by Communists or any power hostile to U.S. international interests. Also in the U.S. interest is preservation and promotion of communication and commercial connections with the region as a whole, and maintenance of access to Middle East oil on terms reasonable for both the United States and its allies. Finally the Nation has a deep interest in preserving peace and stability generally and in preventing tensions in the region from escalating into world conflict. Three broad categories of problems face the United States in the Middle East: those stemming from Arab hostility toward Israel, those related to Arab nationalism and intra-Arab rivalries, and those created by Russia's efforts to reduce Western influence and extend its own. U.S. Middle Eastern policy aims to prevent or contain conflict and preserve a balance in its relations with various factions. The Nation is committed to attempts to slow the arms race in the

region. It has concluded that a Palestine settlement cannot be grafted on by outsiders but must be accepted by the people involved. Finally U.S. policy is based on the assumption that peace between the Arabs and Israelis is possible, and that it is in the U.S. interest to seek its attainment.

955
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, spring 1967: 34-36.
D839.A85, v. 5

"Reprinted by permission from L'Europe en Formation, December, 1966."
P&GP RR

There are few Americans who aspire to a true Atlantic Community founded on the renunciation of a part of national sovereignty by all the Parties including the United States, says Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. He says the Americans "unconsciously and with great good will" conceive of a Europe which will submit gracefully to American leadership as it did under the pressure of necessity between 1947 and 1955. Today things are different. (Abstract supplied)

956
A EUROPE TO JOIN. Socialist commentary, Feb. 1967: i-xxxii. HX3.S74, 1967

Contents.--Britain faces Europe, by Sam Silkin.--A wider Europe, by Eric Heffer.--The Treaty of Rome, by Stanley Henig.--Community profile, by Roger Mackay.--What kind of Europe? by Roy Pryce.--Technology: chasm and bridge, by Charles de Hoghton.--A pillar of world society, by John Pinder.

A special supplement on European unity. Silkin chronicles the changes in postwar British policy toward the rest of Europe, concentrating particularly on the reaction to De Gaulle's veto of British entry into the European Community in 196- and the future of U.K.-French relations. Heffer sees the European Economic Community and European Free Trade Association as the first stage in a united Europe. Henig outlines the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community in 1958, and the obligations Britain would incur by signing it. The impressive accomplishments of the EEC in less than 10 years are documented by MacKay. Pryce discusses the future role of Britain in the European Community as it evolves from a purely economic union toward a political union with a common foreign and defense policy. How Europe with British help may bridge the "technological gap" between itself and the United States is explored by De Hoghton. Pinder feels a strong European Community would not adversely affect relations with the United States or the Soviet Union but, as a strong entity with a common foreign policy, would enable European nations to sway greater influence in world affairs.

957
Geiger, Theodore. THE ENDING OF AN ERA IN ATLANTIC POLICY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, spring 1967: 87-98.
D839.A85, v. 5

"Reprinted by permission from Looking Ahead (National Planning Association), January, 1967."
P&GP RR

Dr. Theodore Geiger discerns a new "Isolationism" which has developed in Western Europe within the generation now coming to power. He discusses why it has spread, and how it looks inward and tends away from the concept of an Atlantic partnership of equals. He sees Western Europe as looking increasingly toward Eastern Europe and away from Asia, Africa and Latin America, while questioning their previous goals of political and economic union. These new developments, he suggests, call for "a fundamental reexamination of the assumptions, objectives and methods of American policy." (Abstract supplied)

958
Gelber, Lionel M. THE ALLIANCE OF NECESSITY: BRITAIN'S CRISIS, THE NEW EUROPE, AND AMERICAN INTERESTS. New York, Stein and Day [1966] 192 p. E183.8.G7G29

Maintains that Britain's present world role, as center of the Commonwealth and as chief ally of the United States, would diminish rather than increase through entry into Europe. Gelber treats his thesis in terms of relations between Europe and the United States, Europe and Britain, and Britain and the United States.

959
THE GREAT DEBATE ON EUROPE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, spring 1967: 12-33.
D839.A85, v. 5

A "Great Debate" on Europe is building up in the United States Senate. Hence the Quarterly carries remarks by Senators Mansfield, Dodd and Javits, who have introduced resolutions and an amendment to one, foreshadowing a discussion concerning the whole range of relationships in Europe and the Atlantic Community. The resolutions themselves appear in the Source Material of this issue (p. 145-149). (Abstract supplied, modified)

960
Guillain, Robert. [THE CHINA OF TODAY AND THE CHINA OF TOMORROW] Chine d'aujourd'hui et Chine de demain. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Feb. 1967: 192-203. D410.R45, v. 23

Undoubtedly China has made great progress during the past 15 years. Following long years of paralysis, humiliation, and despair, the Mao Tse-tung regime brought the people peace, unity, and a method. Combined with the people's inherent energy these three assets have unleashed a real work explosion; the Chinese courageously accept the severe discipline of communism and find in their achievements a patriotic satisfaction. As they are also the people most capable of developing industries we can expect the "Chinese miracle" by the end of this century. But China's main problem in the near future will undoubtedly be its population growth. Since its neighbors are also overpopulated this problem will not be easy to solve. In other respects China will most likely remain far behind the United States and Russia even in nuclear matters. Although its future strength will probably be centered in defense, past humiliations and the Vietnamese War might have increased the latent aggressiveness of the Chinese and perhaps their desire for revenge. In 1968 China will have a hydrogen bomb; in 1970 ballistic missiles able to reach Japan, India, and Siberia; and in 1975-80 intercontinental ballistic missiles reaching the United States, Russia, and Europe. Thus in less than 15 years China will occupy a place in the dangerous balance-of-power system. But in the meantime the world will make enormous progress, and among the large political units that will be established the size of China will not seem so imposing. It may be that the Red Guards will by then not seem as bad and men will

cease to speak about the "yellow peril" because they will feel talking about it is the best way to create it. But all that will be in vain if the rest of the world does not decide to help China in the realization that to open the Chinese wall and keep it open is one of the greatest needs of our time. Nations should try to understand the Chinese and, as France has done, recognize their country and establish close contacts. The time will come soon when the white man must accept the fact that he must share his resources, force, and knowledge with the Asian man.

961
Halle, Louis J. DE GAULLE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. Virginia quarterly review, v. 43, winter 1967: 1-19. AP2. V76, v. 43

Dissects General de Gaulle's view of France, which embodies recreating the grandeur that France enjoyed in the 19th century. "In the second half of the twentieth century, however, his ideas are no longer relevant to the needs of France, to the needs of Europe, or to the needs of the world at large."

962
Henkys, Reinhard, ed. [GERMANY AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS. CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN EVANGELICAL MEMORANDUM] Deutschland und die östlichen Nachbarn. Beiträge zu einer evangelischen Denkschrift. Stuttgart, Kreuz-Verlag [1966] 237 p. (Sonderband der Protestantischen Texte)
DD738. H4

Partial contents.--Discussion of the memorandum, by Reinhard Henkys.--Discussion of international legal aspects, by Alard von Schack.--The Oder-Neisse territories in the Polish view, by Eberhard Schulz.--The German Federal Republic's standpoint, by Dietrich Schwarzkopf.--The memorandum--and what now? by Erwin Wilkens.--Documents.

Discusses the moral, legal, and political aspects of the Polish-German boundary problem, using as a basis an October 1965 memorandum of the German Evangelical Church. The documents section includes the full texts of the October 1965 memorandum of the Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany on the situation of expellees and the German people's relations toward its Eastern neighbors; the November 1965 letter from the Polish Roman Catholic bishops to the German bishops on the causes of Polish-German antagonism and the need for reconciliation between the two peoples; and the December 1965 reply of the German bishops.

963
Kearney, Vincent S. MAO TSE-TUNG'S LAST REVOLUTION. America, v. 116, Feb. 11, 1967: 215-217.
BX801. A5, v. 116

The cultural revolution currently raging in Communist China is Mao Tse-tung's last attempt to communize his country on his own terms. One can predict with a degree of certainty that his effort will fail, that what will occur instead will be "the development of a more flexible, sophisticated type of communism," similar to that which evolved in the Soviet Union. For there are present in China today a great number of middle-aged, technology-oriented "revisionists" whose main concern is to see China get on its feet economically. The United States and the Soviet Union are watching the present upheaval with considerable interest. For Russia the outcome of the cultural revolution will affect the direction of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The United States is undergoing a reorientation of its China and Asian policies. The former, which as a policy of flexibility and moderation was to be "an application of carrot-and-stick diplomacy," has been newly categorized as "containment without isolation." Actually Washington has been rethinking its Peking policy for some time. The important consideration is whether this is the right time in which to do something constructive about altering it. For while Communist China is in a state of upheaval and showing tendencies toward irrationality, any attempts to reach or cultivate the elements of moderation present now may become self-defeating. Knowing that Western technology is a devisive influence on his form of pure communism, Mao Tse-tung may possibly see through the "containment without isolation" thrust. He is determined not to foster a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement similar to the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The best tact for the United States, then, is to let the moderation and rationality China needs now come from within. During this time, it would be fruitful to work toward understanding "what kind of Asia we ... have in mind when we speak of the Asia to which China must one day adjust and with which it will eventually realize it can live in security."

964
Kudlicki, S. WEST GERMANY'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY. Poland and Germany, v. 10, Oct./Dec. 1966: 3-9. DK418. 5. G3P55, v. 10

West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger has shown little inclination to change his nation's Eastern Europe policy from that of his predecessors. Reunification of Germany remains the primary aim of the Federal Republic, and its policy toward Eastern Europe is a mere function of this effort. However the presence of such leaders as Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, and Franz Josef Strauss in the Kiesinger cabinet may indicate some future modification. For example Kiesinger has shown willingness to establish contacts with the Democratic Republic "up to the threshold of recognition," an act considered virtually treason in the past. The desire to resolve the German problem strongly influences the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union, and normalization of relations with East and Central Europe are subordinated to that aim. Kiesinger's policy toward Poland differs little from former governments'. While Brandt and other Social Democrats admit the impossibility of recovering prewar German provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse boundary, they show no willingness to recognize that frontier. West Germany views Poland solely as a function of its relations with Russia, and Polish affairs only from the standpoint of their role in achieving German reunification.

965
Massenet, Michel. [FOREIGN POLICY OF A UNITED EUROPE] La politique extérieure d'une Europe unie. Paris, Bulletin Sedeis [c1964] 83 p.
D1060. M346

Studies the possibilities of a common foreign policy for the six states cooperating under the Treaty of Rome. The book is a methodological study of the divergencies among French, German, and Italian diplomacies, and the chances for its realization. The author feels that a common economic policy, as it is practiced by The Six, is inseparable from a common attitude toward the external world. If a common foreign policy is not realized the whole movement toward European unification will be blocked. A draft treaty to create a union of the six states is included.

966
Ramsey, James A. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. Foreign service journal, v. 44, Mar. 1967: 14-15.
JX1. A53, v. 44

In the past 20 years the United States has participated in European affairs to an unprecedented degree, both through its military presence and its influence in the defense, foreign, and even internal policies of most of the European nations. In the early postwar period the U.S. presence was generally accepted, even welcomed as a stabilizing influence and a source of economic assistance. Currently this attitude is changing for complex reasons ranging from resentment over U.S. predominance on the Continent to uneasiness about the American stance on world problems. Europeans, both West and East, desire to lead a normal life free from the tensions and threats of war and from outside intervention. Gradually they perceive the United States no longer has answers for the problems they face. Europeans become suspicious when Americans, after insisting for over a decade on the indispensability of American troops to guarantee the Continent's security, suddenly decide (for economy's sake) this is not quite so essential. While the transition period will be tense, a more stable situation may eventually emerge when the United States involves itself less in European matters. Under present world conditions the two would probably fare better with a less interdependent relationship. The United States must recognize the changes that have taken place in Europe and accept them gracefully.

967
Reischauer, Edwin O. WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT IN ASIA. Look, v. 31, Apr. 4, 1967: 21-23.
AP2. L79, v. 31

The United States cannot extricate itself easily from the Vietnamese War, but it should at least learn from this experience to avoid similar situations in the future. Between the blind advocates of ever-increasing military efforts and the isolationists who would leave Asia to its own poverty and turmoil, a middle course exists for U.S. Asian policy. In the early postwar years the United States saw its goal as keeping the nations of Asia out of the clutches of a unitary Communist bloc; this threat no longer exists. Today's Asian policy should emphasize not the essentially negative aim of denying the continent to the Communists but rather the positive aim of helping it become a healthier part of the world. Past U.S. failures have resulted from misunderstanding the scale and complexity of Asia. One false analogy was the concept of a firm defense line in Asia similar to that established against the Communists in Europe, but this approach can achieve little against the primary threats to Asia, subversion and guerrilla warfare. The most serious U.S. blunder was to underestimate the potential of nationalism in Asia, both as a barrier to Communist takeover and as a relevant factor in its economic and social development. Rather than smother Asian nationalism, the United States must withdraw from its leadership role to that of impartial supporter. Militarily, "we should be extremely chary about committing our power in Asia because it is so relatively ineffective and so easily stirs up countercurrents." There is cause for considerable optimism in Asia--most countries are inching upward economically, and the menace of China is fading. Good Japanese-American relations portend happier American relations with other Asian nations as they modernize. Much of the above analysis applies to Communist China as well as to Asia generally. To contain China's aggressive urges is sound policy, but to isolate Peking is unwise.

968
REPORT ON AFRICA. Current history, v. 52, Mar. 1967: 129-174, 178-182. D410. C82, v. 52

A seven-article study of the strengths and weaknesses of African states. The first, "Africa in the World Arena," discusses inter-African foreign policy, U.S. policy in Africa, and the role of the Organization of African Unity. Succeeding articles discuss North Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Southwest Africa, Rhodesia, and the Congo.

969
Spencer, Robert. GERMANY AFTER THE AUTUMN CRISIS. International journal, v. 22, spring 1967: 210-230. D839. I5, v. 22

Taking into account the background and political factors behind West Germany's recent change of government, a new foreign policy is emerging in the Federal Republic despite the difficulties of reconciling coalition differences. While the Social Democrats favor complete renunciation of any atomic role, the official Government policy is to renounce national control or ownership but reserve the option of participating in a supranational European deterrent. Concern that the proposed nonproliferation treaty will inhibit Germany's development of industrial atomic power has created an extraordinary uproar despite assurances from Washington that the final treaty will not be prejudicial to German interests. Bonn hopes to create a new image in Eastern Europe, as shown by Kiesinger's recent references to détente, tension reduction, and disarmament. Improvement in Franco-German relations has a similar purpose. Bonn is clearly "moving beyond the Schroeder-Erhard concept of linking the solution of the German question with détente towards seeking détente as a desirable objective of its own." Kiesinger has energetically attempted to transform trade relations with Eastern nations into diplomatic relations and has had some success in Rumania, with others expected to follow. The Soviet Union has made no moves to hinder the ties with Rumania, but the new diplomacy has evoked vigorous criticism from East Germany. The Democratic Republic, conscious of its insecurity, "is not interested in but rather fears détente." Bonn must not seek to isolate East Germany but must act through the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members to moderate Ulbricht's stance.

970
Strauss, Franz Josef. THE GRAND DESIGN: A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. New York, Praeger [1966] 105 p.
DD257. 25. S85

Expounds the idea of a Europe with East and West united and integrated as a solution to the Continent's present problems, which include German reunification and such territorial disputes as that over the Oder-Neisse Line. Strauss believes that "only an integrated Europe can become the full partner of America." He suggests a "Bonn-Paris Alliance" as the starting point and "a London-Paris-Bonn triangle" as the basis for the Europe of the future.

971
Ulbricht, Walter. MOVE TO THE RIGHT IN THE WEST GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC. GDR review, v. 12, no. 1, 1967: 27-28.
DD261. G2, v. 12

Excerpted from an interview that appeared in Neues Deutschland. Newsp

The "grand coalition" of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats of West Germany's new Government embodies the same warmongering tendencies, "chauvinism and revanchism," as the Erhard and Adenauer governments. The very fact that the Social Democratic leaders preferred Christian Democrats of the Adenauer and Strauss brand to Free Democrats as their coalition partners indicates their support of the antidemocratic methods of government recommended by the Christian Democratic Congress. The Congress suggested the constitutional changes to be effected by the proposed "stabilization law": modification of the electoral law and providing legislation for emergency war powers. The so-called "Germany policy" of the Kiesinger government actually aims at establishing German hegemony in Europe. This tendency must be counteracted by the cooperation of all peace-loving forces in both Germanies. Nothing but pan-European settlement of the European security problem and the guaranteed integrity of existing frontiers in Europe, including the boundary between East and West Germany, can ultimately dispel the danger of West German "revanchism and nationalism."

972
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA. Report; hearings. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 582 p. (89th Cong., 2d sess. House Document no. 488) DS518.8.A463

Text of hearings (p. 1-582) follows report (p. 1-12).

Hearings held by the Subcommittee (Jan.-Mar. 1966) and its report thereof. While the hearings dealt with a wide range of subjects relating to all parts of Asia, of central concern were the implications of the rise of Communist China for U.S. policy. The report recommends that, while continuing to meet its commitments, the United States must also enlarge its efforts at peaceful contacts with mainland China.

973
[U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS: QUESTIONS POSED TO AMERICANS] Les rapports Etats-Unis-Europe; questions aux Américains. Entreprise, no. 591, Jan. 5, 1967: 30-34. HC271.E5, 1967

A synthesis of the views of 20 American Government officials, businessmen, bankers, etc. on U.S.-European relations, the common defense system, German unification and the possibility of its achievement in a divided Europe, the Kennedy Round, the technological gap, the balance of payments, and American investments in Europe. Permanency of the American policy of support for European unification is stressed.

974
Vernant, Jacques. [EUROPEAN PROSPECTS: AMERICAN ISOLATION?] Perspectives européennes; isolement américain? Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Feb. 1967: 291-294. D410.R45, v. 23

Discreetly and without much noise the Governments of Franco's Spain and Communist Rumania have signed, in Paris, an agreement on consular exchange that seems to be the first step toward normal diplomatic relations between Eastern and Western Europe. The Rumanian-Spanish agreement might well mark a new stage in the general evolution of Europe toward normalization and intensification of relations between countries having different economic and social systems. In the 1951-64 period the economic growth in both parts of Europe was almost the same. The growth of the national income in Eastern Europe was 4.9%, while that of Western Europe was 5.4%. This does not mean the standard of life is the same in the two parts, but that Europe develops at the same rhythm of growth on both sides, which incites Europeans to intensify economic and cultural exchanges. Europe is motivated to occupy in today's world, in which interdependence is a fact, a role conforming to its economic weight, its cultural capital, and its political interests. It is significant that these aspirations of the geographic Europe appear at a moment when the United States, because of the Vietnamese War and the attitude its power allows it to assume in the world, confronts a psychological gap separating it from a large part of world public opinion. There is no doubt that many Europeans are hostile to the methods applied by the United States in Vietnam and contest the legitimacy of American political objectives. The loss of American prestige is remarkable and cannot be compensated for by the support of the few countries that attended the Manila Conference. Even U.N. Secretary General U Thant thinks that the United States should accept the French concept and make the first step to peace by discontinuing the bombing and recognizing some kind of representative character on the part of the Viet Cong. In Europe American isolation accentuates the effort for solidarity. Realizing that world conflict must be solved by negotiation, today's Europe studies measures which would eliminate future conflicts and limit future risks.

975
Wolf, Charles. UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD: PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS. Boston, Little, Brown [c1967] 204 p. E744.W575

Analyzes the conflicting and complementary relationships among political, military, and economic conditions in the Third World, and their effect on U.S. policy. Part I is a theoretical discussion of such broad factors affecting U.S. policy as: the "value" of the less-developed countries to the United States; relationships among economic growth, redistribution of wealth, and the role of force; the problem of insurgency; and the uses and limitations of nuclear deterrence in dealing with conflict in the underdeveloped world. Part II attempts to quantify some of the relationships described in Part I. Wolf considers the relationship between defense and development in several countries, and the possibilities of realizing economic benefits from military programs. He attempts to evolve an objective measure of a nation's development performance and evaluates ways to improve the effectiveness of U.S. aid programs through better economic-military coordination.

# II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

## A. MODERN WAR

976
Beaufre, André. [THE REDISCOVERY OF STRATEGY] Die Wiederentdeckung der Strategie. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Jan./Feb. 1967: 18-24.
P&GP RR

Considers the role of strategy in peacetime, cold war, conventional war, and nuclear war, as well as the interaction of each strategy on the others (e.g., nuclear warfare on nuclear deterrence in peacetime).

977
Bidwell, R.G.S. THE FIVE FALLACIES: SOME THOUGHTS ON BRITISH MILITARY THINKING. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Feb. 1967: 53-55.
Ul.R8, v. 112

Criticizes British military thinking for underestimating the value of numerical military strength in winning wars, overestimating the value of "magic weapons," elevating "the manoeuvre to the decisive factor" in war, overemphasizing bloodless military operations, and assuming that heavy enemy losses will render him passive and ready to give in. Bidwell points to the "laws of war" defined by the forgotten mathematician Lanchester as clearly negating these tenets of British strategic thought.

978
Dalkey, Norman C. STROP: A STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 38 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-4817-PR) Q180.AIR86, no. 4817
"Research ... sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND - contract no. AF 49 (638)-1700."
Bibliography: p. 38.

This small, rapidly computable model of central nuclear war was developed to help the analyst to evaluate quickly a large number of possible plans, each of which depends on the actions of the enemy. The game, coded for an IBM 7040-44, evaluates a pair of Red and Blue allocations of missiles and bombers to some combination of four target systems: missile sites, bomber fields, bomber defenses, and value targets. One pair of Red and Blue allocations can be evaluated in about 1/50 of a second. Although the model is basically static, time enters into STROP in determining the average number of bombers or missiles at risk during enemy attack; in assessing the effect of warning and relative execute times; and in assessing the effect of rate of fire, a capability that can also be used to take into account the results of withholding portions of the forces for later attack. The outcome of nuclear exchange can be evaluated if the attacks on both sides are completely preplanned, or if one or both sides have a retargeting capability to compensate for losses to enemy fire. STROP distinguishes between value targets and military targets. In addition to exploring strategic plans, it can be used to evaluate force mixes. (Abstract supplied)

979
Deutsch, Karl W. CHANGING IMAGES OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. Journal of social issues, v. 23, Jan. 1967: 91-107.
HN51.J6, v. 23

Major images of war which have prevailed in various periods of history are reviewed: war as inexorable through God's design or man's weakness, as the ultima ratio, as Armageddon, as obsolescent, as failure of control. Coalitions among contemporary holders of potentially peace-promoting images are examined. The warning is given that existing national and international instruments of political communication and control may not be able to cope with the demands placed on them as the world's strategic interdependence outstrips its economic, cultural and social interdependence. (Abstract supplied)

980
Dudley, C.E.S. SUBVERSIVE WARFARE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Feb. 1967: 47-52.
Ul.R8, v. 112

Examines the characteristics of subversive warfare from the time of the 30 Years War to date and points out differences between the old and the new. Dudley discusses Mao Tse-tung's practice of employing "guerrillas, in conjunction with regular forces, in a strategic role," analyses the traditional subversive activities of Communists and Nazis, and stresses "the importance of terrorism in subversive warfare." The author considers psychological warfare as part of subversion.

981
Gift, Richard E., ed. FIVE STUDENT ANALYSES OF WAR. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Mar. 1967: 127-138. JX1901.J6, v. 11

Essays written by five students in a seminar at Davidson College. The papers, each of which relates a single societal variable to the occurrence of war, consider level of capital accumulation, national sovereignty, foreign investment, cultural integration, and unemployment in a dualistic setting.

982
Knorr, Klaus E. ON THE USES OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. Princeton, N.J. [Published for the Princeton Center of International Studies by] Princeton University Press, 1966. 185 p.
UAll.K63
Bibliographical footnotes.

Explores the "value of national military power as an instrument of foreign policy." Acknowledging that military power has political, economic, and psychological benefits, the author concentrates on the international utility of military forces and their maintenance as they serve this purpose. The utility factor is not easily quantified, but some measures can be attached to the main factors--values (goals) and costs. "At any one time, variations in values and costs expected from

the maintenance and use of military power in part account for differences among nations in their attitudes toward maintaining military power, and toward its aggressive or defensive employment." The author also takes into consideration the utility of nonmilitary means of achieving desired international goals.

983
McClintock, Robert. THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 239 p.
D842. M3

Examines specific examples of the seven categories of 20th century limited wars: limited strategic war in Greece and Korea; war for independence in Israel; war for limited political and strategic objectives in Suez; civil war with outside intervention in Lebanon; war for the acquisition of territory exemplified by China's attack on the Himalayan frontier of India; wars of national liberation in Vietnam; and domestic rebellion without outside intervention. The author aims to demonstrate that limited war is political and that peace requires resolving the political differences among nations. Therefore the book emphasizes the objectives of limited war and the manner in which conflicts are eventually solved.

984
Nicholson, Michael. TARIFF WARS AND A MODEL OF CONFLICT. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 1, 1967: 26-38. AS9. J6, v. 4

The article describes and discusses some of the tariff wars which went on between various European states at the end of the nineteenth century. Various countries, such as France and Switzerland, went through periods of building high tariffs against each other to force the rival country into making a favourable tariff treaty. The tariff wars appear to follow the pattern of a short period tariff "escalation" followed by a long period of "seige". A theoretical model is built which attempts to explain this basic characteristic of tariff wars. The similarities between tariff wars and other forms of conflict including violent wars, is discussed in a section at the end of the article. (Author's summary)

985
Prasad, Har. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: LESSONS FROM HISTORY TO REMEMBER. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 96, July/Sept. 1966: 175-188. U1. U5, v. 96

Delineates the "principles of war"--lessons great commanders and students of war have attempted to draw from past campaigns for more profitable conduct of future wars--from Sun Tzu Wu to the modern Indian Army. The author discusses the role in warfare of selection and maintenance of the goal, maintenance of morale, offensive action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, cooperation, and administration.

986
Sevigny, Robert S. MODERN WAR GAMES: FROM WW II TO PRESENT. [Portland? Ore., 1967] 40 p.
U310. S4

A manual for playing war games that use modern weapons. It includes rules for setting up the game, maneuvers, supplies, and the tactical value of the vehicles and weapons available. Far from encouraging militarism and destructiveness, Sevigny insists that war games develop the powers of reason and logic and show the participants "how irrational and blundering the real wars actually are."

987
The TEMPO warfare environment studies. LOCALIZED TACTICAL WARFARE, by David W. Lueck. [Santa Barbara, Calif., General Electric Company] 1965. 12 p. (Its Study no. 1)
U21. 2. T4, no. 1

An attempt to study limited war by examining the earliest phase of trouble between two states as though they were isolated and before the major powers are involved. The author explores the spectrum of potential attitudes and actions by the participants to the confrontation and finds conflict only a portion of the total environment. He concludes by defining limited war "not by the weapons used nor by location of the conflict, but rather by the objectives of the participants."

988
Wylie, Joseph C. MILITARY STRATEGY: A GENERAL THEORY OF POWER CONTROL. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press [1967] 111 p.
U162. W9, 1967

Briefly describes existing theories of military strategy and comments on their shortcomings in applications to specific situations. Wylie proposes a general theory as a more stable and orderly basis for formulating strategy for a specific purpose. He isolates the factor that is common to both military and nonmilitary power struggles and is exercised in all situations by one social entity over another--control. According to Wylie's general theory, the strategist's primary aim in the conduct of war is some degree of control over the enemy. This he achieves by manipulating the war's center of gravity to his advantage.

## B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

989
Brodie, Bernard. ESCALATION AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1966. 151 p. UF767. B73
Bibliographical footnotes.

Debates the merits of conventional weapons versus tactical nuclear weapons. Focusing primarily on the arguments "usually advanced for building up conventional forces in Europe as a substitute for reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons," Brodie centers the thrust of his essay "around the allegedly self-propelling escalatory effect of any use of nuclear weapons." To determine whether tactical nuclear weapons can be used as a deescalating device in conflict is crucial.

990
Cabiac, Roger. [COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF THE FUTURE] Kampfflugzeuge der Zukunft. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 62-64. illus.
U3. W38, v. 11

The controversy surrounding the choice of a future combat aircraft for the Air Force is at present much more animated in France than, for example, in either Britain or the Federal Republic. Ultimately, of course, not only the efficiency and strength of the French Air Force are here involved, but also the entire weal and woe of the French aerospace industry. The article by Roger Cabiac presents an up-to-date account of the situation in the military aircraft field in France. Roger Cabiac describes the somewhat complicated position as regards the development of the various

new Mirage versions and of the variable geometry aircraft, and arrays the many "ifs" and "buts" of this complex problem. (Abstract supplied, modified)

991
Corliss, William R. SNAP NUCLEAR SPACE REACTORS. [Oak Ridge, Tenn.] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Division of Technical Information [1966] 46 p. illus. (Understanding the atom series)
TL1102.N8C6
"Suggested references": p. 45-46.

Explains the nuclear power reactors that are being developed for use in spacecraft. The program's history is outlined, as are the principles on which Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power [SNAP] are to function. Corliss compares SNAP reactors with alternate power systems for spacecraft.

992
Csizmas, Michael. [MILITARY CYBERNETICS IN EAST EUROPE] Militärische Kybernetik in Osteuropa. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1966: 477-486. illus.
P&GP RR

Explains the importance attached by the Warsaw Pact countries--especially the Soviet Union--to cybernetics as a means of a weapons-systems analysis and improvement of command. Csizmas discusses the use of cybernetics by Soviet bloc countries in military training, research into military operations, simulation of conflicts, and preparation of an air-defense system.

993
DETERRENCE BY ANTI-MISSILES: EXAMINING THE PROPOSITION THAT WORLD PEACE CAN BE MAINTAINED ONLY BY EXTREME ESCALATION. Time, v. 89, Feb. 24, 1967: 22-25.
AP2.T57, v. 89

Aside from the strategy arguments advanced for and against deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] defense system and the continuous cost estimates and fatality predictions, the real question is whether any system, regardless of cost, can buy protection. ABM's are built to destroy incoming missiles, either by the nuclear explosion itself or by its heat and blast effect. Neutrons produced by the ABM warhead can penetrate the uranium trigger of an ICBM warhead, causing it to fission prematurely and generate enough heat to deform the trigger and disarm the missile. Within a 2-mile range the ABM explosion can damage the heat shield of the incoming missile, causing so much friction that the warhead burns up in the atmosphere before it reaches the target. Electromagnetic pulses can also induce damaging surges of electric current in the circuits of the ICBM to prevent it from exploding. Although this may sound formidable the Pentagon admits that even the costliest ABM system cannot buy security, because scientists have already learned to penetrate it. They have devised double heat shields in the ICBM, a neutron-blocking layer to protect the uranium trigger, and more rugged electrical components and bypass circuits to reduce damage from electromagnetic pulses. Dummy missiles or missiles releasing decoys can confuse radar, and single missiles can eject multiple warheads. Why then, many ask, are the Russians willing to deploy ABM's? Conceivably Russian strategists feel the system could destroy enough U.S. missiles to enable the U.S.S.R. to survive, or perhaps they have developed a better defense system than the U.S. has contemplated. On the other hand Moscow may be bluffing with its ABM plans, hoping to make the United States overreact and further strain its economy. Or possibly the Soviets have deployed ABM's for defense against China. Both America and Russia stand to lose severely from full deployment now. Yet should one deploy an effective ABM system before the other, the possibilities of nuclear war will increase. If both deploy concurrently, the balance of terror remains the same, and nothing will have been gained from the expenditure of untold billions.

994
[THE FRENCH-BRITISH PROJECT JAGUAR] Das französisch-britische Projekt Jaguar. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 64-65.
U3.W38, v. 11

Outlines French-British cooperation in construction of the military aircraft Jaguar. The article gives technical data and combat characteristics of Jaguar, describes organizational economic aspects of the project, and underlines the potential value of the craft for the West German Air Force.

995
FROM THE EDITORIALS. Japan quarterly, v. 14, Jan./Mar. 1967: 99-101.
DS801.J274, v. 14

Excerpts of editorials from various Japanese newspapers commenting on the Chinese Communist guided missile launching of Oct. 27, 1966, and on the United Nations General Assembly's 1966 decision not to seat Communist China.

996
Geneste, M.E. THE SMALL NUCLEAR PAWNS. Washington report (American Security Council) Feb. 6, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

Tactical nuclear weapons represent a transition on the escalation ladder leading from guerrilla warfare to total destruction. Strategic nuclear arsenals alone are no more than scarecrows since their use means suicide, which is no defense at all. To keep the peace today the atom, like the queen in chess, needs small pawns protecting it front and rear. A credible tactical nuclear deterrent must be triggered to react automatically, like a minefield, on any incursion. The military must thus be given automatic authority to use nuclear pawns to fulfill their defensive mission. Once the vital credibility of the atom is assured, the progressive release of increasingly longer range weapons by political authorities might control further escalation. To question the ethics of using modern weapons against less developed enemies is irrelevant. If throughout history the advanced civilizations had refrained from using their sophisticated weapons against barbarians, no developed civilization would exist today. The tactical atom might be "the best guardian of Peace in a troubled world and the main defense of our civilization."

997
Getler, Michael. USSR TO PUT MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON ICBM'S. Technology week, v. 19, Dec. 12, 1966: 13-14. UG630.M54, v. 19

Not only have earlier reports that the Soviet Union has embarked on a program for increasing its ICBM force been confirmed, it also appears now that the change will be of a qualitative nature. Along with

adding missiles to its offensive force and deploying an antiballistic missile system, Moscow is apparently looking toward "a mix of high-thrust ICBM's able to carry either a significant payload of multiple warheads, each perhaps of at least a megaton in yield, or a single very large warhead which could be exploded at heights of 100,000 to 150,000 ft. above a target." The latter effort is designed to keep the missiles out of range of U.S. Sprint ABM's. In response the United States is working on longer-range, heavier-payload Nike-Zeus interceptor missiles. The submarine-launched Poseidon missile will be the first multiple-warhead U.S. missile; it is expected in service by late 1969. The Soviets also may use the multiple-warhead concept as a "hedge" against ABM defense deployment. Their success in this area is suggested by the apparent limited deployment of the small, solid-fueled missile, Savage, which could be carried in group configuration on large ICBM's. The United States has no definite information on current Soviet ICBM work. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara acknowledged that the 1965 intelligence estimates of Soviet offensive forces for 1968 were "off-base." McNamara nevertheless asserted that even if "new" intelligence estimates for mid-1968 Soviet ICBM levels prove accurate the United States will continue "to have a substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority" over the Soviet Union. The U.S. ICBM force today is still substantially ahead of the current estimates of Russia's projected force for some years to come. The United States will continue to have sufficient retaliatory strength to inflict unacceptable damage on any aggressor.

998
Giese, A.D. [THE WEST GERMAN NAVY AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR] Die Bundesmarine an der Jahreswende. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 80-81. illus.
U3.W38, v. 11

Sets forth the numerical strength, present status, and shortcomings of the West German Navy.

999
Hargreaves, Reginald. A BRITISH EXPERT'S VIEW: THE CHALLENGES FACING THE U.S. NAVY. Navy, v. 10, Mar. 1967: 14-19.
VA49.N28, v. 10

The U.S. Navy must plan for three eventualities: "sub-nuclear" warfare, "unrestricted nuclear conflict," and "post holocaust salvage of victory." In subnuclear warfare the Navy will face many of its traditional problems in keeping the seas open and protecting the mercantile marine. The Navy's main contribution to unrestricted warfare will be Polaris-Poseidon-type submarines armed with nuclear rockets and surface vessels equipped with guided missiles. Since nuclear-powered vessels can be "sealed off" from the heat, blast, and radiation effects of nuclear explosions, as many existing craft as possible should be converted to nuclear propulsion, and all future construction should be of that type. Without physical occupation and control of the aggressor's territory there can be no victory in war. The Navy will inherit the traditional tasks of transporting troops and supplies, guarding them in transit, and supporting them if landing is opposed. Landing troops will rely on a "carefully preserved Fleet train, functioning in lieu of shore facilities temporarily out of commission." The possibility that the "Communist enemy" has surviving submarines or missiles hidden in sympathetic territory will necessitate a convoy system of patrol craft and "anti-submarine submersible and sea/air escort groups." The Navy will also need an assault-landing ship of at least 10,000 tons to accommodate 400 troops and their equipment, to be protected by such escorts as the vertical takeoff and landing [VTOL] aircraft.

1000
Heumann, Gert W. [THE AVS PROJECT; GERMAN-AMERICAN V/STOL MULTIPLE-PURPOSE STRIKE/INTERCEPTOR] Das AVS-Project; deutsch-amerikanisches Mehrzweck-V/STOL-Kampfflugzeug. Flug-Revue, no. 4, Apr. 1967: 14-16. illus.
TL503.C524, 1967

With the announcement of the winners of the AVS competition, EWR Sud and the Republic Aviation Division of Fairchild Hiller, this project for the bi-national advanced V/STOL strike system has reached another phase of the development programme. Both partners will carry the AVS through its system definition phase before a decision will be made to go ahead to the prototype stage. According to current plans, twelve prototypes should be built and tested but this has to be decided and approved by both governments, the U.S. and the FRG. The EWR Sud will employ its VJ 101C-X2 test plane and the entire test facilities at Manching for the basic work, applying all the know-how gained in four years of intensive VJ 101 testing. These experiences as well as those gained from the F-104 G programme will be important assets to be put into Republic's share. The AVS is expected to join the services of the FRG and the U.S. in the late seventies as the most advanced strike/interception system. This programme will keep the industry busy for at least twelve years from now and, bearing in mind that it will be worth 10 to 12 billion DM for the German industry, it will be the most important programme ever started--on the technological and the economic side. This article gives a view of the history of AVS and its releasable details. (Abstract supplied)

1001
Johnsen, Katherine. AEC TO START NEW WARHEAD PRODUCTION. Aviation week & space technology, v. 86, Jan. 30, 1967: 37-38. illus.
TL501.A8, v. 86

The Atomic Energy Commission's [AEC] main research and development program for the past 3 years will come to fruition during fiscal 1968. $32.2 million has been allocated for facilities for producing nuclear warheads "capable of penetrating any possible anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defense system." The Commission hopes to improve strategic missiles "by further decreasing warhead vulnerability to advanced enemy anti-ballistic-missile countermeasures." Two major test sites are also being considered by the AEC. One, on Amchitka Island near the western end of the Aleutian chain, will add to U.S. ability to monitor Soviet or Chinese underground nuclear tests. The Rover space nuclear propulsion program represents another important activity for fiscal 1968.

1002
Kishida, Junnosuke. JAPAN'S ROCKETRY. Japan quarterly, v. 14, Jan./Mar. 1967: 87-92. illus.
DS801.J274, v. 14

Describes developments in Japan's rocket program, which culminated on Oct. 31, 1966, with the successful firing of the Mu-1 solid-fuel rocket designed for the purpose of launching a "true scientific satellite." The author notes that all Japanese space research is

directed toward peaceful ends, that everything Japan does or achieves in this area is made public, and that it is ready at any time to cooperate with other nations.

1003
Kolcum, Edward H. U.S. STRESSING NEW RE-ENTRY TECHNOLOGY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 86, Feb. 6, 1967: 26-27.
TL501.A8, v. 86

Outlines the components of U.S. strategic offensive forces emphasizing the areas in which Robert S. McNamara places confidence or seeks qualitative improvements. If the United States succeeds in its present attempt at developing "the capability to launch more than five hydrogen warheads on a single Minuteman 3 or Poseidon missile," by 1972 it will be able to shower either Russia or China "with more than 5,000 warheads launched by 1,656 missiles." Included in the 5-year plan outlined are re-entry vehicles, penetration aids, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile.

1004
Lepotier, Adolphe. [STRATEGIC MOBILITY] La mobilité stratégique. Stratégie, no. 11, Jan./Mar. 1967: 17-24. U162.S78, 1967

The enormous development of air transport during the past 40 years gave statesmen the erroneous notion that the airplane can solve all strategic-mobility problems and autonomously intervene in all parts of the world. In fact planes still need a great deal of fuel, which limits their load capacity. Moreover the fuel must be transported in advance to refueling stations either by boat, train, pipelines, etc., in order to avoid delay. More ships transport fuel than anything else. The deficiencies of air transport are best exemplified in Vietnam, where military action depends completely on naval transports for refueling airplanes and transporting vehicles to the operational theater. Unless technology either substantially reduces the consumption of fuel or permits the use of a nuclear "fuel" that would enable planes to take heavier loads, aerial mobility will not be the key factor of decisive operations in a potential intercontinental war.

1005
Lindsey, G. THE STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE DEFENSE. EMO national digest, v. 7, Feb. 1967: 2-4.
P&GP RR

Outlines the roles and limitations of strategic striking forces and discusses strategic alternatives for an antimissile defense. Lindsey weighs the advantages and disadvantages of an operational ABM system to a superpower in terms of cost-effectiveness. He also summarizes the conclusions of a cost-effectiveness analysis of a theoretical passive defense of Canada.

1006
Mavor, L.D. MODERN AIR POWER. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Feb. 1967: 6-15. UI.R8, v. 112

A lecture given October 19, 1966, at the Royal United Service Institution in London, and the discussion following it.

Describes the effectiveness of air weapons systems and air transport systems in modern war, both conventional and nuclear, and at various levels of escalation of nuclear war. Mavor, British Air Vice Marshal, underscores the effectiveness of such airborne delivery systems as manned aircraft and missiles for nuclear deterrence. He feels modern missiles guarantee that wars between nuclear powers "will be fought at levels which they themselves find acceptable." The discussion of Mavor's lecture is reprinted.

1007
Michigan. University. Engineering Summer Conferences, 1966. TOPICS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH: AN INTENSIVE SHORT COURSE. [n.p., 1966] 1 v. (various pagings) illus.
U104.M5, 1966

Includes bibliographies.

Lectures that attempted to familiarize students with "the concepts, procedures, assumptions and effectiveness of quantitative approaches used in planning for future forces of weapons systems." In an introduction the history of operations research, the "weapons development cycle," concepts of modeling, and a typical model were presented. Further lecturers treated such topics as statistics, a model to predict weapons performance in dynamic combat, field experimentation, and cost effectiveness analysis.

1008
THE NEW FRENCH MISSILE TEST CENTRE. Interavia, v. 22, Jan. 1967: 86-87.
TL500.I555, v. 22

Some time this year France will leave its Colomb-Béchar test center for two new sites, one in Guiana for launching satellites, and the other, known as the Centre d'Essais des Landes [CEL], on the French Atlantic coast for testing missiles. In addition to its 32,000 acres of launching-base areas, CEL has three flanking stations and a tracking station. The launching site consists of three silos (with a fourth under construction), designed primarily for testing ballistic missiles but also used for developing tactical missiles. The test center is equipped with a wide variety of observation, tracking, and measurement equipment, including high-precision radar, a trajectory-plotting system, Doppler recorders, and kinetheodolites for optical-trajectory recording. All the information is fed into an electronic computer at the range-control point. Staff currently numbers approximately 2,000 and is expected to increase to 3,000 by 1970.

1009
Nitze, Paul H. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEA-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. Navy, v. 10, Apr. 1967: 10-11.
VA49.N28, v. 10

As the United States moves into the 1970's confronted by increasing Soviet strategic capabilities, naval systems will assume great strategic importance in meeting potential threats to the U.S. deterrent posture. Naval systems often can survive to retaliate when land-based systems cannot. Enemy attacks on U.S. ships at sea do not threaten destruction of the continental United States. Naval units are mobile, easily redeployed, and threaten potential aggressors in international waters rather than third-country territory. Sea-based weapons are hard to pre-target for surprise attack and compound the enemy's difficulties in both direct action against U.S. forces and positioning antimissile defense systems. In acknowledgement of the importance of the Navy's strategic role, the Office of the Director for Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems has been created in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1010
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES; FIRST FOR FRANCE. Economist, v. 223, Apr. 1, 1967: 68.
HG11.E2, v. 223

The total cost of the first three French nuclear submarines, including development of the ship, reactors, and ballistic missiles, is estimated at 4 billion francs. The American policy of withholding the material and information needed for producing nuclear weapons has greatly irritated the French. In the Sputnik panic of 1957 the Americans unbent sufficiently to give France enough enriched uranium to conduct land-based prototype experiments, but not enough to put the submarines to sea. Through restriction of nuclear fuel America hoped to thwart French nuclear weapons development; it almost succeeded. The enrichment plant at Pierrelatte has cost France 5-1/2 billion francs and considerable difficulty. Pierrelatte's output, which at present is not large, will restrict France's rate of nuclear buildup. Moreover, the necessity of channeling the entire capacity of the Pierrelatte plant into military work will hamper severely the French civil atomic program.

1011
Pay, Rex. NEW EFFORT AIMED AT X-RAY PROTECTION. Technology week, v. 20, Jan. 2, 1967: 10-12.
UG630. M54, v. 20

Describes the work now being done in the area of hardening missiles against the "thermal" radiation that would be emitted from antimissile missiles. Much of the work will involve changing materials requirements in the guidance and communications systems, where materials that have high atomic numbers and are therefore most susceptible to X-ray absorption are used.

1012
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [NUCLEAR SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD] Die Atom-U-Boote in der Welt [by Jacques Pergent] Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Apr. 1967: 199-201.
U3. A43, v. 133

An appraisal of the American, Soviet, British, and French nuclear submarine programs. Pergent gives data on the strength, weapons, and equipment of existing and projected fleets, and completion deadlines for individual programs. He describes and gives general specifications for different kinds of nuclear submarines and concludes that the U.S. "decisive superiority" in that area is secure for the next 10 years.

1013
[THE SOVIET NAVY HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL A NOVEL REMOTE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEM] Sowjetische Marine verfügt über neuartiges Fernmelde- und Leitsystem. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Feb. 10, 1967: 125. U3. W38, v. 11

A submarine fleet armed with strategic rockets constitutes an important part of the Soviet Union's "Blue Belt" defense system. According to Soviet naval authorities the fleet has recently been equipped with the speediest possible remotely controlled communication system, representing "the Navy's electronic nerves." This will radically reduce the chances of erroneously transmitting reports of nuclear-rocket launchings and lower the risk of distorting the orders to retaliate against the enemy. The system is very intricate and can reach the troposphere from both sea and land, but it will also be able to withstand hostile nuclear attack. Of great importance are its computing elements, enabling high coordination of its complex components. When all Soviet Armed Forces are similarly equipped, this new communication system will enormously enhance Soviet capability to launch surprise attacks.

1014
Stone, Jeremy J. THE ANTI-MISSILE FOLLY. New leader, v. 50, Jan. 2, 1967: 13-15.
HX1. N57, v. 50

Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] defense system, according to Secretary of Defense McNamara, is a foolish move, which the steadily improving U.S. offensive panoply can easily offset. A reasonable U.S. reaction should be satisfaction at Russia's waste of resources tempered both by fear of escalated arms competition and recognition that the United States need not join it. Instead the widespread view of the move as a "secret and devastating Russian breakthrough" threatens to catapult America into huge expenditures on Nike-X. The new Chinese bomb, while not vitiating the case against ABM deployment, has led some to advocate a limited ABM defense against this new threat alone. McNamara himself has not indicated agreement, but the Pentagon statement for fiscal 1967 predicts such defenses might remain highly effective against China for some time. This presumes that the Chinese do not develop the more sophisticated offense "for which our antimissile defense would provide a most compelling incentive." McNamara recognizes that, once installed, ABM defenses will be difficult to jettison even if they prove useless; the amount already spent always being advanced as an argument for spending more. In addition he worries about how the decision will affect the arms race and attempts to limit it. While a partial program might blunt the political attacks against the administration on the issue, it might also intensify pressures for a larger ABM system. Although Republican candidates in 1968 might use the "defense-gap" issue as the Democrats used the "missile gap" in 1960, a Secretary of Defense as well informed and articulate as McNamara should dampen much Republican enthusiasm for such a tactic.

## C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

1015
Alexandros, L. [ARMS SUPPLIES AND DEFENSE BUDGETS] Waffenlieferungen und Militärbudgets. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Feb. 10, 1967: 115.
U3. W38, v. 11

Gives data on the Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, and Iraqi Armed Forces: their acquisitions of weapons in 1966, their 1966 defense budgets, and their military assistance received from abroad.

1016
Allen, H.R. THE FUTURE OF BRITAIN'S AIR POWER. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Feb. 1967: 32-36.
U1. R8, v. 112

Suggests that Great Britain's deterrent strategy should be based to a great extent on or under the high seas. Airpower, though the "most important item" in Britain's armory, cannot supersede the necessity of supporting land and sea operations.

1017
[ARMAMENTS INDUSTRIES OF THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE] Die Rüstungsindustrien der neutralen Staaten Europas. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1966: 370-376; no. 6, Nov./Dec.: 462-465. illus.
P&GP RR

Discusses Sweden's defense industry, particularly the state company Förvarets Fabriksverk and the Swedish-controlled, world-wide concern Bofors. The article describes the various kinds of weapons produced by those enterprises, including anti-submarine missiles and naval artillery.

1018
[ATOMIC FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, by XXX] Forces atomiques et forces classiques. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Apr. 1967: 612-617.
D410.R45, v. 23

Currently both the United States and the Soviet Union are establishing complete nuclear systems. The United States and the Soviet Union are both attempting to cover every battlefield situation; both divide their weapons into similar categories; and both are concerned about safeguards against their unleashing. Of special interest in the U.S. system are the cannons and howitzers able to fire conventional as well as nuclear missiles. Aside from equipment belonging to special units, the United States possesses IRBM's, ICBM's, the Polaris, and the B-52 and B-58 strategic bombers. The Soviet Union's nuclear weapons are assembled under the generic designation, "weapons of massive destruction," and are operated generally by the same units as those of the United States. Like the Americans, the Russians possess IRBM's, MRBM's, ICBM's, and heavy and intermediate strategic bombers. In the American as well as the Russian Army special weapons, nuclear and chemical, appear at the divisional level. But while quantitatively the United States seems to favor stabilizing strategic nuclear weapons production, tactical nuclear weapons are proliferating in both camps. Both the United States and the Soviet Union continually stress the efficacy of nuclear weapons at all levels. But while the Pentagon visualizes only a nuclear war or a war under nuclear threat, Moscow insists on coordination of weapons of mass destruction and armored forces at tactical levels. This Soviet doctrine is shared by the satellite countries, which have been given a smaller quantity of launching equipment than the large Soviet units and no nuclear warheads.

1019
Bates, Martin D. ROCKING THE WARSAW PACT BOAT. An Cosantoir; the Irish defense journal, v. 27, Jan. 1967: 33-36. Ul.C8, v. 27

Stresses Soviet difficulties in maintaining cohesion in the Warsaw Pact. Bates points out that most Warsaw Pact members share Rumania's publicly announced view that "the existence of blocs as well as the sending of troops to other countries is an anachronism." Hence the Warsaw Pact declaration of July 5, 1966, calling for the "simultaneous dissolution of the existing military alliances." The author also refers to parallel tendencies in NATO.

1020
BETWEEN ASSISTANCE AND DETERRENCE [editorial] Minority of one, v. 9, Mar. 1967: 2-4.
AP2.M55985, v. 9

The United States constantly applies punitive measures against other countries that aid North Vietnam. However, President Johnson while blaming China for its aid carefully abstains from reprimanding the Soviet Union. The United States is not unhappy about the Soviet attitude and does not regard Soviet military aid as an obstacle to achieving American objectives. Americans are aware that the Soviet leaders cannot adopt a noninterference policy in Vietnam for fear they would lose the allegiance of the Communist camp; they are aware that Russia is using the aid as a propaganda instrument and does not necessarily want to deter the United States from intervention. Thus, for diplomatic reasons America exercises tolerance and ignores Russian aid, although it makes fighting the war much more difficult. At the same time and for the same reason the United States lures the Russians by negotiating various agreements and showing willingness for simultaneous U.S.-Soviet reduction of military forces in Europe. If the guess that Russia decided for practical reasons not to pre-empt American objectives in Vietnam is right, only a direct massive Chinese intervention could prevent U.S. victory. However China is not likely to intervene because it is no longer covered by the Russian nuclear umbrella and must fear enormous destruction in a collision with the United States. Therefore China is unlikely to go to war unless it is provoked and finds war unavoidable. In this situation U.S. provocation could have incalculably dangerous consequences. Presently it seems that the minimum the United States can achieve is a firm establishment of military bases in South Vietnam protected by a friendly and cooperative South Vietnamese Government. Maximal achievement might be the bombing of Chinese nuclear installations in order to prevent China from becoming a nuclear power. If Russia agrees to let the United States achieve its goal in Southeast Asia, it might not interfere even if the United States were to bomb China.

1021
Brand, H. ON "CONTAINMENT" IN ASIA. Dissent, v. 14, Mar./Apr. 1967: 140-144.
HX1.D58, v. 14

What the Johnson administration means by "containing" China is incomprehensible. Not only do the containing forces lack cohesion, but the forces to be contained are far from monolithic and are steadily losing whatever homogeneity they had to begin with. When containment was originally formulated by George Kennan it was a thoughtful, conservative reaction to the Russian expansionism of the 1940's. "Chinese expansionism is a fiction. There is no significant recent history of Chinese territorial aggression." Russia, not China, is giving military aid to Hanoi. Containment assumed that communism was monolithic; this is obviously no longer true. It also presupposes interrelated economies and common civilizational impulses on the part of those engaged in its practice. "The East," however, connotes none of this social and cultural homogeneity. Asia's social structures have been decaying for 150 years. Its ruling classes are generally alienated from the population and are frequently inept and corrupt. Such allies cannot provide a political base for containment comparable to that which was created in Europe after 1947, even if the policy were feasible in the first place. Vietnam demonstrates the failure of containment in Asia: "whatever internal political bases existed there, they rotted away under the very impact of the American presence." Americans often think of themselves as modern Romans, extending welfare standards as the Romans extended citizenship to their subjects. The Romans possessed military superiority, yet were defeated by primitive Germanic tribes. Vietnam may be America's Teutoburg unless Washington draws basic political lessons from the experience. Johnson's new commitments are scarcely cause for optimism. His policies will fail, not because they

carry the threat of world war but because their disastrous results require increasing sacrifices of men and resources. Americans will not long tolerate lack of success stemming from inability to adapt to new conditions.

1022
Brunner, Dominique. [STABILITY OR ARMS RACE] Stabilité ou course aux armements. Revue militaire suisse, v. 112, Feb. 1967: 79-83.
U2.R5, v. 112

The Chinese nuclear explosion in 1966 and the recent Soviet announcement that it is deploying antiballistic missiles (ABM's) prompted hot debate in the United States on the advisability of constructing a U.S. ABM system. The decision is eminently important, because on it and the parallel Soviet decision depends the preservation of nuclear stability between the two countries or its replacement by another arms race. Stability has proved useful in facilitating détente and ensuring the absence of crises conducive to war. What is the sense of spending billions of dollars for partial protection against ever-developing offensive weapons? Would not the development of the most modern and effective means under the present deterrence umbrella be more suitable? For defense against China a light defense system adequate to limit a Chinese attack could be developed in agreement with Russia. Whether Russia is ready for such an agreement is questionable, but the U.S. administration seems ready to seek agreement in order to prevent another arms race. American leaders apparently do not believe that Russia's intention is to build up a defensive system able to substantially reduce American retaliatory capacity.

1023
CAN GERMANY STEER A MIDDLE COURSE BETWEEN FRANCE AND AMERICA? Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 194, Jan. 1967: 26-29. AP4.R2164, 1967

Interview with Gerhard Schröder, former West German Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Minister of Defense, conducted by François Schlosser. According to Defense Minister Schröder West Germany reaffirms interdependent relations between the United States and Europe in the area of national security. Mr. Schröder strongly emphasizes that it is U.S. military might--not the self-made French force de frappe--that will protect Germany and Europe. NATO can meet the needs of European security with "a system integrated for atomic as well as conventional weapons." Germany's interest in nuclear weapons is motivated by a need for a security guarantee based on concerted rather than individual action. West Germany endorses efforts for nonproliferation that would deny potential nuclear powers "the right to individual control" of nuclear weapons.

1024
THE CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTS. Intelligence digest, v. 29, Mar. 1967: 19-20.
D410.R47, v. 29

Despite the apparent state of anarchy existing in Communist China, the crash program of scientific and technological projects continues to succeed. Chinese Army officials take a serious view of nuclear warfare potentialities, but have not undertaken an effective civil defense program. China's industrial and population centers are therefore extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack.

1025
Cho, M.Y. [WHAT DOES PEKING WANT FROM ITS ATOM BOMB?] Was will Peking mit der Atombombe? Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Apr. 1967: 249-253.
D839.A885, v. 18

Sees a paradox between Red China's nuclear armament and its underestimation of the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. Cho thinks that since 1963 Chinese military leadership has feared that the Americans would use tactical nuclear weapons in local conflicts, which may lead to a world war. Hence Peking's restraint policy, exemplified by "the Tonkin crisis in August 1964." Cho maintains that owing to Soviet propaganda the West has been inclined to exaggerate Red China's aggressiveness. However, China's domestic situation may cause its leaders to risk a war.

1026
Coddington, Alan. GAME THEORY, BARGAINING THEORY, AND STRATEGIC REASONING. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 1, 1967: 39-45.
AS9.J6, v. 4

Strategic reasoning must take place, explicitly or implicitly, within some framework, whether this be a formal one or otherwise. It is often assumed that game theory is the only formal framework for strategic analysis. In this paper, however, strategic reasoning is distinguished from its particular bases. It is suggested that formal bases other than the game theoretic one are possible. A number of weaknesses and inadequacies of game theory, both as a direct and as an indirect basis for strategic reasoning, are pointed out. (With a game theoretic model of bargaining processes which in turn serves as a framework for strategic reasoning, game theory forms an indirect basis.) An alternative approach is suggested, involving the idea of a closed loop system; and it is argued that this may serve as a more fruitful basis for strategic reasoning. (Author's summary)

1027
Cogny, René. [MISLED STRATEGY] La stratégie fourvoyée. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 69, Mar. 1967: 13-21. H3.R4, v. 69

Questions the wisdom of General de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO and build up France's own nuclear striking force. Reciprocal deterrence of the two nuclear superpowers established a balance of terror in Europe and prevented a potential nuclear war. Under this balance even a conventional war is not likely to unleash a nuclear disaster. By withdrawing France from NATO De Gaulle deprived his country of adequate protection by American nuclear weapons. France's nuclear power will never be strong enough to deter Russia or any stronger nuclear state from aggression. Besides France will never be able to develop means of escalation that would permit it to use the American concept of flexible response. Its defense system cannot protect it from destruction and would probably involve its population in desperate guerilla warfare. The main reasons for De Gaulle's action were political--a matter of prestige. The consequence of the action is a profound imbalance in the French military system. The pretext of independence has made France abandon the unified defense system and rational use of the modern possibilities of defense.

1028
[THE CRISIS IN GERMAN DEFENSE POLICIES] Die Krise der deutschen Wehrpolitik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 46-55. maps.
U3.W38, v. 11

A study by the Wehr und Wirtschaft Research Group. ("STUDIE I/66 des Forschungskreises Wehr und Wirtschaft.")

The centres of world politics have shifted. By all indications, the political arena of the seventies will be dominated by the battle for the decolonized areas, which have meanwhile become political no-man's-land. The result is that the Americans, who have hitherto been the main guarantors of Western European security, are gradually being forced to devote their attention to acute problems in other parts of the world. This shift in emphasis, however, could give rise to new dangers in Europe, by encouraging the Soviet Union to switch to an offensive policy towards the West again. France's withdrawal from NATO has completely dislocated the Federal Republic's present security system. The old concept based on the Atlantic Pact has become unreliable since a gradual reduction in Allied strength in Europe must be reckoned with. This applies particularly to the Americans. The question which now arises is not whether the Americans want to stay in Europe, but whether they can. It would certainly be more useful from their point of view if they made it far clearer than they have yet done to the Europeans, and in particular the Federal Republic, that they must look after their own security in the seventies. No airlift can make good for the presence of the Americans in Europe. In this situation the Federal Republic will inevitably be forced to bear more of the responsibility for its own security, at the same time taking steps to ensure that its conventional fighting strength can be substantially increased at an economically tolerable cost. The defence of the Federal Republic as frontier country in Western Europe requires a defence system organized on a broad basis, i.e., a return to a strategy of mobilization which would enable militia units to be set up without delay in the event of war. For this purpose it would be necessary to convert five of the present twelve Bundeswehr divisions into training and mobilization units, in which the Bundeswehr reservists, roughly one million strong (whose training has already cost somewhere in the region of 16,000 DM), could find useful military employment. Such, in broad outline, is the subject-matter of the present study. The alternative it puts forward to the Federal Republic's present defence policy is naturally not to be regarded as a patent remedy. It is intended as a basis for examination, like those put forward earlier by Bonin, Schulz and others, and stems from concern for the security and future of our country, which no longer seem to be adequately guaranteed by the defence concept at present in force. (Abstract supplied)

1029
Draper, Theodore. THE AMERICAN CRISIS: VIETNAM, CUBA & THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Commentary, v. 43, Jan. 1967: 27-48.
DS101.C63, v. 43

Examines three recent situations in which the United States has resorted to military force to implement its foreign policy. Draper sees the main segments of a nation's foreign policy as political, economic, and military. While they cannot be completely separated from one another, they are distinguishable and can be used in varying combinations and degrees. As a result of a number of political frustrations and failures, the United States has increasingly resorted to economic and military methods of persuasion, particularly the military. Draper uses a discussion of the Cuban and Dominican Republic crises to introduce a more extended analysis of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Nation is squandering its power by using too much too frequently and too maladroitly, he asserts. Now the United States must "break the sinister cycle of political ineptitude and military intervention."

1030
[EAST OF SUEZ] A l'Est de Suez. Air & cosmos, v. 4, Jan. 28, 1967: 32. P&GP RR

For many months the "East of Suez" policy occupied the minds of British politicians. Some advocated a reduction of expenditures in the area, and others the maintenance or even reinforcement of British commitments. Now for several months the attention of the British Government has been turned toward the countries West of Suez. Southern Arabia will achieve independence in 1968, and Great Britain is not only willing to contribute $51.5 million toward its defense but to take over other responsibilities ensuring its security. Nevertheless the situation in the area is troubled, and British public opinion fails to understand the Government's willingness to take risks. Recently Sir Alec Douglas-Home outlined a constructive strategic program, which was received enthusiastically in certain British circles. The program seeks recall of British forces deployed in Asia and the establishment of a neutral belt to include Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam; a system of collective security throughout Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia; and Britain's participation in an enlarged Australia-New Zealand-U.S. force which would guarantee communication lines in Asia and freedom of the seas. This plan represents, in the opinion of the Conservatives, a substantial modification of present British "East of Suez" strategy.

1031
Eliot, George F. ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY IN LIMITED WARS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 93, Apr. 1967: 52-57. illus.
V1U8, v. 93

Alliance diplomacy in an area as strategically important as South Asia is based on the common interests, responsibilities, and existing capabilities that nations seek to preserve within the scope of a limited-war objective. Preventing a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean area between Southern Arabia and Singapore is such an objective. The compatibility of the existing naval interests and responsibilities of Britain and the United States in this area may lay the foundation for cementing NATO's infrastructure. However, a two-fold problem prevents a smooth operative alliance: the indignation and humility suffered by the British at the hands of the United States in the Skybolt affair, and the reduction of the confrontation threat in the Indian Ocean area. These problems could be remedied with negotiations consistent with British dignity. Economic and military aid to Britain for maintaining its carrier force in the Indian Ocean would be less expensive than a U.S. build-up in this area. Potential tension areas may confront the allies with mutual responsibilities. Should a crisis arise in the Middle East, France could join the United States and Britain in a limited war objective. The net result of this action would instill a new sense of unity in NATO.

1032
Eliot, George F. ROBERT MCNAMARA AND THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DECISION. National review, v. 19, Feb. 21, 1967: 189, 196-197.
AP2. N3545, v. 19

Argues against the principle of civilian "overlordship" in a shooting war. Eliot attributes the ebbing public confidence in the conduct of the Vietnam War to McNamara's failure to give military leaders due credit and support. The persistent notion that the professional judgment of military leaders should be kept under tight civilian control prevents the United States from making full use of its skilled and experienced military talent.

1033
Freistetter, Franz. [THE GENERAL WORLD SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1967] Die allgemeine Weltlage zu Beginn 1967. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, Jan./Feb. 1967: 1-7. map.
P&GP RR

Reviews the military and political situation of the world, particularly Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Near East, pointing out locations of acute and potential crises. Freistetter analyzes the strength of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The article includes statistical data on the armed forces and weapons systems of the United States, the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic, Italy, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

1034
Gasteyger, Curt. [PROBLEMS AND REFORM IN THE WARSAW PACT] Probleme und Reformen des Warschauer Pakts. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Jan. 10, 1967: 1-10. D839. E86, v. 22

Considers the Warsaw Pact an important instrument of consolidation of the Soviet bloc at a time when the bloc's cohesion is being loosened by the disparate policies of its members. Gasteyger points out the dependence of member states on Soviet weapon systems, including missiles, describes the latest changes in Soviet strategic thinking, and predicts a possible reorganization of the Pact that would aim at achieving European security based on East-West cooperation.

1035
Gerasimov, G. BIBLE FOR THE HAWKS. New times, no. 12, Mar. 22, 1967: 33-34.
D839. N483, 1967

Gen. Nathan Twining's book Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York, 1966) expresses the thinking of American reactionary elements. The General divides the world into "bad" and "good" people, and the Communists are of course in the latter category. Being bad, they must be eliminated. Unfortunately the U.S. Government has neglected this task, either through negligence or cowardice, not having taken into consideration the advice of the General and other experts. The Government's gravest error was the demobilization of the U.S. Army after the Second World War. Later Washington showed a deplorable indecision in not using atomic weapons in Korea, in preventing the General from taking drastic measures against Castro, and recently in showing the same lack of determination in Vietnam. The policy of reducing the number of bombers and replacing them with ballistic missiles is also erroneous. U.S. leaders are infatuated with theorizing, which represents a danger to the nation's security. In the General's view the United States should produce the greatest possible number of weapons; it should neither indulge in "creeping disarmament" nor participate in disarmament negotiations. The conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty was a mistake, and there is no reason why the United States could not use the outer space for military purposes. He totally rejects the concept of limited war, for his view of war represents merely the fantasy world of war games.

1036
Gilbert, Pierre Eugène. [ACTORS AND SPECTATORS IN THE VIETNAMESE DRAMA] Acteurs et spectateurs du drame vietnamien. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 69, Jan. 1967: 21-33.
H3. R4, v. 69

Examines the attitudes of China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the population of North and South Vietnam toward the Vietnamese War. China hopes that the pressure of public opinion will force the U.S. Government to seek peace. The President of the United States will not capitulate unless he is sure that the subversion in South Vietnam will cease. The Soviet Union is not likely to move and seems to have a tacit agreement with the United States that the solution of the Vietnamese War should be a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements. In North Vietnam the pro-Chinese faction seems to weaken, but the Government has the country under control. The South Vietnamese are undisciplined and anarchistic, but seem not to want Communist control. The author proposes that a solution of the Vietnamese War might be wrought by joint diplomatic action to stimulate negotiations, control of South Vietnam by U.N. forces, and neutralization of Vietnam. In exchange China could be offered admission to the United Nations and its Security Council, assurance of a search for an adequate solution to the Formosa problem, and "peaceful coexistence." Finally the author deplores the fact that France by its policy of disengagement lost the opportunity to play the role of mediator for which it was naturally destined by tradition and experience. Perhaps France still will be able to put its good relations with the Communist countries at the disposition of this worthy cause.

1037
Gittings, John. WILL CHINA FIGHT? Far Eastern economic review, v. 55, Mar. 2, 1967: 360-362, 403.
HC411. F18, v. 55

Analyzes the credibility of Communist China's threatened intervention in Vietnam. The fluctuations in Chinese pledges, Gittings feels, reflect shifts in policy brought about by the cultural revolution and by developments in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Therefore China's commitment should be viewed with some skepticism. Strategic realities and the threat of a U.S. victory might compel China to intervene if asked to, but there is no evidence it is "eagerly awaiting the call."

1038
Gownley, Hugh J. [GERMAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN LOGISTICS] Deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit in der Logistik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Feb. 10, 1967: 113-114.
U3. W38, v. 11

From the early days of the reactivation of the modern German armed forces within the NATO framework in 1956 it became apparent to both German and

American defence authorities that a cooperative logistics system was going to be necessary to support these forces in a state of operational readiness, particularly in view of the fact that so much of the Bundeswehr's equipment was of American origin. First steps in this direction were undertaken in the spring of 1961, and the first Cooperative Logistics Agreement between Germany and the United States was signed in October of that year. Since then the agreement has been renewed several times. The American contribution to this support covers six main areas. Supply support for most of the German Army's U.S. -produced weapons systems is handled through the U.S. Army supply system in the United States and in Europe in exactly the same way as support for U.S. Army units, with the two Armies being given equal priority at the various levels. Over 180,000 requisitions were processed during fiscal years 1961-66, over 200,000 are expected between 1967 and 1970. Training support has covered the sharing of training facilities for the German Army and Air Force in the United States. So far over 21,000 students from the German armed forces have been trained in the USA, and a substantial amount of training time has been provided for the German Army at U.S. training areas in Europe. Procurement support granted in connection with German equipment purchases from the USA include aid in contract negotiation, inspection, quality control and similar services. Maintenance support has made U.S. Army maintenance facilities in Germany available to overhaul, repair and rebuild American equipment used by the German forces. Here again German needs receive the same attention as American. Under this programme over 50 major types of equipment are maintained for the German Army. Similarly, storage and administrative space is also shared wherever practical. Finally, a cooperative research and development programme brings together top engineers and scientists from the two countries on such projects as the main battle tank and VTOL aircraft for the 1970s. (Abstract supplied)

1039
Halperin, Morton H. CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY. Boston, Little, Brown [1967] 156 p.
U162.H26

Contents.--The role of force in the nuclear age.--Warfare in the nuclear age.--Qualitative and quantitative research methods.--The evolution of American military strategy.--Soviet military strategy.--Chinese military strategy.--General war: the strategy of controlled response.--Limited war: the nature of the limiting process.--Deterrence and defense in Europe.--NATO nuclear relations.--Deterrence and defense in Asia.--Counter-insurgency: the challenge of revolutionary war.--Arms control: approaches and issues.--Index.

Outlines recent changes in the nature of military technology and the subsequent impact of these changes on international politics. Halperin evaluates the research techniques, particularly the quantitative ones, developed to cope with the novel and formidable problems of the nuclear age. He traces the evolution of American, Soviet, and Chinese strategy in the post-war period and then focuses on specific strategic situations. The book purports to examine the role of force in international politics with the assumption that "force does continue to play a role despite the development of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles." An abstract of the author's chapter on arms control appears elsewhere in this issue.

1040
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Die Allianz, Amerika und die Bundesrepublik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 26-27.
U3.W38, v. 11

With or without France, NATO still constitutes--perhaps because of de Gaulle's pragmatic policies--the political backbone of the Western nations. Always assuming, of course, that the American atomic guarantee is reliable, since this is the decisive deterrent factor on which the alliance is ultimately dependent. European doubts about the dependability of American atomic backing have been repeatedly nurtured by the United States itself. The McNamara committee has done nothing to remove these doubts, since the American prescription for Europe amounts to total nuclear abstinence. Small wonder, then, that the Federal Republic is beginning to examine the whole question of territorial security afresh. The various remedies proposed all stem from concern about the disproportion between defence costs and fighting strength, from the fear that our defence set-up may be too vulnerable, that the million trained reservists may not be used, and above all that the only mission the Bundeswehr can perform is deterrence. Nobody wants war, of course, but many are concerned about a defence concept whose sole object is to prevent war and which thus stakes the security of the country on a single card. (Abstract supplied)

1041
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [DÉTENTE, NONPROLIFERATION, DEFENSE POLICY] Entspannung, Nonproliferation, Wehrpolitik. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Feb. 10, 1967: 102-103.
U3.W38, v. 11

If West Germany is to seek détente with East Europe, its security requires the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe and American and British troops in Germany. However the financial burden to Germany of offsetting the costs of these troops is too great and cannot be carried on comparably after the present agreements with the United States and Great Britain expire. An equitable cost sharing method must be found in any new agreement. The presence of American troops in Germany is also important to the United States. The current East-West détente in Europe might well end if the Soviets take a more aggressive attitude toward West Europe. With West European security unsettled, the United States would have difficulty coping with the growing Red Chinese challenge in Asia or Peking's threat to America's own security. A treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will be disadvantageous to the nonnuclear powers if it restricts in any way their peaceful use of nuclear energy, or politically or technically subjugates the nonnuclear states and retards their technological development. Moreover it must be accompanied by a commitment from the nuclear powers to freeze their atomic armaments at the present level and abstain from the further development of nuclear weapons. Standing alone "the German Federal Republic will not be able to refuse signing" an unsatisfactory agreement, but together the nonnuclear powers can press for an adequate treaty.

1042
Hiscocks, Richard. REARMAMENT. In his The Adenauer era. Philadelphia, Lippincott [1966] p. 207-208.
DD259.7.A3A5

Outlines the history of West German rearmament since 1949. Hiscocks discusses the integration of the West German Armed Forces with NATO and appraises Adenauer's policy with regard to the German reunification problem, Polish-German boundaries, the Atlantic alliance, the Franco-German Pact, and West German relations with East Europe.

1043
Hofacher, Peter. [SWITZERLAND'S MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND NEUTRALITY. NUCLEAR ARMS ACQUISITION AND "MILITARY" COOPERATION WITH OTHER STATES AS RELATED TO THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY] Wehrbereitschaft und Neutralitat der Schweiz. Neutralitätsrechtliche Aspekte einer Atomwaffenbeschaffung und einer "militärischen" Zusammenarbeit mit andern Staaten. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Feb. 1967: 65-69.
U3. A43, v. 133
Bibliographical footnotes.

In contrast to the usual sense of neutrality, which falls merely under general international law and restricts its bearer's conduct only in wartime, Switzerland's perpetual neutrality obliges her also to follow certain passive and active kinds of behavior in peacetime. She must abstain from doing anything that could reasonably induce a third state's doubt about her determination to remain neutral in a "forthcoming war." She is also obliged to undertake, as far as she can, all necessary steps to keep credence in her future wartime neutrality unimpaired. That duty "is a correlate of the recognition" of her neutrality and integrity by other states. The credence requirement can be satisfied only by Switzerland's total defense preparedness. Her neutrality precludes her from political or military dependence upon other states to secure her defense capability. Total defense preparedness implies the ability to answer any military threat or attack by adequate weapons. The role of nuclear arms in modern warfare makes it mandatory for Switzerland to acquire such weapons, if she is to fulfill her role under the law of neutrality. Having her own uranium deposits and technology Switzerland is quite able to embark on production of nuclear arms. Testing nuclear weapons domestically may present some problems due to the fact that under the test ban treaty Switzerland renounced conducting experimental nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and under water. A solution may lie in purely technical, nonmilitary cooperation with some other country. Legally Switzerland is free to train her troops and test her weapons in any consenting country. If she chooses to do so, by taking certain precautions she may guarantee that the law of neutrality is not violated. For instance she may eschew any contact between the Swiss troops and those of the host country, as well as establishing extraterritorial access routes for transporting of Swiss troops and arms to and from the training and testing grounds.

1044
HOW TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR WAR: WARNING TO AMERICANS BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. U.S. news & world report, v. 62, May 15, 1967: 31-33.
JK1. U65, v. 62
The text of the Joint Chiefs' statement follows the article.

In a statement to the House Appropriations Committee on March 6, 1967, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, openly challenges the judgment of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and warns that the United States openly risks nuclear war by failing to deploy an antimissile defense system. His statement notes that Russia's missile power is growing rapidly and that their antimissile deployment has begun. The Joint Chiefs unanimously favor Nike-X deployment for military bases and 25 major population centers. Because they feel the issue is so crucial they have decided to take their case directly to Congress and the American people. The cost of the system does not concern McNamara so much as an overwhelming desire to avoid a renewed arms race with Russia. However his critics argue that permitting Russia to close the gap in nuclear power so as to achieve parity and ease its fears of U.S. attack openly invites a Soviet first strike. General Wheeler argues that contrary to McNamara's statement on its effectiveness, missile defense would save 40-50 million American lives.

1045
IN THE FAR EAST. American opinion, v. 10, Mar. 1967: 53-54. AP2. 04732, v. 10

If Lenin were alive today he would be pleased with his successors' application of his strategy of defeating the West in the Far East. Throughout the whole area revolutionary unrest is in progress. In Japan internal struggles necessitated calling for national elections 10 months before they were due. Sino-Japanese economic relations are growing, to the great satisfaction of China. It seems that now, when the war rages in Vietnam and the cultural revolution troubles Red China, the time has come for the United States to give Chiang Kai-shek his opportunity to exploit the explosive situation on the Chinese mainland. In Washington the experts believe Chiang Kai-shek engages in wishful thinking. Instead, they should reconsider their views and not accept the Communist propaganda uncritically. The most dangerous wishful thinking about China is that the Red leaders will mellow and accept a kind of "peaceful coexistence" if the United States restrains Chiang Kai-shek from aggression. The present situation in China does not allow such hopes. What is emerging there is not a moderate but a more militant leadership, one which will pursue a tougher and more aggressive policy under Lin Piao's rule. The fact that Chou En-lai can remain Lin Piao's close collaborator and supporter while advocating a reconciliation with Russia indicates that an agreement between China and the Soviet Union is to be expected. Obviously the "International Communist Conspiracy," through Russian and Chinese aid to North Vietnam and widespread propaganda and subversion activities in Thailand, Laos, the Philipines, New Guinea, and other Far Eastern areas, is setting the stage for a compromise agreement in Vietnam unfavorable to the United States.

1046
IS CIVIL DEFENCE THE WAY TO PREVENT WAR? International civil defence, no. 139, Jan. 1967: 1-5.
UA926. I488, 1967

Review of Civil Defence, a collection of papers and proceedings from a symposium held by the Committee on Council Affairs of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Berkeley, Dec. 1965). The participants explored the arguments for and against civil defense, the medical and biological factors involved in recovery from nuclear attack, the effects of nuclear attacks on agriculture, and the general overall effectiveness of civil defense measures. The reviewer summarizes the conclusions of the symposium as follows: "(a) Civil Defence measures may be of some value in very small nuclear attacks, (b) Civil Defence

systems must nevertheless be extremely large and costly, (c) These systems are as likely to be a liability as a benefit in a large war, which we could have no certainty of surviving in any case."

1047
Jacobs, Walter D. SECOND PLACE IN THE ARMS RACE. National review, v. 19, Feb. 21, 1967: 186-189. AP2. N3545, v. 19

In his 6 years in office Secretary of Defense McNamara has rendered the Nation incapable of successfully waging either low-intensity, mid-intensity, or high-intensity warfare. The overall effect of his tenure has been to put the United States in second place in the arms race. In Vietnam, a prime example of low-intensity war, the superb performance of American fighting men has been severely hampered by the political constraints imposed by Washington. The troop buildup was wasteful and chaotic with prodigious foulups in logistics among other mismanagement. The U.S. disadvantage in mid-intensity warfare is vividly reflected in the situation in Europe where, if war occurs, the enemy will have more divisions available locally than will the NATO powers. The credibility of U.S. high-intensity war capability is suspect for many reasons: the cutback in planned missile deployment, failure to provide for an advanced manned strategic aircraft, current strategic monologues directed at the Soviet Union, and support of the test ban treaty and nonproliferation concepts. The professional military has been ignored, muzzled, and taunted to the detriment of morale. McNamara's gravest error is probably his refusal to deploy a U.S. antiballistic missile defense--a discussion that leaves the Soviet Union better prepared for nuclear war than this Nation. U.S. defense policies based on the Communists' alleged rationality and hatred of war and on Soviet-U.S. cooperation should be abandoned. McNamara must change his policies to meet the Soviet threat, or resign in favor of someone who will.

1048
Johnson, Chalmers. LIN PIAO'S ARMY AND ITS ROLE IN CHINESE SOCIETY. Current scene, v. 4, July 1, 1966: 1-10; July 15: 1-10. P&GP RR

Reveals the extent to which the Chinese People's Liberation Army "intervenes in domestic politics probably more than any other armed force in the world today, including those in nations openly ruled by their armies." The People's Liberation Army is the physical apparatus of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of revolution called the "people's war."

1049
Klass, Philip J. STRENGTHENED U.S. ICBM FORCES TO OFFSET SOVIET MISSILE DEFENSE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 86, Feb. 6, 1967: 27-28. TL501.A8, v. 86

Secretary Robert S. McNamara's current defense posture statement to Congress underlines his belief that antimissile defenses are not the answer to reported Soviet antiballistic missile [ABM] deployment. He believes that the United States should strengthen its strategic offensive forces "beyond the capabilities of any defense system." In support of his anti-ABM stand, he argues that population centers can not be protected from ICBM attacks. Secretary McNamara also feels the Soviets would respond to U.S. ABM deployment with more ICBM's or better penetration aids for their existing missiles. Both ABM defense configurations--light defense and higher-density defense--were outlined in the statement. The limited defense, which is built around the Sprint missile, would cost about $9.9 billion; the more extensive one about $19.4 billion. Rather than undertake this kind of program, Secretary McNamara favors new strategic missile systems, even though the United States leads the Soviet Union in missile quantities. He emphasizes that it is the character of the payload, not the delivery vehicle, that counts. This has been taken as a veiled reference to the multiple-warhead concept. The threat presented by Communist China is insufficient to warrant deploying Nike-X against it.

1050
Lavergne, Bernard. [AMERICAN LEADERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISFORTUNES OF WEST GERMANY, WHICH MUST DRASTICALLY REVISE ITS FOREIGN POLICY] Les dirigeants américains responsables des malheurs de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest qui devra faire une révision déchirante de sa politique extérieure. L'année politique et économique, v. 39, Dec. 1966: 369-377. D410.A6, v. 39

Undoubtedly the United States is responsible for the misfortunes of West Germany. In 1948 the U.S. monetary reform inadvertently established the "Deutsche Mark" in the tri-zone without Soviet consent, and thus divided Germany and created a problem which plagues the world to the present time. Another American mistake was helping the Germans to rearm, thereby stimulating the renaissance of nazism. America maintained the Germans in the illusion that Bonn will one day retake East Germany and extend its territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line. Germany's primary concern is the danger of Soviet aggression. But since Stalin's death the Russians have shown no desire to attack Germany. Recently even the Americans have ceased to consider Russia a danger and continued with NATO in Europe only to keep Europe under control. Presently Americans are afraid of China and may try to destroy the Chinese nuclear installations. That, of course, would be another grave error. It would involve the United States in a long war which would probably last until the Chinese destroy 50 to 100 million Americans with their intercontinental missiles. Furthermore Germans must realize that Russia will never allow West Germany to hold nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. refusal to give them some is definitive. Even if they turn to France, De Gaulle's refusal is also certain. Furthermore Germany should decide to accept the Oder-Neisse line. The territory beyond the line is not necessary for Germany and is inhabited by Slavic people whom Bismarck failed to Germanize. The acceptance, while painful, is unavoidable, because certainly the United States will not risk a war to force Poland to return territory to Germany. Furthermore West Germany's recognition of East Germany might represent the first step toward a Confederation within which lasting ties could develop between the two German states. Although these decisions are hard to make, they will serve Germany's best interests. And if Germany returns to its 19th-century cultural traditions, it will be loved by all again.

1051
Locke, Katherine D., Edwin A. Locke, and Lois R. Dean. A COMPARISON OF THE ATTITUDES OF CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. Journal of applied behavioral science, v. 2, Oct./Dec. 1966: 413-430. H1.J53, v. 2

Discusses results of a questionnaire designed to test the hypothesis that differences in attitudes between local community leaders and local civil defense directors are partly responsible for lack of progress on local civil defense programs. Civil defense directors were found to have more confidence in the role of individuals to influence national problems, greater distrust for Communists and outsiders, more positive feelings on the likelihood of war, and more confidence in the value of civil defense generally. The study also found that the most successful civil defense directors came from larger cities and were more "professionalized."

1052
Lorince, Gabriel. CRISIS IN THE WARSAW PACT. New statesman, v. 73, Feb. 10, 1967: 176-177.
AP4. N64, v. 73

While Premier Kosygin has been in London, Leonid Brezhnev has attempted to patch the growing rift in the Warsaw Pact. This rift was felt in the straitening of relations between East Germany and Rumania after the latter agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. In fact the real reason for the difference is not the establishment of German-Rumanian relations, but a clash of interests between the northern and southern members of the Warsaw Pact Organization [WAPO]. Last summer Rumania raised the question of the cost of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, demanded more command posts for non-Soviet generals, and requested a bigger say in the deployment and possible use of atomic weapons. These demands were bitterly resented by the northern Communist countries, which rely on the Warsaw Pact for protection from the revenge-seeking Bonn, although they have been favorably received by the southerners. While the Rumanian demand that all military blocs be abolished was countered by Russia (the Soviets seek military integration within the Pact and unity in the Communist camp), it started a disintegration of WAPO just as France's withdrawal endangered NATO.

1053
Luchsinger, Fred. TWO KINDS OF ATLANTIC POLICY. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, Apr. 1967: 1-2.
D839. S9, v. 17

Bonn's stress on Franco-German relations and Washington's on American-Soviet accord on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control portend a further loosening of the Atlantic alliance to the benefit of Soviet-American bilateralism. Washington's failure to consult its nonnuclear European allies promptly upon reaching a Soviet-American understanding on nonproliferation "confirms once again . . . that in basic questions of global security, especially in nuclear policy and strategy, Washington operates singly and independently according to its own interests as a big power." Europe has obviously failed to lend its part of the Atlantic alliance a weight measuring up to the American. Washington's new decision to slow down the gradual reduction of American troop strength in Europe may have been motivated to avoid aggravating European resentment over the approaching "discriminatory nonproliferation treaty." But discussion in Washington of the American engagement in Europe displays a certain skepticism about the "big lift idea." U.S. thinking thus begins to stand on more realistic grounds and may foreshadow a new overhauling of American strategy. In any case the European part in the alliance cannot be adequately played as long as the Continent does not speak with a strong, "concerted chorus."

1054
McNamara, Robert S. MCNAMARA'S PLAN FOR DEFENDING THE U.S. IN A NUCLEAR AGE. U.S. news & world report, v. 62, Feb. 6, 1967: 38-39.
JK1. U65, v. 62

Excerpts from a "statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, which was made public on Jan. 26, 1967."

A discussion by the U.S. Defense Secretary of the threat to the United States posed by the Soviet Union, of Red China's nuclear capability, and of the U.S. plans for countering these Communist dangers by granting overriding priority to offensive forces. McNamara explains his reasons for opposing the deployment of a U.S. antiballistic missile system, but asserts that if negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the ABM race fail, the deployment decision will be reconsidered.

1055
McNamara, Robert S. SECRETARY MCNAMARA COMMENTS ON RISKS OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Mar. 20, 1967: 442-447.
JX232. A33, v. 56

"Transcript of an interview with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara by James Mossman of the British Broadcasting Company's television program 'Panorama,' which was videotaped at Washington on February 15," 1967.

An analysis in which McNamara expresses his disapproval of American antiballistic missile deployment on the basis of cost effectiveness. Beyond that, the Secretary asserts, such deployment "would actually increase the risk to both of the parties [the United States and the Soviet Union] were they to deploy antiballistic-missile systems." McNamara explains his view of the reason the Soviets have chosen to deploy an ABM system and shows how an increase in American offensive capability will offset Soviet ABM deployment more effectively than a response in kind. He also touches on the ABM's potential for countering a Chinese nuclear threat and its effect on nuclear proliferation.

1056
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [THE LAUGHING THIRD] Der lachende Dritte. Politische Meinung, v. 11, Nov./Dec. 1966: 67-74.
H5. P75, v. 11

The implications of Peking's role in Asia render somewhat paradoxical the bloc alliances and the interbloc enmity that crystallized there after the Second World War, for China's expansionist aspirations focus both toward Southeast Asia for certain raw materials and toward Siberia for old Chinese territories. An American-Soviet alliance against China seems to be unlikely, however. It will be years before China is militarily able to invade Soviet Siberia. On the other hand Peking, through its "indirect strategy," is already able to pose a real threat to the West in Southeast Asia. A prolonged Sino-American struggle in the form of guerrilla wars would substantially weaken the United States and China to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Any Sino-Soviet military confrontation over Siberia must necessarily rely on land forces. In contrast a Sino-American war would largely involve sea and air operations. The problem for the United States would be to penetrate China's mainland--a virtually impossible task in terms of logistics, costs, and

natural conditions that favor simultaneous mass invasion of Southeast Asia by Red China. Yet for the United States there is no way to stop the Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia but war. Soon China's lack of certain raw materials will be too critical for its industrialization to proceed any further without Chinese control over developed raw-material sources (e.g., zinc) in Southeast Asia. A possible neutralization of the region by Sino-American agreement would postpone the Chinese expansion but not stop it. As an alternative to war the United States could concentrate on protecting South Korea and the "island chain" of Okinawa, the Philippines, and Formosa against possible Chinese invasion. These islands constitute a bridge between China and Indonesia, the door to Australia. Such a strategy would require Washington to reconcile itself to Peking's dominant position in all Asia as well as to Chinese nuclear armaments. But it would enable the best utilization in that part of the world of existing American military preponderance on the sea and in the air. Another alternative would be preventive nuclear attack on China, with all its unforeseeable consequences.

1057
Nehnevajsa, Jiri. THE CIVIL DEFENSE DISCOURSE. EMO national digest, v. 7, Feb. 1967: 8-12, 21.
P&GP RR

Text of an address given November 1966 in Arnprior, Ont., at the Provincial Co-ordinators' Conference.

Considers civil defense measures that reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's weapons as much "an integral part . . . of the national and continental defense posture" as are arms control and disarmament measures. Nehnevajsa describes the difficulties of making choices between defense options and of adequate planning for emergency situations. He comments on various sets of arguments against civil defense planning, such as the impossibility of thermonuclear war occurring, the futility of defense against nuclear attack, the cost of civil defense programs, the questionable desirability of life after nuclear attack, and the adverse effects of civil defense planning on progress in international arms control and disarmament. He concludes that "the wisdom to learn to cope with the man-made dangers" of his environment need not contradict man's serious efforts toward peace.

1058
[THE NEXT WORLD WAR IS IN SIGHT; editorial] La prochaine guerre mondiale est en vue. Ordre français, v. 11, Jan. 1967: 1-5.
DC1. 072, v. 11

Undoubtedly the explosion of the Chinese bomb has increased the possibility of another world war. China is not likely to forget the humiliations inflicted by the white man. It adopted communism and combined it with nationalism for the sole purpose of gaining a better position for revenge. The present changes in China will not bring about a new regime for Mao is using the cultural revolution mainly to get rid of his opponents. In this situation the yellow peril is imminent, and China's intention to start a war obvious. The question is: How will China do it? Because of its ideological differences with Russia, its aim to regain the Siberian territories from Russia, and its determination to become a leader of the Communist movement, China cannot count on Soviet support. Japan, although ethnically affiliated, does not seem disposed to extend anything more than economic assistance. Thus China, being aware that the United States is now perfectly able to destroy its nuclear installations, must wait until its intercontinental missiles are ready for use. In the meantime China is likely to expand its influence to the sparsely populated countries of Australia and South America, using the former to dominate the Pacific area and establishing military bases in the northern part of the latter. As soon as the state of its nuclear weapons development will allow, China will simultaneously attack the United States and Russia. Probably the conflict will start as a nuclear war and degenerate into a bacteriological one. The destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons will unleash a subversive racial war in the United States, an autonomist movement in Eastern Europe, an automatic reunification of Germany, Chinese infiltration of Africa, where the Sino-Soviet rivalry will foment war. Conflicts in the Middle East will inevitably follow. As Western Europe will be too weak to fight, it may stay out of the conflict; if this happens French independence from the American-Russian alliance may prove valuable.

1059
[NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY. A DISCOURSE] Atomare Bewaffnung und internationale Politik. Ein Gespräch. Dokumente; Zeitschrift für übernationale Zusammenarbeit, v. 23, Apr. 1967: 123-132. H5. D65, v. 23

Translation of a discussion published in the February 1967 issue of La table ronde (Paris).
AP20. T3

Considers the strategic and political implications of nuclear arms and armaments, including their deterrent role and their stabilizing effect on world peace. The article is a transcription of a round table discussion among the following: writer Jacques de Bourbon Busset; director of the French Institute for Strategic Studies Gen. André Beaufre; president of the French Institute for Military Science Gaston Bouthoul; and French sociologist Léo Hamon.

1060
O'Ballance, Edgar. VIET CONG STRATEGY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 96, July/Sept. 1966: 189-194.
U1. U5, v. 96

General Giap, the mastermind of the Communist war effort in Vietnam, is following a predictable pattern of Asian guerrilla warfare. Basically it consists of terrorism, persuasion, elusiveness, ambush, and set-piece attack. Victory was in sight for the Viet Cong until American troops poured into the nation to begin counter-actions. American aerial activity severely hampers General Giap's operations by limiting his quantities of men and arms and restricting his freedom of movement in the countryside. The deadly American "search and destroy" strategy has introduced elements of surprise and mobility that were for so long the monopoly of the guerrillas. General Giap, "a prisoner of his own guerrilla experiences," is not able to make last minute alterations in his plans or react quickly to the unexpected. The Viet Cong may be forced to drop back a stage in guerrilla warfare and concentrate primarily on self-preservation, resulting in smaller formations and fewer harassing activities. If they refuse to take this step, the Viet Cong, like the Communists in Greece, "may crack suddenly and the movement disintegrate."

1061
Polzin, E. B. [COMMUNIST CHINA AND WORLD PEACE] La Chine communiste et la paix du monde. Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, v. 44, Oct./Dec. 1966: 352-353.
JX3. R37, v. 44

Chinese leaders feel that a Sino-American conflict is unavoidable and hope that when it happens Russia will come to their aid. However they will not ask for Russian help, for fear they will again fall under Russian tutelage. This danger has been aggravated by recent indications that Russia wants to rule the world in connivance with the United States, which have convinced the Chinese they themselves must plan to wage war simultaneously against the two powers. Although the idea seems more absurd than Hitler's plan to defeat all the great powers of his time, the Chinese appear undeterred by the catastrophic consequences of such a war. They still think that even in the nuclear age political problems must be solved by arms and wars; this is why China represents a real danger to world peace. This danger must be checked while there is still time. How to halt it is an open question to which the politicians of East and West should devote their thoughts and attention.

1062
Powell, John Enoch. THE OPIATE OF DETERRENCE. Spectator, v. 218, Mar. 31, 1967: 364.
AP4. S7, v. 218

Every generation apparently needs an opiate to save it from the necessity of seriously contemplating future war. Between the First and Second World Wars this opiate was collective security; today it is deterrence. The "opiate of deterrence" is most appealing to nations that are essentially defensive or nonaggressive and therefore see no special advantage in disturbing the existing territorial or political balance. Believing that war is impossible is most comforting and most necessary to such nations, and they attribute their own lack of aggressiveness to other nations and grossly oversimplify the possibilities of future disturbances. In a recent Parliamentary debate the Secretary of State opined that if war should break out in Europe Russia would immediately use nuclear weapons. Since Britain's purpose is to prevent war from breaking out, "the deterrent value of our current posture gives us greater security than any attempt to raise the nuclear threshold, which might tempt the other side to risk a conflict staying wholly conventional." Yet it is difficult to believe that a nation with Russia's overwhelming conventional superiority in Europe would reject this option in favor of instant nuclear warfare. Furthermore the second part of the argument destroys the first, "for it argues that the weaker are one's conventional forces, the surer the deterrent, because the plainer is one's reliance on it." In the same speech the Secretary of State asserted that a prolonged conventional war could inflict damage as severe as that resulting from a nuclear exchange. This, he claimed, is an option unacceptable to any of Britain's European allies. Actually the European allies do not have this option. The real question is whether the United States would find damage to the continent as difficult to bear as damage to its own territory from a strategic nuclear exchange. In either case, to base deterrence on the belief that conventional war is impossible represents sheer fantasy.

1063
Ra'anan, Uri. ROOTING FOR MAO. New leader, v. 50, Mar. 13, 1967: 6-10.
HX1. N37, v. 50

Among other available material, the speeches of Chinese leaders indicate the probable trend of Peking's foreign and military policies if one or another of the contestants in the current upheaval wins. The competing factions have coalesced into two major groups divided over such vital issues as China's future military posture, the options in Vietnam, and the choice of main enemy--whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union. Within the Army, the "professional" faction, led by Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, regards as highly probable an early military confrontation with the United States. This group advocates a modern, sophisticated, relatively small, and highly mobile army, equipped and trained with Soviet assistance--thereby necessitating at least a limited reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. The other military group, "political" or "guerrilla" officers, is headed by Defense Minister Lin Piao, and opposes "unity of action" on the grounds that it would give the Soviet Union dangerous control over China's military and political moves. It maintains that early war with the West is improbable, particularly if China refrains from direct involvement in guerrilla struggles. The arguments between the rival military factions are reflected in similar conflicts among top civilian leaders. Lui Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-ping urge limited reconciliation with the Soviet Union, primarily for economic and political reasons. Opposing this group in the bureaucracy was P'eng Chen (later purged by Mao), who warned that the Soviet Union is totally unreliable and the West enormously strong, and that military confrontation should be avoided at any cost. The domestic fanaticism of Mao's and Lin's associates has little or no bearing on their foreign policy, which is extremely cautious and isolationist rather than interventionist. The West has many sound reasons to hope for a victory of the Mao faction.

1064
Raven, Wolfram von. [DISMANTLING DETERRENCE: THE NATO CRISIS AND GERMAN SECURITY POLICY] Demontage der Abschreckung: Die NATO-Krise und die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Dec. 1966: 623-628. U3. W396, v. 15

Each nation's security policy must not only protect it from foreign aggression but also guard "the spiritual foundations of its very existence." It is in this latter area that nations display their strongest egoism and intransigence in safeguarding their interests. Germany's NATO membership is by no means dictated by love of the Organization but by the nation's security interests. The principal question is the extent of protection provided by NATO against Soviet attack. Soviet strategy toward West Europe, especially West Germany, has been offensive; their strategy toward the United States, defensive. Europe's strategic situation does not lend itself to a limited conflict in the least. All of the 42 such conflicts since the end of World War II have taken place in strategically marginal zones. The continent's crucial position renders it imperative that any nuclear deterrence designed to protect West Europe be "total." Hence the tendencies within NATO toward "disintegration, denuclearization, and disengagement" must be viewed as dismantling the existing nuclear deterrent that prevents Soviet aggression toward West Europe. The expected reduction of American troops in Europe is tantamount to a reduced guarantee of automatic American response to any aggression against NATO allies. As of now Bonn is impotent to stop progressive dismantling of the Western deterrent in Europe. It renounced producing nuclear weapons years ago. The renunciation, of course, implied

the principle of rebus sic stantibus; but this currently has "only theoretical and, at best, tactical value." Bonn's best course would be to reduce the numerical strength of its Armed Forces and divert the funds thus saved to the research and development indispensible to the nation's security policy of the seventies. A defense policy so altered would demonstrate to the world West Germany's reorientation toward East-West détente.

1065
Rivers, L. Mendel. RIVERS SEES NUCLEAR SURFACE FLEET FOR U.S. NAVY AS 'INEVITABLE.' Navy, v. 10, Apr. 1967: 14-19. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 10

Throughout its history the United States has been a maritime power, and Congress has taken a great deal of interest in maritime posture and naval power. Congress took the lead in promoting the two outstanding components of U.S. naval power today: the nuclear submarine and the Polaris missile. In recent years the Committee on Armed Services has been particularly interested in the "Fast Deployment Logistics" ship, the rate of replacement for aging ships, and the use of nuclear power in surface vessels. The Navy's first nuclear-powered task force recently cruised 30,000 miles around the world without any logistic support, clearly demonstrating its significant wartime advantages. Opponents of nuclear surface vessels argue the additional cost does not justify the advantage gained. However, considering long-range fuel and logistic support costs, the expenditure above that for conventionally powered ships is not great. Congress is convinced that nuclear power is inevitable; Department of Defense leaders will become convinced of this, too, particularly when Congress gives them "a little push toward inevitability."

1066
Roy Chowdhury, Subrata. MILITARY ALLIANCES AND NEUTRALITY IN WAR AND PEACE. Bombay, Orient Longmans [1966] 280 p.
JX4005.R6
Bibliography: p. 259-263.
"Based on Sir Charuchandra Ghosh Lectures delivered at Calcutta University."

Contents. --Recent trends in military alignments. --The military alliances and the United Nations Charter. --Neutrality in a shooting war. --Neutrality in the Cold War.

Depicts the world's military alliances since 1943 and the problems of security in various areas, including East Europe and the North Atlantic. Roy Chowdhury examines the legal aspects of military alliances under international law, the problem of the nonalined nations with regard to East-West tensions, international crisis management, and the Sino-Soviet feud over peaceful coexistence between the Socialist and capitalist societies.

1067
Schelling, Thomas C. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Virginia quarterly review, v. 43, winter 1967: 20-35.
AP2.V76, v. 43

What is the "Atlantic Alliance"? "It is the community that has grown up--the traditions, the common interest, the institutions and even the hopes--from the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Schuman Plan, binding together the military, the economic, and the political development of countries on both sides of the Atlantic and expressing their common purpose." It is not this alliance that is in disarray, but rather the organization attached to NATO. Although France's withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance has disrupted a neat concept of unity within Europe, it has not jeopardized the functioning of the alliance. The French action has destroyed much of the ideology traditionally attached to the Atlantic alliance, and though it may prove disappointing not to have all its previous articles of faith fulfilled, the community of interest that is inherent in the alliance can now serve useful though pragmatic purposes. Regarding NATO and the military aspect of the alliance, it is vitally important that the American guarantee embodied in the NATO commitment be continued and nourished. The physical presence of American forces on European soil deterring Soviet attack or encroachment expresses this commitment. This is particularly important because the dilemma of nuclear sharing in Europe and NATO is insoluble. Turning from the military challenge, the Atlantic alliance now faces a diplomatic challenge--the German problem. One approach to the partition of Germany would involve a change of attitude in West Germany. West Germany is implicitly bartering nuclear capability for an East German settlement. "The line is a very thin one between renouncing nuclear weapons in return for an East German concession and threatening to possess nuclear weapons to induce an East German concession." A more imaginative West German foreign policy would be to champion nonproliferation and to demonstrate that impressive military strength does not require nuclear weapons. One can speculate whether it might not be possible that "two Germanys might be united sooner than one Germany could be re-united." Might it not better serve West German interests to recognize East Germany? The entire alliance must look toward Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany, in order to develop an effective foreign policy.

1068
Schmid, K. [PROBLEMS OF AIRSPACE DEFENSE] Die Probleme der Luftraumverteidigung. Österreichische Ingenieur-Zeitschrift, v. 10, Mar. 1967: 77-84.
TA3.O287, v. 10

With particular emphasis on Austria, inquires into the legal and political problems of a neutral nation's airspace defense and its efficacy in terms of the weapons available.

1069
Schmidt, Helmut, and others. INTERVIEWS. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Jan. 20, 1967: 35-39. illus.
U3.W38, v. 11

Comments on West German defense policy by the following: Helmut Schmidt, chairman of the Social Democratic membership in the Bundestag; Friedrich Zimmerman, chairman of the Bundestag Committee on National Defense; Gen. Johannes Steinhoff, "Inspekteur" of the Federal Republic's Air Force, and Hans-Otto Riedel, vice president of West Germany's aerospace industry association. Schmidt, commenting on Bonn's policies toward NATO and its own nuclear role, urges a West German veto over allied nuclear weapons either on German soil or to be used against it. Schmidt calls for a redefinition of West German defense policy in light of the current world situation, but he does not favor a total German renunciation of nuclear sharing unless disarmament is achieved in Europe. Zimmerman promises for 1967 a National Defense Committee examination of the "as yet unclarified role" of nuclear weapons in West European defenses. West German

airpower is discussed by Gen. Steinhoff in the context of European cooperation. Riedel urges increased West German spending for research and development.

1070
Schrader, Rudolf. [DEFENSE RESEARCH IN CANADA] Die Verteidigungsforschung in Kanada. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Jan. 1967: 42-46.
D839. A885, v. 18

Outlines the defense-research activities of Canada's Defense Research Board, its National Research Council, and other Canadian organizations, such as the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment (CARDE), over the past years. Individual defense-research programs are also discussed.

1071
Schulte, Ludwig. [IS THERE STILL A NUCLEAR STALEMATE?] Gibt es noch das atomare Patt? Europäische Begegnung, v. 7, Jan. 1967: 5-9.
P&GP RR

The Soviet Union's new antimissile defense system can conceivably disturb the East-West balance of power, but it cannot destroy the existing Soviet-American nuclear stalemate. Even lacking an antiballistic missile system the United States continues to have an effective deterrent against the Soviet nuclear threat. However even modest ABM systems placed in lesser countries would contribute to regional crisis management by lessening the effectiveness of possible nuclear threats to such countries. The interdependence of the political and strategic factors involved in modern crisis management necessitates delineating interests that, on each conflict level, must be defended even at the risk of escalation. The Atlantic alliance has found no mutual agreement on such interests. Military and geographic factors account for the discrepancy between American and European interests. This problem could be solved by creating a common West European deterrent based on a common strategy. For the sake of effectiveness this deterrent should be somehow tied to U. S. nuclear might.

1072
Schwartz, Benjamin I. UPHEAVAL IN CHINA. Commentary, v. 43, Feb. 1967: 55-62.
DS101. C63, v. 43

Many themes of the cultural revolution in China today can be traced to issues raised by the 1958 "Great Leap Forward." Serious questions began to arise as early as 1955 concerning the applicability of Soviet methods to Chinese problems, particularly economic problems. Eventually Chinese experimentation with approaches culminated in the commune experiment of 1958. Important innovations in foreign policy were also part of the Great Leap Forward. Just as China attempted to overcome all internal obstacles by massive mobilization of forces, so too on the global scene it urged the Communist bloc to join forces in a bold confrontation with imperialism. The hopes of 1958 were never realized; they gave way to the massive retreat and economic crisis of 1958-1962. Still the Chinese did not return to the Soviet model. During this period of retreat the Sino-Soviet dispute surfaced as Peking moved from a rejection of Soviet policies to the assertion of its own authority as bearer of the true Marxism-Leninism. This rejection also embraced the military sphere, where the Soviet model with its emphasis on professionalism and technical proficiency was replaced by party dominance, spiritual training of the soldier, downgrading of the officer corps, and army participation in social service. The Maoist line in military affairs indicates that the present Chinese nuclear development is an aspect more of political than military strategy. It represents defiance of the American-Soviet nuclear monopoly and a demonstration of advanced Chinese technology rather than a retreat from the fundamentally defensive posture of mass military organization. While Chinese strategy does not preclude the use of Chinese arms abroad in situations where their superiority is clear and great power intervention is unlikely, it implies an effort to avoid a confrontation with American power. The main significance of the Maoist military line is its application to internal affairs, in particular its emphasis on the spiritual training of the army as a model of Maoist conduct for the whole society.

1073
Shah, A. B., ed. INDIA'S DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. Bombay, Manaktalas [1966] 169 p.
DS480.84.S45

Collection of articles representing many viewpoints on the important issues facing India. Considerable attention is given to the debate over Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, both as a means of deterring Communist China and as a factor in Indian economic development. Several articles discuss nonalinement as developed for India by Jawaharlal Nehru and the policy's relevance today. One considers how the Indian foreign service can be improved, and another examines Indian foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

1074
Spannocchi, Emil. [STRATEGY AND THE MODERN IMAGE OF WAR] Strategie und modernes Kriegsbild. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1966: 353-358; no. 6, Nov./Dec.: 445-450.
P&GP RR

Reviews current strategic doctrines of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. Spannocchi explains the strategic situation of each, as well as of Austria, Germany, East Europe as a whole, and Communist China. The author thinks there is an inverse relationship between the defense potential of a nation (or alliance) and the potential danger of full-scale escalation of conflict. Thus, for instance, in a confrontation of superpowers escalation of conflict is less likely than in the case of a second-rate power subjected to growing military pressure by the enemy. Because of its lack of a credible ultimate deterrent, such a power would have to use force (including nuclear force if it has it) to the full to repel the enemy. "Only a utopian can dare to believe" that the club of medium-sized nuclear powers would stop expanding. However, for the foreseeable future--or until the problem of defense against nuclear attack is really solved--the United States, the Soviet Union, and (theoretically at least) Red China are the only nations to determine in a "sovereign" fashion the world balance of power.

1075
Stewart, Matthew C. THE NEED FOR NATO. Washington report (American Security Council) Jan. 2, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

French withdrawal from NATO has intensified the Soviet threat to West European cohesion and strength. Yet France's grave error is not necessarily fatal, since the remaining membership of the alliance will struggle to maintain the integrity of Western Europe. France may still provide military forces to assist in

resisting aggression against Europe, but NATO is significantly weakened without bases on French soil or French forces integrated into its military planning. Much of Europe's current prosperity can be attributed to the security and confidence generated by NATO. Soviet aggressive policies have bowed to the strength of Western cooperation, causing some nations to question the further necessity of the alliance. The arguments for dissolving NATO are all invalid when critically analyzed. Though the circumstances of the European nations have improved since 1949, the aggressive aims of the Soviet Union remain unchanged. Surely the West must realize that the Soviets only respect "cold strength and the determination to use it." Prevention of war has been NATO's most obvious and significant achievement. If the Western alliance disintegrates into separate and relatively weak states, the Soviet Union will be tempted to test the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees to individual European states. The remaining 14 nations of NATO must increase their commitments to the alliance. The United States should not be expected to maintain its massive commitments unless those it supports and defends honor their own obligations.

1076
STOPPING THE MISSILES. Economist, v. 222, Mar. 11, 1967: 904, 906, 908.
HG11.E2, v. 222

Soviet Premier Kosygin's recent letter to President Johnson on curbing the missile race remains somewhat mysterious. The fact that the initial optimism over it has been cooled down by later Kremlin and East European statements should not be taken as cause for pessimism--at least "Washington's persistent nudging" has elicited a Soviet response. Until late February 1967 Soviet statements still reflected a negative attitude toward restraining the antiballistic missile race or freezing nuclear vehicles. At that time a "flurry of conflicting Russian statements, mainly from the military top brass," appeared. It would now seem that Kremlin policymakers may be more receptive to the American assertion that antimissile deployment by Russia would only lead to immediate and massive U.S. reaction "in the form of a greatly expanded missile capacity." An antimissile race would also jeopardize chances of extending the test ban to underground explosions or reaching agreement on a nonproliferation treaty. The Soviets currently oppose any arms control measure that does not entail reduction of the American offensive lead. What can they offer to induce Washington to cut its lead? Perhaps a pullback of the Kremlin's own edge in secrecy--the verification bugaboo, still a gigantic problem for any arms control measure. An agreement halting the antiballistic missile race may be a good starting point, for verifying the nonexistence of these weapons requires much less objectionable inspection than verification of agreements banning or reducing offensive weapons.

1077
Tobler, W. [COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE] Führungs- und Organizationsprobleme der Atomabwehr. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Apr. 1967: 187-194. U3.A43, v. 133

Assumes that any future war, into which Switzerland may be drawn or by which it may be directly affected, would be "total" in a much fuller sense than was World War II. Once Switzerland finds itself actively engaged in war it would be in coalition with other countries, for the enemy's main operations would most likely involve other areas. Since the probability that chemical, biological, and radiological weapons will be employed in such a war is high, the nation must prepare its entire defense for that emergency. Even today Switzerland is potentially able to avail itself of the means of such a defense.

1078
Twining, Nathan F. AMERICA'S CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER [interview] Reader's digest, v. 90, Mar. 1967: 49-55. AP2.R255, v. 90

While the United States has maintained an overwhelming military superiority and hence an effective deterrent through the mid-1960's, "we have thrown away more than half a decade of irretrievable lead time in the development of the advanced weapons systems we will need to present a convincing deterrent through the mid-1970's and beyond." During this time the United States withdrew its missiles from Turkey, Italy, and the United Kingdom, cancelled its mobile medium-range ballistic missile program for NATO, reduced its production of nuclear materials, and began phasing out part of the strategic bomber force. The Soviet Union and Communist China continue to enhance their strategic forces and military capabilities while the United States stands still. U.S. weapons technology has suffered at the hands of the "anti-nuclear clique," which insists that the Soviet Union has no intention of starting a nuclear war and that therefore this Nation's strategic capability should be reduced to match Russia's. America lost a 3-year lead over the Soviet Union by agreeing to the moratorium on nuclear testing, which the Soviets broke with highly advanced nuclear tests. In order to achieve "military parity" with the Soviet Union the Kennedy administration resisted pressures from the Defense Department to undertake similar testing. Then in 1963 the United States agreed to the partial nuclear test ban treaty, thereby freezing technology in the field of very-high-yield weaponry. At this time it would be extremely difficult for the United States to resume a full testing program should it be necessary to do so. The "rigid application of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's cost-effectiveness theory to defense planning" has also helped retard U.S. military preparedness. To insure flexibility a mixed force that includes a manned bomber is needed. Following policies that imply general appeasement of the Soviet Union, the United States is heading toward crises far less capable of tidy solutions than the Cuban missile crisis. Miscalculation could mean war.

1079
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMITMENTS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., v. 1+ Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966+ UA23.3.A383
Hearings beginning Aug. 25, 1966.

Members of the subcommittee question Secretary of State Dean Rusk about the extent and nature of America's worldwide military commitments and its ability to meet them. Inserted in the testimony is a State Department compilation of those provisions of formal treaties and agreements and official declarations by Congress, the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State that pertain to U.S. obligations and commitments to nations that are the victims of aggression.

1080

Verberie. [IS DETERRENCE AN ACTION?] La dissuasion est-elle une action? Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1966: 685-694.
U2.R48, 1966

If someone wants to do something in spite of the other's opposition, he undertakes an action; if he wants to prevent the other from undertaking something his action is called deterrence. Thus the two concepts are not contradictory although their means of execution are different. Deterrence strategy is a coordination of forces into an action that will be credible to the adversary. It is mainly psychological, but usually includes military, political, economic, or moral means. Deterrence strategy, which includes "flexible response" used after invasion, and action strategy both try to attain political goals. Whereas the first is concerned only with the maintenance of the balance of forces, the latter attempts to establish a new balance. Today, after the discovery of nuclear weapons which enable the possessor to deter any opposing will, deterrence strategy has become an essential element in nuclear strategy. But, as the threat of nuclear attack cannot deter revolutionary and subversive wars, the deterrence action in this case is incomplete. To be complete deterrence must not only be nuclear, but must include other means to defend the country if deterrence fails. Therefore a deterrence strategy must first make sure that the creditability of nuclear attack is complete, and on the other hand must prepare military means sufficient to avert an attack if deterrence does not succeed. Furthermore deterrence by nuclear weapons is unfinished if it attempts to preserve a status quo without destroying the enemy's will to dominate. Thus presently the Western camp could win a real peace only if the Communist countries renounced the goal of imposing their ideology on other nations. The Soviets actually do not speak at all about deterrence, although they understand the concept and use the method. Because they want to realize their goals in spite of opposition, they use the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" and within its framework try to achieve their objectives. Their strategy is an action strategy, which complements their tacitly applied deterrence strategy. Thus comparing the two strategies we can see that only the action strategy is completely satisfactory.

## D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

### 1. Biological

1081

AMERICAN USE OF WAR GASES AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. Hanoi, Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1966. 56 p. illus. DS557.A68A4

Attempts to prove not only that the United States is employing gases in the Vietnam War but also that these gases, asserted by Washington to be nonlethal, are in actuality highly toxic. The United States, by its use of gases that are proscribed by the Geneva Protocol, has deviated from international law and human morality, American nonadherence to the Protocol notwithstanding. A substantial list of individual, national, and international protests against "this new American crime against mankind" concludes the volume.

1082

Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus Ohio. Radiation Effects Information Center. REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR RADIATION ON CAPACITORS, by C. L. Hanks and D. J. Hamman. Columbus, Ohio, 1966. 144 p. (Its REIC report no. 44)
TA418.6.B35, no. 44

"Prepared pursuant to the provisions of Contract No. AF 33(615)-1124 (Continuation of AF 33(657)-10085), BPSN Nrs. 64-6899 7381 738103 and 64-6399 7634," and reported to the Air Force Materials Laboratory of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command.

Evaluates the effects of steady-state and transient nuclear radiation on six categories of capacitors: ceramic dielectric, glass dielectric, mica dielectric, paper- and paper/plastic-dielectric, plastic dielectric, and electrolytic. The authors summarize in tabular form the results of various test programs and experiments by capacitor classification.

1083

Bizzozero, O. Joseph, and others. RADIATION-RELATED LEUKEMIA IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 1946-1964. II. OBSERVATIONS ON TYPE-SPECIFIC LEUKEMIA, SURVIVORSHIP, AND CLINICAL BEHAVIOR. Annals of internal medicine, v. 66, Mar. 1967: 522-550. R11.A84, v. 66
Bibliography: p. 529-530.

Sets forth "the type-specific leukemia characteristics of the period 1946 to 1964" in the two nuclear-bombed Japanese cities. The period 1950 to 1954 saw the maximal rates of incidence of leukemia "in those who were 0 to 29 years of age at the time of the bombings and who were exposed 0 to 1,500 m." Higher levels of acute lymphocytic and chronic granulocytic leukemias appeared in the aforementioned younger age group, and elevated incidence of granulocytic leukemia in those who were 30 or more years old at the time of the bombings. Age at time of exposure and magnitude of dose may be "just two of several factors that may determine the type of specific leukemia response in the human."

1084

Blumenfeld, S. N. NUCLEAR WAR AND SOIL MICROFLORA. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 39 p. ([Rand Corporation] Memorandum RM-4827-TAB) Q180.A1R36, no. 4827
"Research . . . sponsored by the San Francisco Operations Office of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract AT(04-3)-414."
Bibliography: p. 35-39.

Examines the possible effects of large-scale nuclear war on the microbiological portion of man's environment. Blumenfeld concludes that disruption of either food or wood production because of damage to the microflora of significant tracts of land in the United States will not be a serious problem of a postwar era.

1085

Burnet, Sir Macfarlane. FREAK VIRUS COULD END MANKIND. Medical world news, v. 7, Dec. 2, 1966: 58. R11.M864, v. 7
Excerpts from a speech delivered in Sydney, Australia.

Biochemists have come close to cracking the genetic code--the secret of life. And yet, what good does this knowledge do mankind? That the three greatest scientific discoveries of this century--atomic processes, the transmission of information by nerve

cells, and the structure of nucleic acid--also hold the greatest threats for man's survival is a sad commentary on human affairs. From the first two achievements have come nuclear weapons and the nerve gases. Now that viruses can be chemically manipulated, it is entirely possible that from some laboratory "a deadly virus might escape to infect human beings who have no resistance to it." The potential benefits from molecular biology research are far outweighed by its potential harm, and biochemists must recognize the limitations imposed upon them by human considerations.

1086
International Civil Defence Symposium on Nuclear Radiation Hazards, 2d, Monaco, 1966. PROCEEDINGS. International civil defence, no. 136, Oct. 1966: 4-12; no. 137, Nov. 1966: 1-6.
UA926.I488, 1966

Summary of the discussions and reports of the Symposium, held in Monaco, Oct. 10-22, 1966. The problems discussed include the effects of nuclear explosions, ecological development of radioactive materials, nuclear reactors as potential sources of contamination in case of emergency, civil defense warning systems and equipment, radiation dosage and the relation between man and the contaminated surface, psychological and sociological problems under disaster situations, possibilities of radiological decontamination, shelter systems and policy in Switzerland and Sweden, and civil defense shelter design.

1087
Langer, Elinor. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (I): THE RESEARCH PROGRAM. Science, v. 155, Jan 13, 1967: 174-176, 178-179.
Q1.S35, v. 155

The U.S. Government's research and development program in chemical and biological warfare [CBW] is shrouded in a heavy veil of secrecy, mainly due to the fact that public concern for and awareness of this class of weaponry is in the "afraid of the unknown" stage. Consequently, attempts to research and uncover the nature and extent of the program prove frustrating. Very little of the literature resulting from the Government's research is published in the science journals. In Pentagonese, the CBW program becomes a "cross between defensive preparations, on the one hand, and peaceful byproducts in preventive medicine, on the other." Washington's ambiguous CBW policy is not at all clarified by its chemical weapons use in Vietnam. By 1964 the research and development [R&D] budget for CBW had risen to $158 million. The Army receives the bulk of the appropriations--in 1964, $115 million for R&D and $117 million for procurement related to CBW. Fort Detrick in Maryland is the main center for biological warfare research. Again its work is classified as defensive in nature--seeking ways to combat biological weapons. Much of Fort Detrick's research can be considered "neutral," but it "has a special character, an inverted quality like that of medicine turned inside out." An immunization program becomes a lesson in how to protect one's own troops after initiation of a disease against the enemy by one's forces. Much of the research at Fort Detrick is directed toward supplying diseases with the characteristics needed to make them effective biological weapons--ability "to maintain viability and virulence during production, storage, transportation, and dissemination"; ability to decay minimally and to be produced in significant quantity for military use. The science of aerobiology has come to the fore as increasing attention is given to widespread application of diseases to affect large targets. Various universities are involved in the CBW programs, as are the Public Health Service and private research organizations.

1088
Langer, Elinor. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (II): THE WEAPONS AND THE POLICIES. Science, v. 155, Jan. 20, 1967: 299-303.
Q1.S35, v. 155

Work in the area of chemical and biological warfare [CBW] is not confined to research and development. CBW production is going on at Fort Detrick, Maryland, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, and in commercial manufacturing plants such as that in Newport, Indiana, where the nerve gas, Sarin, is produced. Chemical weapons come in the form of artillery shells, Sargeant missiles, Honest John and Little John rockets, land mines, and bombs for conventional military aircraft. BW delivery systems are mostly classified, but from what information is available, biological weapons can come in the form of warheads for missile systems, cluster bombs, and spray tanks and dispensers for aircraft. The utility of CBW is its ability to inflict little or no material destruction, thus reducing area rehabilitation after conflict. Current chemical agents include nerve gases, a blister agent, an incapacitant, a vomiting agent, and riot-control agents. The nerve gases and the blister agent, distilled mustard, would be used to cause direct casualties. The riot control and vomiting agents "have been authorized for use--and used in many of these ways--in Vietnam." Biological weapons are characterized by the diseases they cause--brucellosis, tularemia, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, coccidioidomycosis, botulism poisoning--and by being anticivilian, in that they are designed to reach vast numbers of people. Use of CBW agents is a matter of national policy. U.S. rejection of their use rests on a 1943 statement of President Franklin Roosevelt: "I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies." President Eisenhower endorsed this in 1960. But during that same year both the State and Defense Departments objected to a Senate resolution patterned on the 1943 statement on the grounds that the U.S. arsenal should include a full spectrum of weapons to meet any kind of hostile action. The present administration claims that the agents in use in Vietnam "do not constitute 'chemical and biological warfare'" as understood in the Geneva Protocol. The problem for the United States in carrying out its CBW policy in Vietnam is where it all will lead. "What is 'unthinkable' at one moment may be policy the next."

1089
Tabuchi, Akira, and others. SUMMARY REPORT ON DISORDERS NOTED AMONG A-BOMB EXPOSED WOMEN. Hiroshima journal of medical sciences, v. 15, Mar. 1966: 1-23.
P&GP RR

Summarizes disorders among women exposed within 2 km of the hypocenter of the bomb. Radiation effects on genital functions and offspring born after the bomb are noted.

## 2. Economic

1090
THE BIG SPENDERS [editorial] Nation, v. 204, Apr. 17, 1967: 484-485. AP2.N2, v. 204

The United States and the Soviet Union account for 70 percent of the world's arms expenditures--$93 billion of a total $133 billion per year spent on military hardware. Other nations lag far behind, with the United Kingdom and Communist China spending about $5 billion a year and France $3 billion. Each year the less developed nations spend $1 billion of their meager resources on weapons. If the superpowers spent even half their current arms expenditures on helping nations in need "they would rank as the benefactors of mankind." As it is now, they threaten man's very existence.

1091
Boulding, Kenneth E. THE ROLE OF THE WAR INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. Journal of social issues, v. 23, Jan. 1967: 47-61.
HN51.J6, v. 23

The war industry is defined as that segment of the economy which produces whatever is bought by the defense budget. The question at issue is that of the reciprocal relations between the war industry and other elements of the international system. The war industry is a component of the threat system aspect of the international system, and in this sense, the various national war industries are symbiotic. Equations are developed for the equilibrium of the world war industry on the assumption that the size of the war industry of any nation is a function of that of the war industries of other nations. It is shown that the likelihood of stability of this system diminishes sharply as the number of nations increases even beyond two. The adjustment of the total economy to disarmament is more a psychological than an economic problem. The impact of diverse rates of economic growth on the stability of the international system is considered, also the high cost of being a world power. The present international system may have considerable stability in it, if it remains bipolar. (Abstract supplied)

1092
Broschwitz, Johannes. [THE FEASIBILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALIZATION THROUGH CONCENTRATION IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY] Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Rationalisierung durch Konzentration in der Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Mar. 10, 1967: 147-153. table.
U3.W38, v. 11

The first intimations that the Federal Defence Ministry--the German aerospace industry's main customer--wished to see a greater concentration among the development and production companies were made as long as 1962-63, immediately after the initial build-up phase in this industry. Although the industry has since gone a long way towards meeting the Government's wishes in this respect, by undertaking cooperative venture, i.e. forming working groups to engage in major production programmes both for reasons of capacity and in the interests of a rational division of labour, and by carrying out a number of mergers, the results hitherto achieved do not appear to go far enough. The author of the present article has taken an active part in many of the German aerospace industry's post-war projects and thus has been able to describe the situation in the industry from practical experience. (Abstract supplied)

1093
Ministerial Meeting on Science, 2d, Paris, 1966. GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL INNOVATION. Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1966. 60 p.
Q101.M55, 1966, vol. 3
"References": p. 57-60.

Government's role in stimulating technical innovation. The effects of military and space research on civilian technology are discussed in terms of possible government measures to spur innovation in the "science-intensive" industries.

1094
Molter, Günther. [DARK FUTURE; editorial] Die dunkle Zukunft. Flug-Revue, no. 4, Apr. 1967: 13.
TL503.C524, 1967

The German aerospace industry is struggling for survival. On April 1, 1967, at least 15 per cent of the 7800 employees busy with military development programmes in eleven branches have got to leave. A number of foreign enterprises, aware of what was going on, have already evinced a marked interest in those technicians, scientists and skilled workers who might be affected by this operation aiming at an essential reduction in spending. Since the government has announced that there could be another reduction, probably again by 15 per cent, two consequences can be foreseen: those fearing to be the next victims will leave as soon as better opportunities are offered (irrespective by whom), and the trickle of remaining programmes still running will stop because the teams working on them will disintegrate during the near future. The tremendous assets gained in modern technology, especially in the field of V/STOL, will be lost before long, and an industry, attractive enough to be a partner in a number of bi- or multilateral development programmes so far, will fall below international standards tomorrow. The German aerospace industry is already in a state of emergency. There are plans to concentrate it into a single group; let's hope it will cure it. (Abstract supplied)

1095
SPECIAL REPORT: THE AEC FISCAL 1968 BUDGET. Nuclear news, v. 10, Mar. 1967: 10-13.
QC770.N75, v. 10

Shows the fiscal-1968 budget for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and briefly explains the plans and funds allocated for such projects as space propulsion reactors, civilian reactors, the AEC weapons program, and Project Plowshare.

1096
Washington (State) Employment Security Dept. A CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE DYNA-SOAR CONTRACT CANCELLATION UPON EMPLOYEES OF THE BOEING COMPANY IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1965. 303 p. (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 29)
JX1974.A1U52

"Prepared under a contract sponsored jointly by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Studies the workers affected by the Dyna-Soar cancellation and their subsequent experiences. These workers, young on the average, proved highly self-reliant in securing new jobs, their major obstacle being simply a scarcity of openings in the area. The mechanics of relocating, reflected in such things as difficulty in selling homes and the costs of moving,

appeared to be an area in which assistance was needed, as did fitting workers' skills efficiently into the job market.

## 3. Ethical and Social

1097

Langer, Elinor. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: IT'S HARD TO KICK THE HABIT. Science, v. 155, Jan. 13, 1967: 177. Q1. S35, v. 155

Summarizes current happenings in the controversey at the University of Pennsylvania over the school's chemical and biological warfare research program. While the research is continuing at present, the debate revolves around the wider problem of defense-sponsored research being done on university campuses.

1098

Nordlie, Peter G. THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR RECOVERY OF SOCIETY. EMO national digest, v. 7, Feb. 1967: 14-21. illus.
P&GP RR

"Paper presented to the 1966 meeting of the NATO Civil Defense Committee Scientific Working Party."

Reports on research done by Human Sciences Research, Inc. (McLean, Va.), under Government sponsorship. With regard to the post-attack behavior of a population the study "concluded that survivors would be psychologically capable of performing required recovery activities" provided they are adequately trained to do so. Nordlie stresses the "recovery-oriented" approach of the study as contrasted to the "attack-oriented" approaches of previous research--a difference with important implications for future civil defense planning. Among the recovery goals discussed in the study are the "preservation of the maximum number of lives," "the continued use of pre-attack technology," "minimum threat to legitimate authority," and the "maximum ability to cope with emergent situations."

1099

Sharp, Malcolm P. REFLECTIONS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO WAR. National Lawyers Guild practitioner, v. 25, fall 1966: 115-124.
LL

In United States v. Seeger (1965) the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that conscientious objectors must believe in a "Supreme Being" broadly enough to include any perception of "hidden power" over the course of events. The Court has not yet dealt with the requirement that objections must be to "participation in war in any form." This requirement raises many difficulties, including the need to distinguish between revolution and war. Some who might believe in Franco's revolution or the Hungarian revolution of 1956, or who might be Marxists committed to revolutionary activities would have difficulties establishing their opposition to "war in any form." Some conscientious objectors choose to oppose participation in illegal or unjust wars. They insist that the violence in Vietnam, for example, is unjustified by the principle of self-defense and violates international agreements and treaties. These arguments are of more questionable validity than a second tactic--the argument from consequences." Limited wars or wars of liberation increase the likelihood of a war of annihilation, which stands condemned not only by the Catholic Church but the general opinion of mankind. Either or both of these positions must also distinguish "war" from a U. N. "police action." Conscientious objectors might quite reasonably favor the use of force in the enforcement of both domestic and international law. A conscientious objector could also base his position on the ground that his objection to participating in the conflict in Vietnam is "not inconsistent with his approval of 'war' in the sense of a war declared by Congress." This position has some plausibility but little relationship to any religious or philosophical attitude toward war. The first amendment, which prohibits Congressional restriction of freedom of religion, may even be extended to the present problem, but currently its applicability seems dubious.

## 4. Other

1100

Allkofer, O. C., and J. M. Fox. NEW CONCEPTIONS ON THE METEOROLOGY OF STRATOSPHERIC FALLOUT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. Archiv für Meteorologie, Geophysik und Bioklimatologie. Ser. A: Meteorologie und Geophysik, v. 15, no. 3/4, 1966: 299-317. illus.
QC851. A73, v. 15

Extensive meteorological measurements during IGY 1957/58 have yielded more detailed information about the climatology of the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. Taking into account these new data, measurements of the distribution of stratospheric fallout are discussed. The result is that radioactive debris in the middle stratosphere (16-24 km height) is not transported by the meridional circulation but by normal and eddy diffusion. At higher altitudes, however, a northward transportation probably takes place by circulation, too. It is shown, moreover that there is a balance in radioactivity concentration between supply and deposition. Seasonal and latitudinal variations consequently are caused by variations of the velocity of transportation and deposition and to a far lesser extent by a variation of the fallout concentration. Observations indicate that radioactive debris from the stratosphere is collected at the zero layer in the upper troposphere, since the tropopause has been revealed not to be a barrier to radioactivity transfer from the stratosphere to the troposphere. The zero layer concept is discussed. The zero layer is defined as the connection of the maximum velocity of westerly zonal circulation with the inversion of the horizontal gradient of temperature and, consequently, with an inversion of vertical motion. The latitudinal differences in the stability of the zero layer may account for latitudinal variations of fallout deposition. (Summary supplied)

1101

THE ASIAN ARMS RACE IN PROGRESS. Minority of one, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 4. AP2. M55985, v. 9

The present arms race between China and the United States is not a race for technological parity. Each of the two countries pursues its own goal. In Asia the Americans are trying to establish a sufficiently powerful military force to deliver a crippling attack on China. China, knowing this, builds up its nuclear power in order to deter the United States. The United States is by now perfectly able to attack China, but refrains from this lest China foment limited wars disadvantageous to the United States. America is now trying to establish in Asia a military force adequate to meet the danger of limited wars. To perfect these establishments necessitates U. S. maintenance and

escalation of the Vietnamese War, and gives the war its stubborn and massive character. Thus the escalation is only a pretext for acquiring an advantageous position against China. If such is the U. S. plan, only Chinese nuclear deterrence power can save the peace in Asia. Just as the balance of power between them prevented an American-Soviet clash, China's nuclear capacity may prevent a Sino-American conflict.

1102

Batten, E. S. THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON THE WEATHER AND CLIMATE. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 59 p. illus. ([Rand Corporation] Memorandum RM-4989-TAB)

Q180. A1R36, no. 4989

"Research . . . sponsored by the San Francisco Operations Office of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract AT(04-3)-414, project agreement no. 3."

Bibliography: p. 55-59.

The possibility that the energy, the debris, or the radioactivity of nuclear detonations in large number may affect the climate and the weather is explored. Because of the complexity and the lack of thorough understanding of the interdependent meteorological processes, it is impossible today to predict the consequences of artificial atmospheric stimuli. This paper explores ways that the by-products of a nuclear war may interfere with the dynamical, hydrological, and radiational processes in the atmosphere. The difficult problems of estimating quantitatively the weather and climatic changes are avoided except to emphasize the ambiguities of such estimates. The study indicates that the interference with the atmospheric processes in some cases can be sufficient to produce changes in them; however, it stresses that the nature, extent, and magnitude of the resulting anomalies in the weather and climate are uncertain. (Authors' summary)

1103

Baugh, James O., Kazuko Yoshikawa, and P. K. Kuroda. SINGLE FALLOUT PARTICLES AND ZIRCONIUM-95 FROM THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 9 MAY 1966. Science, v. 155, Mar. 17, 1967: 1405-1407. graph.

Q1. S35, v. 155

Daily fluctuations of the number of single fallout particles and activity of zirconium-95 in the ground-level air were measured at Fayetteville (94°W, 36°N), Arkansas, for a period of about 3 months after the Chinese nuclear explosion of 9 May 1966. We found a cyclic pattern of variations for both zirconium-95 and fallout particles; this indicated that they were airborne for a long period and traveled far. Apparently some of the particles circled the world more than once. "These results demonstrate the phenomenon of atmospheric fractionation of the products of fission and show that the highly radioactive single fallout particles are important in the process of transport of the nuclear debris." (Authors' abstract with excerpt)

1104

Coffey, Joseph I. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEBATE. Foreign affairs, v. 45, Apr. 1967: 403-413.

D410. F6, v. 45

"An erosion of the already slim possibility of reaching agreement on further arms-control measures which could promote a more secure world" appears to be one of the major costs of either U. S. or Soviet deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Improved and longer-range interception and reduced costs have enhanced the appeal of antimissile defense as a policy choice, thus increasing the prospects of an accelerated arms race. However, the United States must consider the broad effects of a decision to deploy ABM's, such as how the Soviets would react, how the Western allies would react, and how it would impinge on arms control efforts, including future measures and the current nuclear test ban treaty. U. S. ABM deployment against Communist China would decrease the likelihood of Chinese attack and, should such a nuclear strike occur, would limit ensuing damage; it would enhance U. S. containment of Chinese Communist expansion in South and Southeast Asia; and it could deter the Reds from embarking on intercontinental missile development. On the other hand, Communist China is already constrained by its economy to concentration on a minimal nuclear force and is politically motivated to demonstrate its nuclear capability as quickly as possible. Rather than deter weapons development, a U. S. ABM program might simply persuade Peking to concentrate on submarine-launched, cruise-type missiles with which ballistic missile defenses cannot readily cope. Should the Soviet Union demonstrate it is installing an extensive ABM network around many of its major cities, the United States would have no recourse but to respond, in strength if not in kind, perhaps through a buildup of strategic strike forces or retention of an adequate damage-limiting counterforce capability. The available options would probably provide a U. S. capacity for "assured destruction," but each would evoke different reactions from the Soviet Union. Secretary McNamara has chosen to "upgrade" U. S. strategic forces through multiple-warhead weapons and more survivable intercontinental ballistic missiles. The introduction of ABM defense would undoubtedly affect current negotiations for arms limitation, including bomber disarmament, and a nonproliferation agreement. The need to test for warhead effectiveness would jeopardize an underground nuclear test ban. The temptation to test its new antimissile missile devices operationally would eventually be too strong for a country expending billions of dollars, which test would "constitute a clear breach of the present nuclear test ban." Yet a moratorium on antiballistic missiles is feasible, possibly linked with arrangements for adjustment of strategic force levels. If ABM programs must proceed a Soviet-U. S. agreement to limit the types and numbers of systems would provide some assurance. Or arrangements could be worked out whereby increments in antimissile defenses would be accompanied by reductions in offensive weapons.

1105

Collins, Frederic W. $30 BILLION FOR WHOM? POLITICS, PROFITS AND THE ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE. New republic, v. 156, Mar. 11, 1967: 13-15.

AP2. N624, v. 156

Analyzes the enormous political and psychological pressure brought to bear upon all levels of the American Government by the military-industrial complex in its attempt to cause the Nation to embark on a costly and irrational antiballistic missile program. President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara have resolutely opposed such a "futile escalation of the arms race."

1106

[COUNTER-ESCALATION AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRATEGY] Contre-escalade et stratégie anti-impérialiste. La nouvelle critique, no. 181, Dec./Jan. 1966/67: 107-109. AP20. N75, 1966/67

The first bombing of North Vietnam raised many questions in the Communist world. Communists were wondering why the Soviet Union did not interfere and protect a small Communist state from aggression. While knowing that the Soviet Union gives substantial aid to North Vietnam, some accused it of passivity because it did not go to war and left the aggression unpunished and unopposed. These people do not realize that the Soviet attitude is based on a global concept. Today the world is in quest of peace and security. If aggression against a small country is compared with the mortal perils of atomic war, the maintenance of peace seems more important. Under these conditions the most appropriate answer seems to be to give assistance to the Vietnamese people upon their request and politically isolate the aggressor in such a way that he would find it dangerous to pursue the war to the end. Such isolation would happen, for example, if all the United States allies would disavow U.S. Vietnamese policy and refuse to be united with America in military blocs. In some circumstances the struggle for peaceful coexistence becomes the best means for ensuring the people's right to independence and good living conditions. In Vietnam a counter-escalation would be absurd. It would stimulate the solidarity of the imperialists, abolish any chance to isolate the aggressor, and prevent the delivery of aid. The Vietnamese people would gain nothing, and the world might lose its population.

1107
Human Sciences Research, inc. CIVIL DEFENSE BIBLIOGRAPHY, JANUARY 1966: A COMPILATION OF REFERENCES RELEVANT TO THE STUDY OF SOCIETAL RECOVERY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK. [McLean, Va., 1966] 75 p.
Z6724.C6H8

A list compiled in the course of the research organization's 6-year involvement with studies of "the social and psychological effects of a nuclear attack and the possible implications of such effects for individuals, social organizations, and civil defense." Although listed only in order of acquisition by Human Sciences Research, the entries are indexed under 12 broad categories that are listed at the beginning of the bibliography.

1108
Inglis, David R. ANTI-MISSILE DRAG-RACE [editorial] Saturday review, v. 50, Feb. 25, 1967: 36, 95.
Z1219.S25, v. 50

Until recently the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to be approaching a plateau in the arms race upon which each had sufficient power to induce a healthy respect in the other. Presently this situation has been threatened by a new element--antimissile defense. The effectiveness of both the Soviet and American systems is low; they are currently able to intercept only a small percentage of the missiles that would be involved in a massive nuclear attack. It may seem strange for the Russians to deploy such a "militarily uneconomical" defense, but for them it has special psychological value manifesting their compulsion to buy anything labelled "defensive." Anti-missile defense is undeniably defensive, but a more important question is whether it will make an attack less likely. The preponderent opinion is that by prolonging and destabilizing the arms race the antiballistic missile will make nuclear war more likely. It will eventually necessitate added strategic missiles designed to penetrate defenses and an enormous shelter program accompanied by an undesirable regimentation of the urban population. Most Senators agree with President Johnson's announced intention to seek a ban on further antimissile deployment, but some in Washington feel the United States "cannot possibly do without any bit of military hardware that the Russians have, even if they don't have very much of it, and we think they are foolish and wasteful to have it." Influenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress recently attempted to pressure the Administration into accepting ABM deployment by appropriating unasked-for funds. Given the nature of U.S. national politics, an "anti-anti-missile" agreement with the Russians is probably the only way to stop the arms spiral. At the moment this seems unlikely. The alternative is to permit the Russians to indulge unchallenged their peculiar bias toward defensive measures and then see Soviet deployment stop at modest levels for lack of competition. American superiority in strategic missiles would be sufficient to maintain a position of strength while permitting the Soviets to content themselves with modest deployment of their new weapons.

1109
IS RUSSIA WINNING THE ARMS RACE? U.S. news & world report, v. 62, Feb. 6, 1967: 34-37.
JK1.U65, v. 62

The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union stands at a new critical point today. The long-maintained American lead in missiles and bombers "is greatly diminished--in danger of disappearing." U.S. military men are primarily concerned over America's failure to attempt to match the Soviet breakthrough in defensive missiles. At the same time the Administration is cutting back on its production of fissionable materials, a step that one Senator has called "a step toward 'unilateral disarmament.'" Cost is given by civilian officials as the reason for not going ahead with antiballistic missile development, but the Joint Chiefs will probably urge Congress that the safety of the American people is worth a high cost. The Russian arms push started in 1961, when the Soviets broke the test moratorium. In one stroke they finalized development of high-megaton "terror bombs" and gained a fund of knowledge about nuclear blast effects on radar, communications, and missile sites, enabling them to take a strong lead in antimissile defenses. The Kremlin may now own bombs yielding as much as 100 megatons that could "level the largest city." At the end of 1967 the United States will probably have completed its missile force and gained a four to one lead over the Soviet Union, which most military experts agree is adequate. Their concern is for the future. U.S. force is to be frozen while total nuclear megatonnage is cut, and by 1972 the Soviets could have a 10 to 1 lead in megatonnage. To America's military experts, the U.S. "nuclear umbrella is in danger of being destroyed."

1110
Lindbeck, John M. CHINESE SCIENCE: IT'S NOT A PAPER ATOM. New York times magazine, Jan. 8, 1967: 38-39, 60, 62, 64, 67, 70, illus.
AP2.N6575, 1967

China, which may soon be able to test a hydrogen bomb, recently moved ahead of France in the area of nuclear delivery vehicles by firing a nuclear-tipped missile. Of particular significance is the fact that these advances have been made in a country that lacked any of the technological requisites for them as recently as 1949. Since basic research was not necessary and the feat was one of applying science borrowed from the West, China's leaders deserve the

credit for placing high economic and political priorities on what they saw as a supreme political goal--joining the nuclear club. Since 1957, when the decision to go ahead with an advanced-weapons program was apparently made, the mainland has paid the price of discipline to the point of becoming a garrison state. Rigid organization of Western- and Soviet-trained scientists, economic development in industrial areas most important for military power, and overt Soviet assistance in the program (at least until 1959) probably provided the keys to Chinese weapons progress. The program is now firmly established, and indications are that China has opted for a strategy based on missile-delivered thermonuclear weapons. Conventional-war capabilities and early industrialization will have been sacrificed, but technological "fallout" from the program will benefit Chinese society. If nothing untoward occurs, rapid economic growth might begin again by 1970. Ten years from now China will probably "be like Japan before World War II."

1111

Martin, Laurence W. THE GREAT ABM DEBATE. Spectator, v. 218, Apr. 14, 1967: 419-420. AP4.S7, v. 218

Current debate over antiballistic missile [ABM] systems may presage a fundamental reconsideration of Western nuclear strategy. Secretary of Defense McNamara admits that the Soviet Union is well advanced in ABM deployment, and he has recommended Western countermeasures, such as the Poseidon submarine-launched missile and improved penetration devices for existing missiles. McNamara has considered ABM defenses to protect American offensive forces, but he remains opposed to deploying a purely defensive system. His alternative is the limitation of ABM deployment, a proposal on which the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate. What the Russians hope to gain from such talks is debatable. Perhaps they hope to delay American weapons development; or, they may feel their refusal to talk would result in a diplomatic victory for the United States; or, most likely, their willingness is part of a Russian effort to attain strategic parity with the United States. Russia's anti-missile defense and its increase in offensive power make the damage each superpower can do to the other more nearly equal. If the United States sincerely hopes to avoid the next step in the arms race it must reevaluate its deterrent policy and perhaps accept a lower level of American offensive superiority and assured destruction of the Soviet Union. The ICBM was once thought to be the ultimate in military technology, but recent events show the futility of trying to stay with a particular generation of weapons. Even more they show the necessity for arms control.

1112

Shimizu, Kiyoshi. LITTLE-KNOWN EFFECTS OF THE BOMB. Japan quarterly, v. 14, Jan./Mar. 1967: 93-98. DS801.J274, v. 14

Discusses three groups of effects of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II: biological and medical, economic and social, and spiritual and psychological. He describes some of the research which has been done in these fields and areas in which more work is needed. "When one realizes the unspeakable harm that can be done by radiation, even in the slightest amounts," he concludes, "one cannot but redouble one's prayers that the world will never again produce victims of such a horror."

1113

Thein, Myint, and P. K. Kuroda. GLOBAL CIRCULATION OF RADIOCERIUM ISOTOPES FROM THE MAY 14, 1965, NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. Journal of geophysical research, v. 72, Mar. 15, 1967: 1673-1680. QC811.J6, v. 72

The concentrations of $Ce^{141}$ and $Ce^{144}$ in rain were measured at Fayetteville, Arkansas, during the period between November 1964 and December 1965. The $Ce^{141}/Ce^{144}$ data indicate that the radiocerium isotopes produced by the May 14, 1965, Chinese nuclear test explosion traveled eastward and circled around the world at least twice. The mean tropospheric residence half time of the cerium isotopes was calculated to be approximately 40 days. Measurements of variations of the ratios $Ce^{144}/Sr^{90}$, $Ce^{141}/Sr^{89}$, and $Ce^{141}/Ba^{140}$ in rain yielded experimental evidences for the atmospheric fractionation of nuclear debris. (Abstract supplied)

1114

[AN UNKNOWN: THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY] Une inconnue: l'armée populaire de libération. Air & cosmos, v. 4, Jan. 28, 1967: 31. P&GP RR

Except for some insignificant incidents the cultural revolution did not touch the stronghold of China's Army. That of course does not mean that the Army is unimportant in the present situation. As its chief is Lin Piao, Mao's potential successor, the Army is thought to be a support of Mao's regime and a future arbiter in the fight for his suceession. But while many know about the Army's organization and its role in political life, nothing is known about China's choice between conventional and nuclear weapons. Mao himself stresses the importance of the conventional army for control of population and help in economic development. And it also is known that the classical army is supposed to assure victory in the ultimate phase of a U.S. nuclear attack. China might wish to develop both the army and the nuclear weapons, but is its economy able to carry such a burden? Probably not. China's Army is second in size only to Russia's. In this Army the air arm constitutes the elite corps, whose mission is to support the land forces. According to Russian estimates China has 2,500-3,000 airplanes, most of them from Russia, and its aeronaval force consists of 300 Migs. It also has some TU-4's, a squadron of helicopters, and several transportation units. The radioelectric and radar equipment is at the stage attained by the Allied Air Force in 1942. Theoretically the Chinese Command possesses 18 divisions of fighter-bombers and 5 divisions of bombers. China considers its nuclear force to be the key for achievement of its more ambitious objectives. After the Soviets discontinued their military aid China resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft to keep others flying. Moreover China is no longer protected by Soviet deterrence. Nevertheless Chinese missiles already threaten essential Soviet territory and the U.S. Government recently admitted that if it does not have means of protection against Chinese intercontinental missiles, the credibility of its nuclear guarantee to its Asian allies will be compromised. According to Secretary McNamara's estimate China will attain operational capacity with MRBM's in 1967 and with ICBM's in 1976. Also some Chinese class W submarines are equipped with 500-800-km. range missiles. In the next decade, avoidance of a conflict with China will probably be one of the principal problems of U.S. policy.

1115
Vernier, Bernard. [ARMIES AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST] Armée et politique au Moyen-Orient. Paris, Payot, 1966. 252 p.
UA830. V4

Historical and sociological studies of the nonmilitary role of Middle Eastern armies in politics and development. Vernier analyzes the part played by armies in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon, with special regard to the political structure of each state. At the end he examines the relation of the military to other traditional and new political forces in the Middle East. The work includes bibliographical notes and a chronology of events (p. 223-239).

1116
Zier, M. [LONG-LIVED RADIOACTIVITY IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND FALLOUT IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN 1964 AND 1965] Die langlebige Radioaktivitat der Luft und des Ausfalls in der DDR in den Jahren 1964 und 1965. Kernenergie, v. 10, Feb. 1967: 59-64. illus.
QC770. K4, v. 10

The results of measurements made by the Meteorological Service of the G. D. R. for determining the long-lived radioactivity of air and fallout in 1964 and 1965 are given. The mean annual value of air activity was 0·2pCi/$m^3$ in 1965, i. e. only 1/20 of the 1963 value. Radioactive fallout is related to air activity and the amount of atmospheric precipitations and, therefore, is 2 to 4 times higher at the mountain stations (Brocken and Inselsberg) than in the flat-land stations. For days free from precipitation the fallout activity increases nearly proportionally to air activity. Fission products from the two Chinese tests have been determined already 10 and 7 days after the explosions, respectively. (Abstract supplied)

1117
Zifferstein, Isidore. PSYCHOLOGICAL HABITUATION TO WAR: A SOCIOPSYCHOLIGICAL CASE STUDY. American journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 37, Apr. 1967: 457-468. RA790. AlA5, v. 37

In wartime the U. S. Government has often attempted to suppress dissent through appeals to patriotism as well as forceful methods. The Vietnamese War seems relatively free of such actions, perhaps because the obvious techniques of previous wars have been supplanted by more subtle methods, which are "effective without being offensive"--methods introduced and refined through the new "science" of public relations and the mass media. This technique requires very gradual escalation of the war effort in order that each seemingly small and insignificant step prepares the public for increasingly greater involvement. Such gradualness produces "habituation to the involvement." Once the Nation is deeply involved, other arguments emerge, for example that the nation is in danger and our boys are dying. At this stage there is no longer a need for suppressive measures to guarantee pro-war consensus. These new and subtle methods are much more difficult to counteract psychologically, because the suppression comes from within the individual in the form of self-censorship. As the problems of the war and of the Nation's involvement confuse the average citizen, he resolves his anxieties by leaving all decisions to the "father-figures, the all-powerful President and his all-knowing expert advisers," with great relief. Whether gradual habituation to the Vietnamese War was deliberately planned or simply happened is difficult to judge. The process of habituation is reinforced through the mass media by news management and manipulation. The technique is simple: first, alarming rumors are spread about a pending jump in the war effort; next the President announces a more moderate action; finally, after a general public sigh of relief, the originally rumored level of escalation is implemented. News management is not new. What is new and most alarming is the extent to which it is used today with the open assent of high Government officials and accepted by a large majority of the American people.

# III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

## A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1118
Mahnke, Hans H. [THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS] Die politische Bedeutung des Völkerrechts. Europäische Begegnung, v. 7, Jan. 1967: 20-24. P&GP RR
Bibliography: p. 24.

The notion that the law of nations is a political law may be viewed as a negation of the law's very reason for existence by all those who think of law and politics as totally antithetical provinces. Yet failure to recognize the political character of international law leads all too often to gross misconstruction of its actual realm and false illusions of its moral scope. It is necessary to recognize the constant processes of change that transform thoroughly political matters into law, or vice versa, or shift their accent from one to the other. For example the once-absolute right of every sovereign state to recognition by all other states has been gradually ground away by the policy of expediency. The reverse process, whereby an entirely political matter becomes law, has taken place over the past 50 years with regard to the problem of aggressive war. War of this kind has been outlawed per se. Prior to this development the launching of wars belonged totally to the "law-free area"; the prerogatives of sovereign powers to start wars were unrestricted in any sense by general international law. The two areas, mandatory legal norms and the law-free area, along with the third, consisting of dispositive legal norms upon which each state is free to draw, cover the full scope of international affairs, or, in the case of an individual state, its foreign policy. The ideological-doctrinal attitude of the Soviet Union toward the international legal system greatly impedes the system's effectiveness and loosens its cohesiveness. On the other hand the reciprocal interest of the East and the West in a certain amount of "legal conformity of behavior" in their mutual dealings and the fact that they cannot be completely isolated from each other fosters the integration of the law of nations within attainable political limits.

1119
Steiger, Heinhard. [ON THE UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS] Zur Begründung der Universalität des Völkerrechts. Der Staat, v. 5, no. 4, 1966: 423-450. P&GP RR
Bibliographical footnotes.

The raison d'être of the law of nations is and has always been peace between the states of its realm. As a legal phenomenon international peace merely replaces the Hobbesian "state of nature" with the "state of law," wherein the sovereign nations obligate themselves to use their external power in an orderly (foreseeable) fashion that is conducive to the maintenance of peace even when antagonistic relations exist between them. International peace in the legal sense is never absolute, but relative, for it does not subdue the sovereign power of states, the sole bearers and executors of the legal order. An absolute peace would be based on the religious or political unity of nations; it may reinforce the legal peace, but never substitute for it, for subjective values, based on conscience, can never be institutionalized without objective law. Over the last few centuries the European law of nations has been diluted into a rudimentary worldwide one, with its universal validity still an unsettled question. The problem is further complicated by the existence of antagonistic blocs. Three ways have been suggested to prove the universal validity of the international legal order: (1) a call for certain values to be shared by all nations and blocs; (2) the implementation of existing norms that have been accepted by all states; and (3) the establishment of a "genuine central world authority." However, the arguments of Myres S. McDougal, Wilfred Jenks, and Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, the spokesmen of each of these doctrines, cannot withstand legal and factual criticism. Without the recognition of states, each in its legal-political peculiarity and differentia, and without the recognition of the "formal principle of freedom" (each state's sovereignty), no logical justification can be made for the universally binding norms of general international law. The strength and intensity of the present law depends each time on the measure to which peace exists in the world.

## B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1120
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. SEVENTEENTH REPORT--NEW DIMENSIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADE. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1966. 225 p.
JX1908.U6C62

Considers the challenges the United Nations faces in the immediate future: (1) To reconcile the principle of one vote for each state with the fact that some nations are able to make a greater contribution than others to international society; (2) To improve its lawmaking process; (3) To move toward genuine peace settlements and a strengthened system of peacekeeping, peaceful settlement, and collective security looking eventually toward total disarmament; (4) To promote the sharing of the unclaimed resources of the world community (such as outer space); (5) To narrow the gap between rich and poor nations; and (6) To enhance the independence and efficiency of the Secretariat. The study contains the Commission's recommendations and report and a supplementary paper on each of the above subjects.

1121
Hester, Hugh B. THE SICKNESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: HOW THE UNITED NATIONS IS BEING USED FOR GLOBAL POWER. Journal of human relations, v. 15, no. 1, 1967: 81-92.
H1.J55, v. 15

The United Nations, because of its subservience to the capitalist West and particularly the United States, is incapable of promoting world peace in the Far East or anywhere else. It has failed because the United States has both used it as an instrument for world domination and ignored it to solve problems unilaterally or through NATO, SEATO, and the Organization of American States. The United Nations allowed itself to be dragged into the Korean conflict in 1950 and refused to condemn U.S. intervention in the Chinese and Vietnamese civil wars. With this record of subservience to U.S. interests, is it any wonder that rulers in both parts of Vietnam refuse U.N. mediation or interference? Vietnam is clearly an extension of the U.S. policy to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific. The American people must choose between accepting an illegal and immoral war imposed upon them by their Government or forcing a change in policy by massive nonviolent opposition. It is a choice between loyalty to one's nation and loyalty to humanity.

1122

Horn, Francis H. EDUCATION AND ACHIEVING A WORLD UNITED UNDER LAW. Humanist world digest, v. 40, winter 1967: 14-15, 16-19.
B821.A1H85, v. 40

Man can build a world community united under law. To this end he must strengthen the United Nations, intensify efforts toward disarmament, terminate the war in Vietnam, reduce threats to peace in other trouble spots, provide massive economic aid to underprivileged people, and establish the rule of law for nations, bringing them into increasingly large federations and eventually into world government. Education can prepare both leaders and citizens for world government and convince them of its importance.

1123

Lapter, Karol. PUGWASH AND PEACE. Polish perspectives, v. 10, Jan. 1967: 42-48.
DK401.P7947, v. 10

The Vietnam War dominated the mood of the 16th Pugwash Conference "like a thunder cloud," but was not strongly condemned officially despite the fact that most of the delegates, who met in Sopot, Poland in September, acknowledged its seriousness and few defended U.S. policy. This war, added to other events of the past 3 years, has greatly dimmed the chances of general disarmament, and the Conference therefore devoted most of its attention to measures meant to check the arms race. Agreement was impossible to obtain on either the condemnation of a new antiballistic missile race or a call for a freeze on means of delivery. The Conference did, however, approve nuclear-free zones for Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the establishment of which would be tantamount to freezing the status quo. Various proposals, most of them centered around a detection threshhold, were advanced for extending the nuclear test ban to underground explosions. Once again a nonproliferation treaty gained the support of the Pugwash delegates. Peace and security in Europe represented another facet of the Sopot discussions. A Polish paper favored an integrated Europe with a system of collective security that "would not aspire to the role of the third world power." The paper asserted that Germany, particularly the policy of the Bonn government, represents an obstacle to European unity, but the problems of the two German nations must be subordinated to the interests of the whole Continent. Over its 9 years of existence the environment within which the Pugwash movement operates has altered, as has the movement itself. American-Soviet cooperation is blocked now not by weak diplomatic connections but by deep political rifts, and the world is less neatly polarized. Pugwash itself has become less personal and more official. It may soon need a more permanent and well-defined structure.

1124

Zacher, Mark W. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE UNITED NATIONS' FUNCTION OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. International organization, v. 20, autumn 1966: 724-749. illus.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

In the early years of the United Nations the Secretary General's role as an agent of peaceful settlement was small, but since December 1954 it has grown rapidly. Between 1954 and 1965 the Secretary General or bodies under his direction were delegated settlement responsibilities by the Security Council or the General Assembly in 16 cases. While Trygve Lie's initiatives did not meet with much success, Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant succeeded at least partially in about half of their attempts. The Secretary General's enlarged role responds to a major need in the world—an impartial and objective agent upon whom states can call for mediatory assistance in settling their disputes. In most cases this function is better performed by an individual than by a committee. During Hammarskjöld's tenure U.N. members altered their opinions of the kinds of situations suitable for action by the Secretary General, largely due to their recognition of Hammarskjöld's superior diplomatic skills. The initiation of peacekeeping operations under the executive direction of the Secretary General (which puts him in contact with parties to conflicts) and the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions at the United Nations (which gives him continuing contact with high government officials) have both had significant impact on the Secretary General's peaceful-settlement activities. The development of the Secretary General's role has given the United Nations a certain nascent autonomy from its members in international politics and made it a more active center for the resolution of international disputes. If the drift toward supranationality continues, the mediatory activities of the Secretary General and his staff are likely to continue expanding.

## C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1125

Clarke, Andrew. U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: WHY DON'T THEY LEARN WHILE THEY SERVE? World federalist, Dec. 1966: 7-8.
JX1901.W825, 1966

The inability of the U.N. Security Council to create a permanent peacekeeping force or cope with crises has forced the General Assembly to create temporary forces for specific purposes. While such operations have been successful in containing conflicts, to continue to rely on impromptu forces without advance planning and training or adequate logistical arrangements is to court disaster. Nearly all nations support the need for more reliable U.N. peacekeeping machinery, but progress toward this goal has been slow. One of the main problems is political control--how, when, and by whose authority the force would be used. The need for U.N. peacekeeping activities will continue to

grow as major powers attempt to avoid active involvement in the many potential trouble spots throughout the world. A summer education program in existing universities could give candidates specialized training for peacekeeping tasks. These U. N. -trained forces could gradually replace the national forces now engaged in peacekeeping operations, and the national forces in turn might also receive instruction. Since no national government is likely to carry out the research necessary to implement such a proposal, the World Association of World Federalists should undertake the task.

1126
Goldberg, Arthur J. U.S. RECAPITULATES BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR U. N. PEACEKEEPING FUNCTIONS In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Apr. 17 1967: 636-641.
JX232. A33, v. 56

Statement "made in the U. N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Working Group A, on Mar. 22, " 1967.

Discusses the principles basic to the U.S. position on peacekeeping. The United Nations must possess the capacity to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly when an emergency arises, and member nations must agree upon "viable and equitable financial arrangements" to carry out this function. The powers and responsibilities of the Secretary General in peacekeeping, as in all facets of his work, must be respected. The United States believes that no nation should have veto power over a U. N. peacekeeping operation.

1127
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: ASSEMBLY DEFERS REPORT TO SPECIAL SESSION. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Jan. 1967: 68-79.
JX1977. AIU564, v. 4

Reports on the December 1966 deliberations of the U. N. General Assembly Special Political Committee on draft resolutions regarding U. N. peacekeeping operations and the problems of financing them. The article also gives an account of General Assembly debate on the subject and its action on the Committee's report.

1128
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: COMMITTEE CONSIDERS DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, Dec. 1966: 66-70.
JX1977. AIU564, v. 3

An account of discussions during November 1966 in the U. N. General Assembly Special Political Committee on draft resolutions concerning U. N. peacekeeping operations. The article outlines views of delegations on proposed measures, including the financing of "the United Nations capacity to maintain the international peace and security."

1129
A PERMANENT INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE? Intelligence digest, v. 29, Mar. 1967: 13-15.
D410. R47, v. 29

Latin American nations are using talk about the creation of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force, to which they know the United States is committed, to induce Washington to increase its foreign aid handouts. Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic appear to be seriously pushing the peace force idea, while considerable resistance is expected from Mexico and Chile. Mexico, remembering its war with the United States in the 19th century, has always been obsessed by the possibility of U.S. interference and has consistently opposed any measures by the Organization of American States which justify either unilateral or multilateral intervention. The United States is unlikely to get the idea approved in 1967.

1130
SOVIET MEMORANDUM ON U. N. PEACE-KEEPING ACTIONS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 19, Apr. 26, 1967: 6-7, 35.
D839. C87, v. 19
Translated from Izvestiia, Apr. 6, 1967.
Slav Rm

Complete text of a memorandum that states the Soviet position toward Irish and Canadian proposals to revise the U. N. Charter and invest the General Assembly with the authority to adopt binding decisions on questions of peace and security maintenance.

1131
Tackaberry, R. B. ORGANIZING AND TRAINING PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: THE CANADIAN VIEW. International journal, v. 22, spring 1967: 195-209.
D839. I5, v. 22

Canada is one of 40 U. N. members responsible for providing military observers and truce supervisory officers in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Regular, not reserve, officers are selected as for a normal military assignment, but their orientation is then directed along lines specific to peacekeeping duty. Instruction depends mainly on the officer's particular assignment, but all observer candidates are given a solid background in U. N. organization and activities. Organizing and training national units earmarked for U. N. assignment is more difficult than indoctrinating observers, since no two peacekeeping situations are the same. The standby units are organized on the assumption that they will be required to move quickly into troubled areas. They must be equipped suitably for air transport, and they must take with them enough supplies for a 7-day operation. Experience has proven the utility of first-class communication and transportation facilities. All Canadian regular army headquarters, formations, and units receive some training in peacekeeping and security operations, although their degree of specialized or technical training varies, and all can be readied for U. N. service on comparatively short notice. U. N. -designated units are trained not only in air mobility but also crowd control and dispersal, police activities, protection practices, road blocks, search and patrol, and other techniques. Each serviceman in these units also receives a thorough indoctrination in the nature of his mission, the "ground rules" of peacekeeping operations, and the customs of the host country. Because of the urgency generally associated with U. N. operations, Canadian Forces Headquarters retains operational control over the deployment of U. N. standby battalions. The unit's advance party must be able to move on 96 hours' notice and the main body of the unit in 7 days. Much of the effectiveness of U. N. peacekeeping forces depends on the efficiency of U. N. command-and-control arrangements, which in Canada's experiences have shown serious deficiencies. United Nations members must recognize the Secretary General's need of a small military staff to undertake the planning required for peacekeeping operations. The Secretary General should request permission to establish an advisory committee that would plan a permanent peacekeeping force and make proposals to improve the efficiency of

the present ad hoc arrangement. Until the U. N. improves its peacekeeping structure nations must cooperatively exchange information and experiences.

## D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1132
Beglov, S. AND WHAT AFTER THE BLOCS? Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Mar. 24, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 1, 1-4.
Slav Rm

U. S. politicians maintain that the abolition of military blocs such as NATO, CENTO, and SEATO will create vacuums which will be difficult to fill. That is dangerous logic. Obviously the blocs can easily be replaced by a security system based on cooperation of countries with different social systems and guaranteeing mutual security. This system will not be incompatible with neutralization and denuclearization, which many countries genuinely desire. It will be no obstacle to the restoration of the guaranteed neutrality of small European countries (Belgium), and in Southeast Asia it will allow the population to decide their destiny freely under a guarantee of noninterference.

1133
Bennett, John C., and others. THE ROAD TO PEACE: CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT. Philadelphia, Fortress Press [1966] 54 p. (Facet books. Social ethics series, 10)
JX1963. R62

Contents. --Christian approaches to defence and disarmament, by Kenneth Johnstone. --The view of a German scientist, by Carl F. von Weizsäcker. --The view of an American theologian, by J. C. Bennett. --The view of a British diplomat, by Sir Michael Wright. --Bibliography.

Four articles concerned with the problem of preserving world peace, particularly in Central Europe, and establishing a peaceful world order. Johnstone supplies a general background and points to issues needing deeper examination. Von Weizsäcker comments generally on the present situation and ultimate world goals. Bennett discusses the problems of justice and international morality in a nuclear age. Wright surveys the problems of acnieving disarmament.

1134
Clark, Grenville. AN INTERVIEW WITH GRENVILLE CLARK: THE LEGACY OF A GREAT AMERICAN. McCall's, v. 44, Apr. 1967: 64, 164-165, 168.
TT500. M2, v. 44

An interview with "the founder and leader of the worldwide movement that can best be described as an attack on war." Clark's proposals for world government, world law, and an enforced system of disarmament have been published throughout the world. While the interview consists largely of Clark's personal reminiscences of various events and experiences, it also contains his views on strengthening the United Nations, enforcing world law by a world police force, and taking steps toward world peace.

1135
DISARMAMENT: RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE W. F. S. W. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, 2 SEPTEMBER 1966. Scientific world, v. 10, no. 4, 1966: 3.
Q1. S8415, v. 10

The main weakness of the effort to reduce international tensions comes from the fact that specific problems like disarmament are studied separately from the political problems created by the division of the world into two camps, e.g., the Vietnamese War, the explosive situation in Central Europe and elsewhere, and the existence of military bases on foreign territories. All steps toward large-scale disarmament should be considered in connection with the settlement of political conflicts of worldwide dimensions. The World Federation of Scientific Workers recommends a review of all the essential problems by a group of distinguished international experts, who then will prepare material for a conference in the United Nations. This conference can discuss all the economic, scientific, and political aspirations of the individual states and the ways for meeting them, as well as general and complete disarmament. It should be done soon, because the only alternative seems to be a movement toward an inevitable catastrophe.

1136
DO WE NEED PEACE CANDIDATES? 1. THE CASE FOR THE MAINSTREAM, by Theodore C. Sorensen; 2. BUILDING FROM THE GRASS ROOTS, by Arthur I. Waskow. Saturday review, v. 50, Feb. 4, 1967: 32-33.
Z1219. S25, v. 50

Sorensen: To call the candidacies of various Republicans, Democrats, independents, New Leftists, and Communists an American "peace politics movement" is an absurdity. To claim that votes received by successful candidates represented demands for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam is the height of naivete. Support of peace candidates by extremists in politics, appearance, and mores makes it more difficult for voters or candidates to identify with peace causes, and easier for hardliners to ignore all pleas in that direction. Peace candidates entered as independent or write-in candidates divert money and energy sorely needed by the least hawkish main party-candidate into a hopeless effort. In short the peace politics movement is not a movement, does not serve the interests of peace, and clearly knows little about politics. People who are stirred by the war should not drop all interest in politics, but should take a realistic interest by seeking to influence those major party figures who will make the key decisions.
Waskow: There is an issue in American politics more important than victory or defeat on election day: the number of people who come together and stay together to organize, pressure, and question. Without such a group at home a victorious peace candidate may be distracted from his original commitments, and with them a defeated candidate can build a base for another day. Only by joining the issue of war and peace to issues of immediate domestic concern can the peace movement command attention. In communities the peace movement should take the lead in bringing together the "new class," allied in its commitment to a "peace and freedom budget." Such a budget should spell out the savings possible if the war in Vietnam were ended and explain how this money could be put to social uses. Candidates for 1968 can start campaigning now on this platform. The goal is creation of new working relationships around the question of peace, which will stay alive even if an election is lost.

1137
MacDonald, R. St. J. THE RESORT TO ECONOMIC COERCION BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. University of Toronto law journal, v. 17, no. 1, 1967: 86-169. LL

A review of four situations in which international political organizations have used economic coercion against one of their members to persuade him to conform to the organization's policies. The instances studied are the Ethiopian case of 1935, the South African case presently before the United Nations, the Dominican case of 1960, and the current Cuban case. As the author feels that environment plays a large part in political crises, he gives a fairly detailed account of the contrasting atmospheres in which the four situations developed and worked themselves out. He considers the factual background, objective desired, and response of the organization.

1138
PEACE BEGINS IN THE MINDS OF MEN. UNESCO courier, July/Aug. 1966: 46-49.
P&GP RR

Excerpts from the speeches of eleven prominent individuals connected with UNESCO on the topic: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." Thus begins the preamble to the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

1139
Quade, Edward S. SOME PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1966. 21 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-3391) AS36. R28, no. 3391

Reviews systems analysis, which, although it relies on judgment and intuition (like any other decisionmaking system), through its building of analytical models can "yield results which transcend any individual judgment." Quade also warns of pitfalls in the paths of decisionmakers using systems analysis--for example, becoming more interested in the model than in the problem to be solved, or assuming that the method's potential for supplying advice is unlimited.

1140
Read, Herbert. THE PREREQUISITES OF PEACE. Gandhi marg, v. 11, Jan. 1967: 25-30.
DS481. G3G22, v. 11

Whatever heroism and self-sacrifice once existed in warfare have disappeared, leaving only the irrationality and absurdity of immediate obliteration of whole communities. Only Freud's death-wish can adequately explain the conception of and preparation for universal holocaust. Aggression is first and foremost an individual problem that must be solved before men can eliminate war. All antisocial, destructive behavior has a single cause: social adaptation resulting from "control of egoistic instincts for the assumed benefit of society as a whole." Suppression of primary erotic instincts on the basis of so-called "morality and civilization" is based on a systematic repression of the aggressive tendencies that arise from the frustration of the erotic instincts. To meet the challenge of nuclear war mankind must redeem some of its deepest instincts and subject them to new disciplines and positive aims. Worldwide infant care under trained specialists could prevent the formation of maternal anxieties and induce a happy, relaxed relationship between mother and child. Reorientation of education toward the natural environment and creative and constructive ends could provide an antidote to destruction. Although aggressive instincts are individual in origin, their disastrous consequences arise from their collective accumulation. Since war is a function of the state, peace depends on the decentralization of power. "There can be no peace on earth so long as individual freedom is suppressed in the interest of a class, a race, a creed or even in the interest of peace itself."

1141
Strammer, Heinz. PEACE UNIVERSITY IN BELGIUM. Sarvodaya, v. 16, Feb. 1967: 368-371.
HD871. A1S26, v. 16

In the small city of Huy, Belgium, Father Dominique Pire, winner of the 1958 Nobel Peace Prize, heads a unique institution known as Peace University. Father Pire insists he is not naive enough to believe he will build world peace in this University, but he feels any contribution to understanding between men fosters peace and eliminates the causes of war. In the last few years, he notes, 4000 people have come to the University to talk and think together, and the circle is constantly widening. "Peace by brotherly dialogue" is Father Pire's credo. Peace, he says, is not the "silence of guns"; it is the elimination of hostility in men's hearts. It cannot be enforced by violence or nonviolence, but rather through better understanding between men and nations. A dialogue is useless if one tries to convert another to his truth. A person must live according to his own principles, but should always try to understand the convictions of others and recognize that good and evil, truth and error, never reside on only one side. Father Pire advises his students to avoid "anti" positions (antiwar, anticommunism, etc.) and to act positively. Protest actions have little use; "one has to engage himself."

# IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

## A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1142
Davis, Gerald H. THE "PETROLITE" INCIDENT: A WORLD WAR I CASE STUDY ON THE LIMITATIONS OF WARFARE. Historian, v. 29, Feb. 1967: 238-248. D1. H22, v. 29

The several attempts to limit World War I included Austria-Hungary's endeavor to solve its Serbian problems without Russia, Russia's hope to influence Austria-Hungary without involving Germany, Germany's attempts to limit its submarine operations, America's wish to remain neutral, and Italy's hope to maintain neutrality toward Germany while at war with Austria-Hungary. All of these policies of moderation failed, partly because of the complexities involved in limiting warfare, but also because they "lacked the soldierly simplicity of 'war to the utmost' or 'peace through victory.'" The incident of the American tanker Petrolite presents a particular challenge to the proponents of limited warfare, for it exemplifies many of the failures noted above. Briefly, on Dec. 5, 1915, the Petrolite was fired upon by a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag. The American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, demanded an explanation from the Austro-Hungarian Government, which downgraded the incident. At this same time heated exchanges were taking place between the German and American Governments on the wartime rights of neutrals on the high seas and the effect of submarine warfare on merchant shipping. Germany finally promised limited acquiescence to American demands. During June 1916, America reopened the Petrolite incident and Austria-Hungary delayed giving satisfaction to Secretary Lansing. More significant, however, are the diplomatic exchanges between Berlin and Vienna. The Petrolite had been attacked by a German submarine (flying the Austro-Hungarian flag) that was carrying out Germany's policy of covert warfare against Italy. Italy was at war with Austria-Hungary but not with Germany. In order not to expose Germany's involvement in the Petrolite incident, Vienna wanted the German submarines transfered to Austria-Hungary. Germany agreed to the full transfer in name only when Italy declared war on Germany. The flotilla remained outside the Austro-Hungarian naval command, and the Germans exerted their authority to gain greater influence over Austro-Hungarian naval operations. It was perhaps inevitable that German dominance of the alliance would ensue and that greater coordination throughout the military command and the entente would be required. Italian participation had escalated as was America's to follow. This chain of events "eroded away those limits upon the extension of war which the Petrolite case illustrates."

1143
Genevey, Pierre. [DISARMAMENT AFTER THE VERSAILLES TREATY] Le désarmement après le traité de Versailles. Politique étrangére, v. 32, no. 1, 1967: 87-112. JX3. P6, v. 32

A lesson applicable to any general disarmament and arms control agreement can be drawn from a retrospective glance at the disarmament of Germany from 1919 to 1927. Undoubtedly as far as armaments are concerned the Allies attained in 1927 the goals they set for themselves in 1919. The Control Commission developed high efficiency. However the abolition of armaments did not prevent Germany from swift and complete rearmament with the most modern and effective weapons an eminently industrial country can produce. Nor did it abolish militarism and break the German spirit of revenge. Quite the contrary--it stimulated the national spirit and desire for power of the German people. Thus unilateral disarmament that is not followed by general disarmament actually attains no durable goals. In any future agreement on general disarmament and arms control the circumstances and objectives will be different, and many obstacles met in previous negotiations will be absent. Thus the understandable opposition of the public to unilateral control will vanish if the control operates equitably in all countries. Public opinion will probably support it and help to uncover clandestine production and retention of armaments. In the nuclear age reducing troops is irrelevant, and control will gain in efficacy if it concentrates only on controllable objects, arms. Sanctions against treaty violations will remain a delicate problem. But the Cologne experience in 1927 could perhaps serve as example. If general disarmament or even partial disarmament can be achieved at all, this study shows an optimistic outlook for control.

1144
Muste, Abraham J. THE ESSAYS OF A. J. MUSTE. Edited by Nat Hentoff. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co, [1967] 515 p.
JX1963. M8455
"Notes on previous publication": p. 514-515.

The writings of the noted American pacifist. Ranging from 1905 to 1966, these essays deal with such diverse aspects of peace, war, and morality as the labor movement, Christian theology, nuclear weapons, scientists and their responsibility, and the Vietnam War.

1145
Salewski, Michael. [DISARMAMENT AND MILITARY CONTROL IN GERMANY, 1919-1927] Entwaffnung und Militärkontrolle in Deutschland, 1919-1927. München, R. Oldenbourg, 1966. 421 p.
D650. D5
"Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik E. V., Band 24."
Bibliographical footnotes.
Bibliography: p. 401-410.

The Treaty of Versailles required that Germany's disarmament be completed within a specified period of time. Its execution was to be supervised by the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission. The Treaty also provided for universal disarmament under the new League of Nations. Germany believed this would solve the problem of its national security, but disillusionment with this idea came quite quickly. Germany endured encroachment on its sovereignty by the

Allies' expansive interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Facing this, as well as the undiminished military strength of its neighbors, the constant danger of Soviet invasion (an argument against Germany's too thorough disarmament to which London was receptive), and revolutionary unrest at home, Germany had no choice but to put its security interests above some of its Treaty obligations. No nation can be required by international law to give up its security. The Reichswehr and the Government were thus actually obliged to resort to expedients violating the Versailles Treaty. Many of the disarmament provisions (especially those regarding "war material") were too ambiguous for both sides to agree on their application. Due to that discrepancy and to the ingenuity of the methods employed by German industry, Germany saved a great deal of its industry from destruction by the Allied Powers. Still a great amount of the nation's arms and a considerable percentage of its industry were put out of order. Through its diplomacy, and in a roundabout way, Germany exerted influence on the governments of the Allied Powers, to the effect that in some instances the activities of the Inter-Allied Control Commission were curbed, until finally the Commission ceased to exist in 1927. Franco-British rivalry had also contributed to a number of the concessions won by Germany. Germany's disarmament in 1919-1927 was bound to fail, due to its execution by foreign powers. That kind of disarmament can never succeed. Only voluntary disarmament, executed by the disarming nation itself without any outside interference, can be fully successful.

## B. GENERAL ANALYSES

1146
Burhop, E. H. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT. Scientific world, v. 10, no. 4, 1966: 17-20. Q1. S8415, v. 10

Presented to the 28th meeting of the World Federation of Scientific Workers Executive Council, Varna, Bulgaria, Sept. 1966.

Deplores the inefficiency and inertia of the nuclear powers in promoting disarmament. After reviewing the disarmament and arms control proposals made since 1963 the author urges the necessity of agreeing on general and complete disarmament in the near future. He feels that partial disarmament measures, although constituting a step forward, will never be able to solve the central problem. Partial measures deal primarily with small states, and leave the great powers "in full possession of their nuclear arms." Concentrating on this approach dims the prospects of achieving disarmament.

1147
Halperin, Morton H. ARMS CONTROL: APPROACHES AND ISSUES. In his Contemporary military strategy. Boston, Little, Brown [c1967] p. 143-152. U162. H26

"Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs Harvard University."

The most fundamental conflict in discussions of arms control has been over their ultimate goal. To some it is general and complete disarmament--the total elimination of organized international military forces except under control of an international institution--and to others it is a system of stabilized deterrence under which the United States and the Soviet Union retain small nuclear forces. Even if it is attainable, pursuit of GCD may not be the best course for the United States. The Nation is not interested in disarmament for its own sake but in peace throughout a just and secure world. It remains to be shown that U. S. goals are more effectively pursued in a world without arms than in a world with moderate armaments under close control. The commitment to GCD and the drafting of treaties and proposals consumes time that arms control conferences could spend more fruitfully on other measures and gives the whole negotiation process an unreal propaganda quality. The United States should announce that, while it favors GCD in principle, such an agreement is impractical in the near future. Nuclear proliferation is undoubtedly against the U. S. interest, reducing American influence and power and increasing the likelihood of the weapons being used and of general nuclear war. However the extent to which formal arms control measures can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons remains an open question. Basically the solution is to increase the political cost of weapons programs to various countries by increasing the technological cost, by restricting technological information, by threatening to apply economic and political sanctions, and by enhancing the belief that nuclear weapons will not be used in any conflict. While formal proposals have been made concerning the strategic arms race, the emphasis in practice has been on unilateral moves and tacit understandings, such as the restraint which both the United States and the Soviet Union have shown in the procurement of strategic offensive and defensive systems--an agreement impossible to formalize but important in braking the strategic arms race.

1148
Sakamoto, Yoshikazu. THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE. Japan quarterly, v. 14, Jan./Mar. 1967: 17-25. DS801. J274, v. 14

International relations are a mixture of antagonism and cooperation, of enmity and mutual dependency. A given nation is never on terms of enmity with all other nations, nor are its enemies of the moment permanent nor reconciliation rare. In fact it is not unusual for nations that are in theory enemies to be at the same time interdependent and cooperative. In addition international relations are essentially relations between humans, and, as with human relations on more personal levels, the image entertained by one of the other is not always a simple reflection of reality, but in itself helps to form reality. Given these two premises, it follows that human modes of perception have played an important part in changed relationships. For example the "realist" views international relations as a state of anarchy ruled by the law of the jungle. He feels that the dominant idea in determining foreign policy should be that the worst of all possible situations for one's own nation will occur in the future, and that the nation must begin immediately to prepare for the eventuality. Such feelings, soon reciprocated by the other side, quickly result in militarization and an arms race. This pattern of behavior is a great obstacle to disarmament, as each side seeks to obtain conditions that will ensure its own safety should the other side break an agreement. Until one side takes the lead with an unequivocal policy aimed at relaxing tensions, no disarmament will occur. Charles Osgood, an American psychologist, calls this the concept of a "graduated unilateral initiative for peace." In order to convert international relations from anarchistic power politics to peaceful coexistence and cooperation, one side at least must realize that, despite various conflicts of interest, shared interests also exist; that side must take a unilateral initiative, i.e., must gamble on the possibility of increasing those shared interests still further. The United States, with its overwhelming

military and economic superiority, can afford to take that unilateral initiative in its relations with Communist China, and can do so without threatening its own security. As indicated by the maxim "noblesse oblige" it is the stronger of the two sides that bears the greater responsibility.

1149
Senghaas, Dieter. [ARMS CONTROL: GENESIS AND DIMENSIONS OF A STRATEGIC CONCEPT] Arms Control--Rüstungskontrolle. Genesis und Dimensionen einer strategischen Konzeption. Neue politische Literatur, v. 12, no. 1, 1967: 13-26.
H5. N38, v. 12
Bibliographical footnotes.

Considers various aspects of arms control from the strategic standpoint: elimination of nuisance factors, slowing of the arms race, self-restraints in warfare, etc. Senghaas believes that simulation of arms-control situations is of very limited practical value. The author also thinks that after several years of new, overly theoretical or political concepts of arms control, a return to a conventional approach has been on the increase--the advocacy of "traditional practices of surveillance of arms reductions, inspections of demilitarized zones, and the like." The concept, however, still needs a theoretical explanation, for it postulates "an elimination of war leads to the perpetuation of the means of war." In his critique Senghaas discusses the pertinent writings of experts in the field.

1150
Sottile, Antoine. [DISARMAMENT AND VIETNAM: PROBLEMS THAT WILL NEVER BE RESOLVED] Désarmement et Vietnam; problèmes qui ne seront jamais résolus. Revue du droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, v. 44, Oct./Dec. 1966: 340-343. JX3. R37, v. 44

Albert Willot's book General and Complete Disarmament: An Approach [Le désarmement general et complet; une approche, Bruxelles, 1965] argues, erroneously, that disarmament is possible. Armament is not a direct cause of wars; thus its abolition will not assure peace. The real cause of wars is international dispute; therefore only an international agreement in which states declare war to be an international crime and pledge acceptance of pacific solutions to their disputes can bring satisfactory results. Even then it is doubtful that states will respect this agreement, as they did not honor the famous Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes that was adopted in the League of Nations on October 2, 1924. As far as Vietnam is concerned, only a nuclear war could stop Chinese interference. Even if China promises not to infiltrate, the promise must be taken with reservations. Everybody knows the value of Communists' pledges. For them international law, treaties, the Charter of the United Nations, etc., are only scraps of paper.

1151
Suinn, Richard M. THE DISARMAMENT FANTASY: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT MAY PRODUCE WARFARE. Journal of human relations, v. 15, no. 1, 1967: 36-42. H1. J55, v. 15

In an experiment designed to assess disarmament, stockpiling, and warfare behavior, two players were each given a stack of poker chips and a push button, and a third stack of chips was placed between them. To move, a player could take a chip from the third stack, discard one of his own into it, or push the button to terminate the game, making the player with fewer chips the loser. When the game was originally played in 1962 the subjects inevitably chose to acquire chips (stockpile) from the third pile, but a recent experiment showed intuitive agreement between players to discard chips (disarm) as rapidly as possible. Interviews conducted to determine the reasons for this found that players had a high degree of concern for the well-being of their opponents and belief in their sincerity. On the other hand repeated experiments showed that cooperative behavior very rapidly disintegrated into suspicion and conflict. When the game was modified so that players were not certain of their opponent's strength and weaponry the game changed considerably. Increasingly players tended to terminate the game (warfare) when they thought they were ahead. Secrecy and competitiveness definitely enhanced the likelihood of war despite cooperative impulses. Each participant's perception of the same moves varied considerably, and the game was influenced by these perceptions or misperceptions. Wars through history have had many and varied causes, but psychological factors more than any others will be responsible for nuclear war. The tactics and techniques that are the focal point of current diplomatic negotiations merely distract attention from more basic needs and problems. Competitiveness, ambiguity, and misperception must be replaced by sincere and reciprocated concern for the well-being of others.

1152
Wiesner, Jerome B. A STRATEGY FOR ARMS CONTROL. Saturday review, v. 50, Mar. 4, 1967: 17-20.
Z1219. S25, v. 50

It is possible, even today, to devise an arms control program that would in no way detract from U.S. national security. In fact such a program would almost certainly enhance it. The Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament for the White House Conference on the International Cooperation Year recommended a series of individual limited measures that together would constitute a major step toward comprehensive world disarmament. The real problem in achieving disarmament is not, as Soviet leaders like to claim, the war in Vietnam, but the lack of genuine commitment to the goal. Very few of the world's leaders and citizens regard disarmament as realizable; therefore most are unwilling to risk a loss of national freedom and initiative to explore the untried routes needed to achieve it. Demonstrating that disarmament is practical is only half the problem; the other is to recognize that it is essential. Nations seem convinced they can ensure their security indefinitely through unilateral technical developments and vast military forces. They tend to evaluate any arms control proposal in light of the most dangerous possible eventuality while giving no weight to the consequences of continuing the arms race. This attitude reflects an almost universal failure to appreciate how rapidly the international situation can worsen in the potential trouble areas that already exist throughout Europe and the Middle and Far East. In today's world, any attempt to implement in one step a detailed and comprehensive plan for global disarmament is hopeless. On the other hand nations can begin a step-by-step program of arms limitation experiments to learn how to create the desired world--if they agree on the need for a disarmed world. The Arms Control and Disarmament Panel, believing that the best way to make progress toward disarmament is to start, recommended a series of measures that are separately negotiable, require no inspection, and, taken together, comprise a major step toward disarmament.

## C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

# V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

## A. NEGOTIATION

1153
Einhorn, Claire. FIFTH ANNUAL ROUND OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. German foreign policy, v. 5, no. 6, 1966: 454-462. P&GP RR

Foremost on the agenda of the 5th session of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament were measures to end the nuclear arms race: a nonproliferation treaty, a comprehensive test ban, and such measures leading toward general and complete disarmament as elimination of foreign bases, nuclear-free zones, and a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. The United States and its NATO allies were largely to blame for the Committee's lack of success. The Soviet draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is a strong proposal designed to prevent all transfers of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states and military alliances, whereas the U.S. draft contains loopholes designed to give nuclear weapons to the West German militarists. Attempts to reach agreement on a cessation of underground nuclear testing failed, largely due to U.S. insistence on on-site inspections--a tactic designed to hamper negotiations. The U.S. purpose is clearly to permit military espionage, since seismographic advances long ago made on-site inspections to detect underground explosions obsolete. The many constructive disarmament proposals made by the Socialist and nonalined nations were met by essentially meaningless Western proposals (to dismantle obsolete reactors or freeze levels of weapons already in overabundance). The peaceful nations of the world must force the West to change its attitude and allow real success in future disarmament talks.

1154
Gasteyger, Curt. THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Disarmament, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 16-20. JX1981.P7D5, 1966

Summarizes the discussions in the most recent session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. Gasteyger discusses in considerable detail both the differences and the points of agreement between the Soviet and American draft nonproliferation treaties. He reviews the demands of some nonnuclear powers that the treaty contain a balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities between nuclear and nonnuclear powers and describes the debate on collateral measures intended to halt the nuclear arms race: the comprehensive test ban, a cutoff of fissile material production, a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The author concludes that in spite of a general sense of urgency to reach positive results, the Conference failed to agree on a nonproliferation treaty, extension of the nuclear test ban treaty to underground explosions, "or indeed any other measure."

1155
Hornstein, Harvey A., and David W. Johnson. THE EFFECTS OF PROCESS ANALYSIS AND TIES TO HIS GROUP UPON THE NEGOTIATOR'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATIONS. Journal of applied behavioral science, v. 2, Oct./Dec. 1966: 449-463. Hl.J53, v. 2

Analyzes the results of an experiment designed to investigate the effects of "survey feedback"--a procedure that increases negotiators' awareness of competitive behavior and distorted perceptions in the negotiation process. The experiment showed that such techniques of process analysis as survey feedback tend to increase the negotiator's positive evaluation of the negotiations and their outcome, making success more likely. High commitment to one's own group and its position in the negotiations was found to mitigate this effect by isolating the negotiator from the opposing groups, thus promoting an illusion of the superiority of his own group's proposal and the inevitability of its success. On the other hand high satisfaction with one's own role within his group gives the negotiator confidence to deviate from the group's position.

1156
Jack, Homer A. DISARMAMENT AS A CAREER. War/peace report, v. 7, Jan. 1967: 14-16. P&GP RR

Chief negotiators for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have written books that portray disarmament negotiations as they have experienced them. British negotiatior Sir Michael Wright, in his Disarm and Verify (Praeger, 1964) finds the lack of agreement on verification and international peacekeeping machinery and the requirement for assurances that no side will gain a military advantage the chief stumbling blocks to more fruitful negotiations. Sir Michael assesses U.S., British, and Soviet disarmament intentions. Arthur Dean's Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation (Harper & Row, 1966) "is noteworthy for its discussions of the Soviet style of disarmament negotiations and the U.S. position." Mr. Dean, the American negotiator at both the nuclear test ban treaty conference and the beginning of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference meetings, advises knowing the opponent well and exercising "patience, persistence, calm toughness of mind, a nature impervious to insults, a constantly creative and resourceful mind, and unwillingness to be discouraged." While negotiating for disarmament may be useful, real progress will be made at the highest political decisionmaking level. One must note that a conservative such as Mr. Dean, who would negotiate a U.S. disarmament policy that is "correct, prudent and competent," may not serve U.S. interests in a fast-changing world that requires flexibility. In his Megamurder (Irwin, Toronto, 1966) Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns (an active Canadian negotiator) presents the military arguments for nuclear armaments and war, and concludes that disarmament is the only reasonable course of action. He proposes that nations seek security in disarmament and the means for peaceful settlement of disputes. Regarding Soviet negotiating attitudes, Gen. Burns feels that his counterparts are functioning at a disadvantage in that the West assumes the Soviet Union is negotiating agreements with the intention of violating them.

1157
Jack, Homer A. U.N. ACTS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. Sane world, v. 6, Jan. 1967: 4.
P&GP RR

The treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space was the sole concrete gain in the field of disarmament made by the 21st U.N. General Assembly. The Assembly spent much time discussing nonproliferation and although no treaty emerged many new insights were developed. Security guarantees to nonnuclear states and the role of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards also were topics of debate. The Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution urging: that all states adhere to the partial nuclear test ban treaty; that nuclear states suspend testing in all environments; that states exchange seismic data; and that the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament [ENDC] conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. Hungary accused the United States of using chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam, prompting the United States to defend its refusal to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Some nations expressed disappointment that the ENDC paid less attention to the topic of general and complete disarmament than in previous years, and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson deplored the antiballistic missile race as a danger to international stability. While some diplomats undoubtedly desire disarmament, "the mounting arms race appears to be matched only by the mounting verbatim disarmament resolutions."

1158
Lambert, Robert W. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, SEPTEMBER 1962-SEPTEMBER 1965. [Prepared by Robert W. Lambert with the assistance of Jacqueline S. Mithun. Washington] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; [for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966] 103 p. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Publication 32)
JX1974. A1U52, no. 32

Supplements Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Department of State publication 7258, 1961) and International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962 (ACDA publication 9, 1962)

Bibliographical footnotes.

Records the history of the nuclear test ban negotiations 1962-65, emphasizing 1963, the year the treaty was signed and ratified by a majority of the countries of the world. While progress has been made in the control of nuclear testing, "a comprehensive test ban remains a major objective of the United States Government."

## B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

### 1. Escalation

1159
Burnham, J. Bernard. THE BIT-BY-BIT WAR. National review, v. 19, Jan. 10, 1967: 35-37.
AP2. N3545, v. 19

U.S. strategy in Vietnam since early 1965 has been a careful and cautious escalation of the conflict--a policy of "incremental escalation." In addition to domestic and international political considerations, a major force shaping this policy is the large school of civilian strategists and "conflict management" experts who point to its supposed ability to minimize risks and maximize gains. Such strategists believe that in this age of cost-effectiveness and systems analysis, incremental escalation is a rational approach to the problem of war. Advocates of incremental escalation in Vietnam claim that gradually increasing military and economic pressure on North Vietnam will force its withdrawal from the South. The results to date have all been negative. What the experts fail to realize is that the very rationality of the doctrine destroys its effectiveness. Anticipating U.S. policy, the North Vietnamese have been able to prepare themselves militarily, economically, and psychologically for each successive step-up in the war. For example, by the time the United States finally bombed the oil depots of Hanoi and Haiphong, the North Vietnamese had already dispersed a large supply of materials to smaller depots throughout the country. As long as the effects of a particular course of action by the opposition are foreseen and planned for, its impact is diluted, sometimes to the point of irrelevancy. The alternative is to surprise the enemy--"hit him where he isn't expecting it." When the enemy is expecting and preparing for an incremental response to his provocation, the U.S. should present him with a very real "quantum jump," such as the use of atomic, chemical, or biological warfare. Incremental escalation enables the Russians and Chinese to increase their military presence in the war, and makes a major confrontation inevitable. It is a useless concept, more damaging to the United States than to the enemy.

### 2. Conventional Arms Transfers

1160
ARMS, UNLIMITED. Progressive, v. 31, Mar. 1967: 7-8.
AP2. P8655, v. 31

Unsupervised by Congress or the State Department, and operating contrary to the avowed U.S. commitment to disarmament, the Defense Department's International Logistic Negotiations office is selling weapons abroad at a multibillion-dollar rate. Despite assurances by Defense Secretary McNamara that the arms are sold in a "responsible manner" a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report found evidence of vigorous and aggressive arms-selling. The report forcefully criticized the Defense Department's "pre-emptive selling" concept--the idea that it must sell arms to nations or they will buy them elsewhere. Such aggressive merchandising of weapons intensifies the arms race in the underdeveloped world and damages European-U.S. relations. The study made the following recommendations: that the State Department's Office of Munitions Control compile quarterly reports on private and Government arms exports; that the Defense Department make full accounting of its military assistance credit account; that Congress explore various aspects of munitions sales; and that the United States press for international agreements on weapon-free zones.

1161
WHO'S ARMED WHOM? Economist, v. 222, Mar. 25, 1967: 1113-1114.
HG11. E2, v. 222

The competition among rival Arab nations to "buy anything that will fire or fly" from the most amenable or available supplier gradually changed in the mid-1950's to a situation in which each nation looked to a single great power as its source of weapons. Arms acquisition in the Middle East thus became a race

between "revolutionary" nations receiving arms from Russia and "traditionalist" nations receiving them from the West. Some nations were able to get arms from both sides, but most have come to rely on their own "great-power protector." The recent extension of this rivalry to North Africa and the Horn of Africa is of great strategic importance. The Russians recently sent to Algeria an arms supply that included 75 MIG's, 12 light bombers, 200 tanks, ground-to-air missiles, helicopters, torpedo boats, and radar systems. Morocco and Tunisia, greatly alarmed, requested American aid and British promises of protection. Somalia also recently received Soviet MIG's, helicopters, and tanks--arms that many feel are directed against American-supported Ethiopia. While nations acquire arms to further their national aims and do not regard themselves as representatives of American or Russian policy, the Soviets seem to acquire an interest in the activities of the recipient once they become involved in supplying arms. The balance of power in the Horn is a delicate one, which could be upset at any time. If a balance of power between Egypt and Saudi Arabia emerges, the great powers are unlikely to become further involved, but if the balance threatens to tilt eastward, America will undoubtedly attempt to prevent a Russian-armed nation from dominating the area.

## 3. Nuclear Proliferation

1162
Aleksandrov, A. END NUCLEAR THREAT NOW! International affairs, no. 11, Nov. 1966: 15-20. D839.1465, 1966

The 1966 session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee failed to reach agreement. The Soviet Union shares the general feeling that currently partial measures are more likely to be accepted than general and complete disarmament. Therefore, in conjunction with the United States, it submitted to the Committee a draft of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Russia proposes a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear countries (not only directly but also through alliances) and on assistance in producing nuclear weapons, as well as a renunciation by nonnuclear states of the production, acquisition, shared possession, disposal, and use of nuclear weapons. In the 21st session of the U. N. General Assembly Russia formally proposed that states renounce activities hindering the achievement of a nonproliferation agreement. Moscow has suggested including in the nonproliferation treaty a clause binding the nuclear powers "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states on whose territory such weapons are not located." Russia's aim is to protect the nonnuclear countries. Evidently the United States opposes the nontransfer proposals because it wants to transfer nuclear weapons to West Germany. It has sabotaged all efforts of the Soviet Union and the nonalined countries to promote any measure of partial disarmament, such as the underground nuclear test ban, the no-first-use declaration, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, and the closing of military bases in foreign countries. But despite all obstacles the Soviet Union feels that the disarmament debates are not fruitless, for they clarify the various positions of the negotiating states. The Soviet Union will continue its efforts toward disarmament because it is the principal goal of Moscow's own foreign policy as well as the policies of all Socialist states.

1163
Bach, Joseph H. FREE FUEL REPROCESSING FOR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS. Nuclear news, v. 10, Jan. 1967: 22-23. QC770.N75, v. 10

The broadening use of nuclear reactors as an inexpensive power source increases the dangers of nuclear spread, since the reactors are capable of generating tons of plutonium. A "free fuel reprocessing" [FFR] scheme may, however, help to impede this form of nuclear proliferation. Basically simple and relatively inexpensive, the plan would involve construction of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in "economically strategic" areas. These plants would operate under U. N. control, would possess extraterritorial status, and would be strictly regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Fuel from any nation would be reprocessed at FFR plants free of charge, provided that nation allows IAEA inspection of its power and fuel reactors. Fewer nations establishing separation plants would relieve political pressure on still other countries to set up these obvious sources of weapons material. Most plutonium and enriched uranium-235 would be returned to reactor owners "only in the form and to the extent that it can be used in the IAEA-inspected power stations." Excess fissionable material, stored, would be inaccessible for weapons use. To make acceptance of the FFR plan by the buyer a condition for the sale of uranium ores would further increase international control. Under FFR nations would be unable to secretly store large quantities of weapons material, since any government's nonadherence to or deviation from the plan would be completely evident. The plan would probably gain rapid and easy acceptance. Many countries now unable to afford the high cost of building their own reprocessing plants would welcome the opportunity to take advantage of cheap nuclear power. Since few such plants actually exist now, major transfers of facilities would be unnecessary. The U. N. general fund would provide the financial backing for FFR. Although it has been claimed that this kind of plan subsidizes nuclear energy to the detriment of other fuels, competitive prices could be maintained through national reprocessing taxes on privately owned nuclear power stations.

1164
BETWEEN CUP AND LIP. Economist, v. 222, Feb. 11, 1967: 490-491. HG11.E2, v. 222

Premier Kosygin may well be masking desire for a broader deal with the United States by his reluctance to discuss proposals to curb the new antiballistic missile race. It must be made clear to him that both nations may soon lose the opportunity to avert the new race. Moscow and Washington do seem to agree on the need for a nonproliferation treaty. In this instance other nations present the obstacle. Hopes for an agreement were raised by a decision "to give Germany a place in the new Nato nuclear planning structure," for it seemed that this would satisfy Bonn's desires for participation and at the same time assure the Soviets that a "hardware solution" had been obviated. Now serious questions have been raised by German spokesmen, who fear that a nonproliferation agreement will forever block the chances for a collective European nuclear force, the only method, they argue, by which Europe can ever guarantee its security. Another aspect of the treaty objectionable to many Germans is the possibility that it may prevent the currently nonnuclear nations from exploiting the industrial potential of nuclear energy. The treaty's supporters fear that German opposition will lend support to opposition voices in other near-nuclear nations such as India or Japan.

The latter has suggested that a nonproliferation treaty be limited to a few years' duration, a demand that points up the strong feeling of the nonmembers of the nuclear club that they will willingly stay out only if the present members begin to do something about "vertical proliferation."

1165
DISARMAMENT: GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS RESOLUTIONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Jan. 1967: 27-35. JX1977. A1U564, v. 4

Describes a series of resolutions adopted recently by the U. N. General Assembly on disarmament: one, "requesting the Secretary General to report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for states of the acquisition and further development of these weapons"; another condemning weapons of mass destruction as "incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization" and with the Geneva Protocol of June 1925 that prohibited "the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare"; the third, appealing to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament for renewed efforts aimed at "agreement on general and complete disarmament, in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the completion of a test ban treaty covering underground nuclear tests." The article explains the vote in the Assembly, reports the discussion in the Political and Security Committee with regard to a proposed elimination of foreign military bases, and includes the full texts of the resolutions.

1166
Donnelly, Harold C. HOW A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY COULD WORK. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Feb. 1967: 52-54. illus. UG633. A65, v. 50

Once a majority of the nations sign a nonproliferation treaty, how can it be monitored? Nations that have submitted to the restraints of both the partial nuclear test ban treaty and a nonproliferation treaty would be hard put under critical public opinion to make the political decision to go nuclear. If a nation did, however, it would require nuclear technology, a source of fissionable materials, and money. The flow of technological nuclear information is virtually uncontrollable, and many nations possess the capacity to develop a crude nuclear reactor program. Assuming the investment of scientific and financial resources, sources of fissionable materials become the prime consideration. Enriched uranium is produced in gaseous-diffusion plants, a very expensive process that is beyond the reach of most nonnuclear countries. The alternative, plutonium, is readily obtainable from the many nuclear reactors now in operation for peaceful purposes. Without a comprehensive nuclear test ban some nations could test crude weapons underground or even produce them without testing. The material available from these reactors can be limited to peaceful purposes through the many agreements administered by the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and the European Atomic Energy Community. American thinking leans toward international control and "the evolution of a single worldwide safeguards system." The IAEA has instituted a system of safeguards over both reactors and materials to prevent the diversion of fissionable materials to weapons development. Both the United States and the Soviet Union encourage and aid the International Atomic Energy Agency. "This program appears to be a unique existing base which can be expanded to apply advanced inspection procedures as the number and volume of nuclear powerplants increase throughout the world." If adhered to by the world's nations, a nonproliferation agreement could truly inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons.

1167
Emel'ianov, Vasilii. KEEP THE ATOM PEACEFUL. New times, no. 15, Apr. 12, 1967: 4-7. D839. N483, 1967

West Germany feels that its adherence to a nonproliferation agreement would damage its status as a modern industrial power. West German politicians argue that a nation with no nuclear-weapons capability will fall behind in scientific and technological development, thus reducing the country's ability to compete on the world market. Yet no scientific grounds for such suppositions exist. In atomic-power engineering nuclear reactions are controlled; in nuclear-weapons technology the processes are uncontrolled. The reasons for West German opposition must be sought in Bonn's reluctance to accept the reduction of tensions in Europe and in its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. West Germans should wake up and take a look at today's Europe. They might see solutions that would lead Europe toward peace and progress. They might also recognize, as the East Germans have long since done, that the "military atom" hinders rather than supports the development and activity of the "peaceful atom."

1168
Gabelić, Andro. RESPONSIBILITIES IN GENEVA. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Mar. 20, 1967: 18-20. D839. R4, v. 18

Recent reports from Geneva indicate that negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty have been halted by the opposition of Germany and the nonnuclear countries. Apparently these countries have discovered that the treaty will preserve the inequality between nuclear and nonnuclear powers. They will accept the treaty only because they do not want to aggravate the present dangerous political situation. The treaty itself will not alleviate international tension unless it is followed by gradual nuclear disarmament. The superpowers fear that one of the smaller nations might provoke general nuclear war. Thus they ask the nonnuclear countries to renounce nuclear weapons even though this, in many cases, does not serve the small countries' interests. For this sacrifice those countries are entitled to demand not only disarmament of the great powers, but also guarantees against nuclear war and nuclear blackmail. They must also be guaranteed the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful use. Other problems can be solved on the basis of U. N. General Assembly resolutions, the constructive Soviet proposals, or suggestions from the nonnuclear nations themselves. West Germany must be isolated and prevented from sabotaging the agreements.

1169
Grewe, Wilhelm G. [THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON POLICY] Über den Einfluss der Kernwaffen auf die Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Feb. 10, 1967: 77-94. D839. E86, v. 22

English translation of a portion of this article appeared in the May 1967 issue of Atlas under the title "Nuclear Sprawl . . . The Have-Not Case." AP1. A83

Traces the development phases of the nuclear era since 1945. Grewe considers the political and military roles of nuclear weapons in various conflict situations, for example the problem of nuclear blackmail and "nuclear impotence." The author discusses proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons as potentially disturbing the balance of power, and he sums up West German reservations about the proposed treaty on nuclear nonproliferation.

1170
Gupta, S. N. DESPITE ABILITY, INDIA UNLIKELY TO BUILD BOMB. Canadian nuclear technology, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1966: 40. TK9001.C34, v. 5

Canadian news media predictions that India would very soon explode a nuclear bomb have proven groundless. For many years, of course, India has had the capability to make an atomic device, but a fairly long time would be required for this potential to be transformed into any significant defense capability. Because no major threat to India's borders was foreseen, and because India was an outspoken champion of world disarmament, from the inception of its nuclear program the nation voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons. Increased Sino-Pakistani aggression coupled with China's entry into the nuclear club have increased pressure on the Indian Government to go ahead with a weapons program, but so far there are no indications it has succumbed to these blandishments. One major reason is cost. India currently has no facility capable of efficiently yielding weapons-grade plutonium (a highly expensive process) nor the industrial base necessary to launch "a full-fledged nuclear defence system." Moreover any Indian reactors, existing or planned, that might be able to produce plutonium for weapons are covered by bilateral safeguards, and it is doubtful that India would ever renege on these international agreements. Pressure abroad to dissuade India from launching a weapons program matches in strength internal pressures to revise the peaceful-purposes-only policy. India's choice is in some respects still a voluntary one, but is dictated also by economic necessity.

1171
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE "NATIONALS"] Atomsperrvertrag und die "Nationalen." Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Mar. 10, 1967: 144. U3.W38, v. 11

Groundless opposition to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty can seriously harm Bonn's efforts to ward off the potential risks to West Germany contained in the proposal. The German Federal Republic cannot afford to reject a treaty that is supported by the world. Nor can it expect from the treaty's sponsors an "unconditional capitulation" to the German critics' exorbitant demands, for that would be as unrealistic as the obstinate insistence of former Bonn governments that German reunification precede East-West détente. Why should the German Federal Republic rally nonnuclear states to oppose the treaty when it is not even a participant of the Geneva Conference? Sweden, which is much more advanced in peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, has willingly subjected itself to control by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The British experience with the IAEA has shown that unwanted inspectors can be replaced on demand. Automated inspection is even possible. International control is an American idea, which Bonn had supported as long as it was rejected by Moscow. It is possible that "the nonproliferation treaty, when it materializes, will remain merely a good faith pact." In answer to the objection that the treaty would preclude "the European Option"--Europe's own nuclear power--"nonexistent states cannot be obligated" in advance under international law. The option, now only a distant possibility, would have to include France, which is in any case a nuclear power and likely to remain so regardless of the nonproliferation treaty.

1172
JAPAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Intelligence digest, no. 341, Apr. 1967: 7-9.
D410.R47, 1967

Certain aspects of the proposed nonproliferation treaty have aroused serious misgivings in some nations, not because these nations oppose limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but because the treaty could create machinery which, over the long term, may pave the way for domination by a few nations over the rest. Furthermore, what value is there in an agreement without France and Communist China? How certain can one be that the Soviet Union will honor its commitment? In Japan the postwar horror of the Hiroshima catastrophe is evolving to an acceptance of the past and a realization of the nation's responsibilites for the future. Modern Japan is showing great interest in the matter of security and in the treaty through which the United States provides Japan with the protection of America's nuclear umbrella. Japan undoubtedly has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, and public opinion is veering in favor of it. Recently in the Diet a government spokesman opined that acquisition of nuclear weapons strictly for defense purposes did not violate the antiwar article of their Constitution. Japan is not worried about China's nuclear progress because it can rely on American protection, but it is beginning to resent its own low political and military status in contrast to its economic strength. Mr. Miki, the Japanese Foreign Minister, recently declared that his government would not develop nuclear weapons "at this time," but he reserved the right to use nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

1173
Japanese Socialist Party. Central Executive Committee. STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: ON THE OCCASION OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Japan socialist review, no. 127, Mar. 1, 1967: 1-3.
HX9.J3, 1967

A statement issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party in support of the proposed nonproliferation treaty.

1174
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON RENEWS CALL FOR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Mar. 20, 1967: 447-448.
JX232.A33, v. 56

A message from President Johnson to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on its reconvening in Geneva, Feb. 21, 1967. Read to the Conference by the American representative, William C. Foster, the message calls for renewed efforts to achieve agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

1175
Kahn, Herman. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND RULES OF RETALIATION. Yale law journal, v. 76, Nov. 1966: 77-91.
LL

While military, technical, and economic indicators point to a rapid increase in the number of nuclear powers, political factors raise some hope that future proliferation may proceed as slowly as it has in the past 2 decades. But even extensive proliferation need not inevitably entail worldwide holocaust, as the attitudes about "first use" currently held by the United States and Great Britain will eventually inhibit most other nuclear states as well. Furthermore, a properly designed nuclear deterrent system deters without executing a disarming first strike, so that one nation's strength does not necessarily entail its neighbors' destruction. Despite these arguments wide consensus exists on the need to inhibit further nuclear spread or use, although to date surprisingly few policy ideas have appeared on how to do this. Any long-range "anti-nuclear" policy must make nuclear weapons be, and seem to be, politically or physically unusable, and must decrease the prestige presently associated with owning them. The policy must also limit the damage in the event that nuclear weapons are used, and must hold true during crises and even conventional wars. Finally it should limit proliferation without seeming to perpetuate U.S. status, power, and obligations. To diminish the actual and perceived usefulness of nuclear weapons in world affairs, each nuclear nation must adopt a no-first-use stance and a credible policy of strict and proportionate retaliation if nuclear weapons are used against it. Nonnuclear nations must find others who will retaliate for nuclear attacks against them. Under this system it might be desirable to make legitimate possession (or further acquisition) of nuclear weapons the exclusive privilege of international organizations--"nuclear defense alliances" in Western Europe, East Europe, Asia, Latin America, North America, etc. --and to establish nuclear-free zones in areas of the world that are unlikely to become nuclear battlefields. Eventually a universal agency might replace or absorb the various regional and national forces.

1176
Khalidi, Ahmad Samih. AN APPRAISAL OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL MILITARY BALANCE. Middle East forum, v. 42, no. 3, 1966: 55-65.
DS41. M45, v. 42

Assesses the relative strengths of Israel and the Arab nations. The author thinks that both Israel and the United Arab Republic have programs for nuclear weapons development, but that Israel will have the bomb first, perhaps within 2 years. Various factors, however, keep conventional weapons in the forefront of determining the military balance in the Middle East. From his examination of the weaponry of both camps Khalidi asserts that the only hope for an Arab victory in the field lies in unified, coordinated military action that subordinates narrow nationalism. The major Arab and Israeli weapons are listed in an appended table.

1177
THE NEW KELLOGG [editorial] Spectator, no. 7235, Feb. 24, 1967: 211-212.
AP4. S7, 1967

Forty years after the signing of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war, world leaders are drafting a second Kellogg--a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. While one cannot be certain this treaty presages the disasters of its predecessor, there is likewise no reason to believe it can prevent them. Nonnuclear powers are not happy about the treaty. They must not only renounce manufacture of nuclear weapons; they must also leave to the nuclear powers the monopoly of "technological spin-off" from the military into the civil nuclear field. In exchange for their sacrifices the nonnuclear nations receive no guarantee against nuclear blackmail and no effective sanctions against nations withdrawing from or violating the agreement. Europeans object that the treaty introduces a major discrimination between France and the rest of Europe. Furthermore, the requirement that all inspection be done by the International Atomic Energy Agency undermines Euratom. Most critically, the draft treaty rules out any possibility of a European nuclear force until the six nations of the European Economic Community are actually united into one. The object of European unity is to create a new world power on a par with Russia and the United States; the object of the nonproliferation treaty is virtually to prevent this. Britain should have announced that it would decline to sign the treaty in its present form. Instead it has persuaded the Americans to eliminate the clause permitting a European nuclear force. Although Britain ostensibly seeks membership in the Common Market, this inept episode of British diplomacy has assured that it will be denied.

1178
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NO MORE? Nature (London) v. 213, Feb. 18, 1967: 641-642.
Q1. N2, v. 213

Nuclear nonproliferation has been greatly discussed among the major powers of late, and they seem to be unreasonably optimistic about achieving agreement on a nonproliferation treaty. Their interest, of course, represents a significant step forward, both toward nonproliferation itself and toward arms control measures of all sorts. Nuclear technology is spreading, and the danger of nations turning peaceful applications into military ones increases apace. Yet there are implicit limits on the rate of weapons spread. Not least among these is the policy customarily followed by the nuclear powers of not allowing technical assistance with nuclear energy to aid "friends and allies to become nuclear powers on their own." It is this policy that the nuclear nations now seek to make explicit. From Geneva will come at most a simple treaty that will bind the nuclear nations not to aid proliferation and the nonnuclear nations not to become recipients or manufacturers of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately even this simple an agreement will require international inspection to be effective. It is also highly unlikely that the nonnuclear powers will help freeze the status quo unless their own security is in some way guaranteed. Thus "it will be good luck bordering on the miraculous if the nuclear powers are able to collect signatures at Geneva without making substantial concessions about their own freedom to accumulate nuclear explosives." A further difficulty of limiting weapons proliferation can be found in the technologically most sophisticated exploitation of nuclear energy, which is so like weapons technology that detailed inspection will be necessary if the most industrially advanced nonnuclear nations are allowed to take advantage of the civilian potential of nuclear energy. West Germany has already raised this objection. Yet the benefits of a nonproliferation treaty may well be worth almost any amount of effort.

1179
Petković, Ranko. NUCLEAR HYPOTHESES. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Mar. 5, 1967: 12.
D839. R4, v. 18

While there is a good chance for an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the agreement

itself will preserve the present national and geographical nuclear status. And while it is perhaps better to live in a world of five nuclear powers, the question arises whether a wider circle of nuclear powers would not represent a lesser evil than the present domination of nuclear powers able to initiate dangerous intervention and pressure. A treaty may be the best means of curtailing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, but it cannot remain an isolated act. Nonproliferation must become the first step in denuclearizing the nuclear powers, for the world must not be divided into nuclear and nonnuclear nations. The Moscow nuclear test ban treaty must be followed by a prohibition on underground nuclear explosions and finally by gradual nuclear disarmament.

1180
Rosecrance, Richard N. PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS. Los Angeles, University of California, 1966. 69 p. (Security studies paper no. 7)
UF767.R635

Bibliographic references included in "Notes" (p. 63-65).

Discusses the technical and political considerations involved in nuclear capabilities and incentives and various patterns and consequences of proliferation. Now that the bipolar arms race has stabilized, the great powers are in hot pursuit of the horizontal arms race--nuclear proliferation--for the time is propitious for either dispersion of nuclear weapons to some 10 prospective nations or limitations on nuclear spread. "The sheer attention to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons indicates what a transformation nuclear acquisition represents; it therefore shows previously undecided nations how they can dynamically alter, presumably for the better, their position in world politics." The outlook for halting the spread of nuclear weapons may yet be optimistic. If guarantees are coupled with great-power nuclear disarmament; if a nonproliferation treaty is signed and ratified; if limited and guerrilla wars remain the desired mode of conflict; and if nations begin to doubt the advantages of nuclear weapons; then further proliferation can be inhibited or prevented.

1181
Rothstein, Robert L. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND AMERICAN POLICY. Political science quarterly, v. 82, Mar. 1967: 14-34.
Hl. P8, v. 82

Both the British and the French decisions to develop nuclear weapons were essentially political. Neither nation developed a national strategy clearly indicating the need for nuclear weapons and then set out to develop them. On the contrary each developed the weapons and then sought a strategy to justify them. Discussion of neither the potential dangers of proliferation nor its costs and liabilities would have been sufficient to induce abstention. The British and French decisions were "reflexive" and "thoughtless"; they were militarily irrational and reflected merely political frustrations. The nations' democratic political structures did nothing to inhibit the decision to develop the bomb. Policy was developed by a small, essentially extra-constitutional group in an incremental manner that made each specific decision seem nothing more than a logical and limited extension of an ongoing program. Nuclear guarantees are the only substitute for an independent nuclear capability. Yet a U.S. policy extending such guarantees to some states that promise not to develop their own weapons can achieve its desired results only as part of a larger policy aimed at preventing worldwide proliferation. Credibility of any U.S. guarantee may well prove the decisive factor in the proliferation problem. The commitments made to date have been far too ambiguous to satisfy any threatened state. A credible guarantee may have to be supplemented by military aid in order not to be undermined by inferiority in conventional forces. China's threat to India exemplifies this problem. If even a political commitment and military aid seem insufficiently credible, the United States might have to station some portion of its nuclear forces within the boundaries of the guaranteed state. Perhaps a guarantee including a specific promise to give an equivalent (or substantial) nuclear force to a nation suddenly threatened by a nuclear power would enhance stability. A nation contemplating nuclear development would hesitate if he knew his opponent would simultaneously receive equal weapons at no cost. The United States would transfer control of nuclear weapons only in limited instances, where the alternative is immediate local war or an uncontrolled arms race. In all other circumstances the United States must strive to prevent proliferation at any cost.

1182
Shishkin, Gennadii. BONN AND "NUCLEAR PLANNING." Daily review; translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Apr. 3, 1967: section 2, 2.
Slav Rm

The new NATO Nuclear Planning Group that will hold its first meeting in April 1967 is apparently a "narrow Atlantic nuclear headquarters" in which West Germany, frustrated in its hope of access to nuclear weapons, will learn the "secrets" of the atomic club. The current favorable outlook for concluding a nonproliferation agreement has panicked Bonn. German militarists will undoubtedly try to block the work of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and revive proposals for a European nuclear force in which Germany would play an important role. Already the German press is spreading rumors that the U.S. Government has given Germany written assurance that a nonproliferation treaty will not preclude a European nuclear force. If this is true, the very meaning and aims of the nonproliferation treaty are undermined. Perhaps "some people should remember that the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries are fully determined to prevent the revenge-seekers from putting their finger on the nuclear trigger."

1183
TREATY IN TROUBLE. Economist, v. 222, Feb. 25, 1967: 697-698. HGll.E2, v. 222

Even with everyone in the world saying they want to halt the nuclear missile race, actual attempts to do anything about it seem to stir up an extraordinary amount of indignation. A mere hint by a Soviet journalist that his nation might be interested in a moratorium on antiballistic missiles called down upon him the wrath of his Government, which bellicosely asserted that it was, after all, the toughest kid on the block. This new spiral in the arms race may spoil the chances of both a nonproliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban. Even a treaty to keep Latin America free of nuclear weapons was met with much more coolness than might have been expected. The Latin American treaty may well exhibit in miniature the problems to be encountered by the supporters of an international nonproliferation treaty. The Germans

are especially concerned that a nonproliferation agreement will deprive them of the right to peaceful nuclear explosions. The Soviets, for their part, have concentrated on German objections to antiproliferation proposals as though no other countries had any reservations whatsoever. Irrational German spokesmen have done nothing to mitigate Soviet worries. These Germans have gone so far as to fasten on the tired old Soviet argument that the nonproliferation treaty offers no real disarmament proposals. To be sure the draft does not involve arms reductions; nor will it force China, France, and some other nations to halt their arms programs. But since it is obvious to all concerned that the near-nuclear nations have no intention of signing "themselves out of the nuclear club for long unless its members start to curb and cut back their own weaponry," assent by the superpowers to a nonproliferation treaty would almost automatically imply willingness to accept sanctions themselves as well as imposing them on everyone else. Nuclear guarantees from at least Moscow and Washington will also go a long way in convincing others the bomb is not a necessity. Whatever happens, annihilation has a better chance of being staved off by even a flawed treaty than by none at all.

1184
Weber, Albrecht. [IN THE SECOND RANK] Im zweiten Glied. Der Volkswirt; Wirtschafts- und Finanz-Zeitung, v. 21, Feb. 24, 1967: 264, 266.
HC281. V74, v. 21

An appended map lists the locations of natural uranium sources in Germany.

The shortest route to self-sufficient nuclear arms production "is through breeding and isolating plutonium." Once a fission bomb is made it takes still less time to produce a fusion bomb. Right now at least 12 nations, the German Federal Republic included, could begin producing nuclear arms within the next 10 to 15 years without any substantial help from the existing nuclear powers. From a technical standpoint their nuclear potential varies according to their individual possession of adequate natural uranium resources, and proper nuclear-industrial facilities. Critics of a proposed treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons object that provisions for international control would harm the West German position in world markets with regard to buying and selling nuclear products. But control by the International Atomic Energy Agency need not have that effect, provided the Agency's present control system remains the same. Moreover IAEA safeguards may be applied in conjunction with two systems to which the Federal Republic has been subjected for years without any adverse effects on its nuclear industry--the thorough Euratom control system and bilateral safeguards based on agreements between the Federal Republic and the countries from which it receives nuclear fuels. Prior experience of other countries with IAEA control dispels fears of its being misused. Under the treaty both the nuclear powers and nonsignatory powers might gain an economic advantage over Germany. But high participation of foreign interests in the pertinent German industries would militate against such odds. West German refusal to sign the treaty would only cut it off from supplies of enriched uranium and other supplies, without which existing German nuclear establishments could not function. To sign the treaty, then, is in West Germany's best interests, but in the meantime it should make every effort to reduce treaty control provisions to their absolute essentials.

### 4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, Etc.)

1185
[LIMITS OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE] Les limites de la défense anti-missiles. Air & cosmos, v. 4, Mar. 11, 1967: 32. P&GP RR

Soviet reaction to American proposals to limit the deployment of antimissile defense systems is difficult to anticipate. The defense-oriented attitude of the powerful Soviet military hierarchy is well known, and their opposition to any such agreement seems inevitable. They argue that antiballistic missile sites now under construction around Moscow and Leningrad are too far advanced to be halted on dim prospects of a limitation agreement. Moreover the United States is not the only target of the Soviet ABM system; Red China must also be reckoned with. President Johnson's Vietnam policies have also made the Soviet General Staff uneasy concerning America's intentions. American proponents of limiting deployment have concentrated mainly on the prohibitive costs of the ABM--a Pentagon estimate puts the Soviet expenditure at $4-5 billion. It may well be, however, that the Soviet ABM marks a new sophistication in Russian missile technology. If so, President Johnson's announcement that Moscow is ready to discuss limiting offensive and defensive missiles is hardly surprising.

## C. REGIONAL

### 1. Tension Areas

1186
Barzel, Rainer. [FOR A REUNIFICATION PLAN] Pour un project de réunification. Documents, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1967: 36-50.
DDI. D65, v. 22

European détente, a basic question for Germany, can be achieved only through the common effort of the Western powers. Yet West Germany cannot abandon the basic principles of its policy. Bonn's policy is based on the Western powers' commitment to achieve the unification of Germany in freedom. All efforts in this direction have so far been frustrated by the stern opposition of the Soviet Union. However its opposition is groundless. If Russia considers its military forces in Germany essential to Soviet security, there is no reason why they could not stay there after reunification and function as a part of a European security system. Reunification might also prove economically profitable for the Soviet Union. Moreover negotiations on disarmament and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would benefit. If the Western powers actually desire détente they should first create a study group to draft a flexible common policy toward the East, which must assure the Communists of the West's conciliatory spirit. The Western powers could then choose an opportune moment to address a carefully worded note to Moscow, referring to the 1955 Geneva Directives (which included a provision to solve the German unification problem through free elections) and, on this basis, request Soviet consent to the formation of a special commission on the German problem. If the four great powers then agree to promote German reunification, study groups composed of East and West German experts could discuss common problems and draft a plan. The work of these committees would end when free elections were held in Germany. West Germans do not ignore the American role in

European affairs, for negotiations would be futile without an American guarantee of European security.

1187
Blumenfeld, Erik. [PATHS TO EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST EUROPE] Wege zu einer europäischen Friedensordnung. Probleme und Möglichkeiten einer Annäherung zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Feb. 10, 1967: 95-104. D839.E86, v. 22

Considers the relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe a starting point for settling the problem of European security. Blumenfeld deems it natural that at least for the time being this be based on existing military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In his opinion these alliances tie to Europe the two most important underwriters of European security. The gradual improvement of cultural and economic relations between both parts of the Continent might enhance an adequate solution, including the negotiated settlement of the outstanding question of Germany's eastern boundaries. Four suggested solutions to the German problem are reunification on the East's terms, reunification dictated by the West, a neutralized, united Germany under international control, and settlement of the problem within a European security system guaranteed by both superpowers.

1188
Bučck, Josef. EUROPEAN SECURITY. Christian peace conference, no. 22/23, Jan. 1967: 27-30. P&GP RR

Points out the interdependence among European security problems and those of the world. Bučck considers Europe both "a theatre of events" of global importance and a reflection of the general world situation. He sees prerequisites existing in Europe today for East-West détente. In the West, for example, "fears and false ideas about the alleged aggressive aims of the socialist states" are evaporating, and the East has come to realize that the self-imposed "isolation of the socialist societies" was an error. But both Bonn's refusal to accept the status quo in Europe and deterioration in other parts of the world hamper the relaxation of tension in Europe and elsewhere. This is evident in the current impasse in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. As of now, however, "no immediate threat of conflict exists in Europe." Bučck suggests new steps governments can take toward East-West détente, such as "an all-European conference on security," and new initiatives in disarmament.

1189
Burlatskii, F., V. Zhuravskii, and V. Nekrasov. CONCRETE PROGRAMME OF STRUGGLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Apr. 26, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 2, 1-4. Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Apr. 26, 1967. Slav Rm

The Karlovy Vary Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties held in April 1967 was carefully prepared in meetings and conferences that developed the concept of an effective struggle for peace and security in Europe. The conference itself mapped out a concrete plan for joint Communist action. The peoples of Europe place great hope in the proposed nonproliferation treaty, but some fear that the treaty might impede the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To alleviate this fear the Soviet Union has declared itself ready to give the nonnuclear countries assistance in nuclear research. If these countries renounce the production, acquisition, and use of nuclear weapons they will get every opportunity to develop atomic energy for peaceful use. The conference also declared that it would support the abolition of military blocs. The Warsaw Pact Organization has been installed only as a countermeasure to NATO, and there is no reason to preserve it if NATO is dismantled. Although the conference pointed out that the Vietnamese War makes East-West European relations difficult, it nevertheless approved the effort to improve relations. Naturally the German question was the center of attention. All delegates agreed that West German militarism must be paralyzed. The Communist countries are not at all opposed to improved relations with West Germany if it recognizes East Germany as a sovereign state. The present West German Government talks of improved relations but shows no intention of recognizing East Germany and ignores the inviolability of the postwar German boundaries and renunciation of nuclear weapons. The conference declared that at present the main task is to avoid nuclear war; it is sure that the world's honest people will support it in its effort to attain this goal.

1190
Craik of Assington, baron. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: SINISTER RUSSIAN MOVES. Intelligence digest, no. 339, Feb. 1967: 2-4. D410.R47, 1967

Deployment of a Soviet ground-to-air missile system by U.A.R. President Nasser is imminent. The present Egyptian missile network consists of more than 30 bases for surface-to-air missiles whose complex equipment will be operated by Egyptian and Soviet technicians. New-type Russian rockets including intermediate range ballistic missiles are expected shortly--part of a major move in Soviet strategy that is comparable to the 1962 decision to send missiles to Cuba. Soviet objectives in the Middle East include southward extension to ports on the Indian Ocean, neutralization of American military force in the Mediterranean, and exertion of influence on Africa from bases near the Suez canal. The Soviets may also move to establish a ground-to-air missile system in Algeria and take over control of copper mines and airfields in Zambia. The aims of Russia and China in the Middle East and Africa are clear. The United States and Britain should thus extend the "fullest military aid in men and equipment to Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and any other Arab nation" fighting for its freedom.

1191
Grézer, Jacques O. [WHO REALLY WANTS "REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY"?] Wer will die "Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands" wirklich? Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 12, Apr. 1967: 391-405. D839.B57, v. 12

Sees a direct relationship between German reunification under Bismarck and the two world wars. Grézer contends that hitherto historical evidence totally discredits Bonn's contention that German reunification is a prerequisite of durable peace in Europe. The author points out that the Allies' proclaimed goal during World War II was the replacement of the German Reich by a loose confederation of German states. After the war the Soviet Union reversed its position for propaganda reasons, but later on changed its stand and now supports the idea of two Germanies. The Western allies, who originally had been against German reunification,

accepted Bonn's thesis in principle. Grézer thinks the sooner that thesis is given up the better are chances for East-West détente and the restoration of a "European Europe."

1192
Harrigan, Anthony. MIDDLE EAST POWDER KEG. Washington report (American Security Council), Jan. 16, 1967: 1-4.
P&GP RR

No area of the world today has greater potential for conflict than the Middle East. The Soviet Union recognizes the strategic importance of the area and has been consolidating its position there. In Syria, for example, the Soviets have begun construction of a missile and radar station at Al-Hassayeh, only 130 miles south of the U.S. missile and spacecraft tracking station at Dyarbakir in eastern Turkey. Syria has also agreed to the establishment of a Soviet submarine base at the port of Kataquia. In supplying arms to Syria the Soviets are playing for higher strategic stakes than most Westerners realize--acquisition of an air-naval base at Aden if the British leave in 1968. A joint United Arab Republic-Soviet presence in Aden would close the Red Sea at both ends, deny Israel its southern sea outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba, and open the entire Red Sea frontier of Saudi Arabia to seaborne infiltrators. Ethiopia and Iran are also possible future danger points, and Israel too faces critical military problems, particularly on its border. Jordan, currently serving as a buffer state between Syria and the United Arab Republic, is seriously unstable. With base rights at Aden and with naval bases in Syria, the Soviet Union could support unlimited campaigns in Eastern and South-Central Africa. The United States must induce Britain to remain in Aden after 1968, even if it means sharing the burdens of maintaining a military presence there. Washington must also use the necessary diplomatic, economic, and military "deterrent power" to prevent a combination of Syrian and United Arab Republic armed might.

1193
Hoskins, Halford L. CHANGING OF THE GUARD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Current history, v. 52, Feb. 1967: 65-71, 114. D410.C82, v. 52

Until recently Great Britain played a significant role in checking Russia's southward drive into the Middle East, in which task it was assisted by the United States and France. The three, in the tripartite declaration of 1950 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, had pledged to extend "the so-called containment barrier into South Central Asia" and to protect the Middle East from Soviet bloc aggression. Still the Soviet Union covertly but effectively extended its influence into the area by playing on British and U.S. responsibility for the creation of Israel and on the Suez crisis in 1956. After the Suez episode Great Britain never recovered its primacy of influence. In 1961 the British commitment was further tested by Iraq's territorial claims made (with Soviet encouragement) on Kuwait. Not wanting to antagonize Iraq (a major source of oil), Great Britain showed little enthusiasm for defending Kuwait. Units from several of the Arab States moved in to protect the sheikhdom, bringing into the open Britain's reluctance to continue in its role as keeper of the peace and enforcer of "Western-engineered pacts for Middle East security." Although British Prime Minister Harold Wilson is said to be "intent on the maintenance of positions east of Suez from which Britain can continue to maintain a role," lack of economic potential seriously circumscribes such plans. Unless the United States underwrites most of the cost of installations East of Suez the British will have to withdraw completely. To what extent the present political vacuum in the area will be filled is an open question; "as to the changing of the guard, however, there can be no question."

1194
Lewis, John F. "SAAR WAQTU--SAAR WAQTU!" Washington report (American Security Council) Feb. 13, 1967: 1-4.
P&GP RR

"Saar waqtu" (the time has come) for the explosion of the Arab masses against pro-Western Arab Governments, against the state of Israel, and against continued Western control of Middle Eastern oil. Many analysts are convinced that Soviet strategists have decided to make the Middle East their next target--an area where the gains would be immediate and substantial and where unclear U.S. policy minimizes the risk of confrontation. Crucial to the Soviet plan are the Arab refugees who were forced into exile after the creation of Israel, nurtured by propaganda from Cairo and Moscow, and armed and trained by the Soviet Union and Communist China. These refugees have never forgiven Abdullah, grandfather of Jordan's King Hussein, for making peace with Israel in 1948 or for his close ties with Great Britain, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Under Russian planning and direction Syria and Egypt are forcing King Hussein to commit his nation to a suicidal war with Israel or face execution at the hands of his own irate populace. The ultimatum was triggered by the Israeli attack on a Jordanian border town in November 1966. Israel, although militarily stronger than the combined Arab States, is nonetheless increasingly alarmed at the Soviet involvement in directly arming the Arabs and in exercising its Security Council veto to check U.N. action favorable to Israel.

1195
Mendès France, Pierre. [THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM OF 1967] Le problème le plus grave en 1967. Nouvel observateur, no. 116, Feb. 7, 1967: 15-18.
AP20.02, 1967

Although General de Gaulle exploits the French fear of war to assure the people that, thanks to him, France will not be involved in a future war, his attitude toward the Vietnam situation makes France's position more respectable than that of other nations. De Gaulle sees problems more realistically than do many others, but instead of working for peace he indulges in giving fruitless lessons. The Vietnamese War is undoubtedly the center of world problems and nothing else can be solved unless it is ended. To find the solution a realistic, concrete, and cool analysis must be made. The core of the whole problem is the shared fear of the United States and China that the other will expand into Southeast Asia in order to attack them. The solution must therefore encompass reduction of these fears to achieve a durable stability in the area. The question is how. Some speculate that the world should wait until China becomes a nuclear power equal to the Soviet Union and America and then try to establish a peaceful coexistence based on a balance of terror. But who can guarantee that before it happens the United States may not attack China and destroy its nuclear installations, thus committing an action the results of which would be incalculable. The only plausible answer seems to be the neutralization of all South Asia. This will assure

each side that the other will not establish its influence in the zone and thus will serve the interests of both. The Vietnamese people will welcome it; China faces too many domestic tasks not to welcome the knowledge that no danger threatens it in the area; and the United States will realize that this formula can achieve something that is unattainable by military force. The colonial policy is foreign to American thinking, and its economic expansionism was always peaceful. Many Americans, among them Senator Kennedy, perfectly understand the situation. France should support U Thant's efforts and take over the role of a patient and persuasive champion of peace.

1196
Moch, Jules S. [HISTORY OF GERMAN REARMAMENT SINCE 1950] Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950. Paris, Robert Laffont [1965] 411 p.
DD259.2.M56

Analyzes the entire history of German rearmament from 1950 to 1955. The author feels that rearmament has been an absurd, inconsiderate, and rash gesture that had no military advantages and represented an enormous political and international risk. German rearmament increased the tension between the blocs, frustrated chances of peace, and retarded disarmament negotiations. Currently it hinders negotiations for the renunciation of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear countries, as well as all disarmament projects. It is an example of the immaturity of contemporary nations and peoples.

1197
Murphy, F.M. THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 93, Mar. 1967: 38-44. illus.
V1.U8, v. 93

The Soviet Navy is challenging Western maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean area. The concept of strategic mobility implemented by the Russians has enabled the Soviet Navy to overcome previous geographic inhibitions that up to now have restricted its three main fleets in the Baltic, Black, and North Seas. The Navy's operation in the Mediterranean of mobile "naval bases" in the form of oil tankers, tugs, and tenders, and the experimental Soviet station near the Greek island of Kithira present a pattern of naval activity designed to attain Russia's historical ambition of becoming a Middle East power. Increased Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and the presence of Soviet surface ships in this area equipped with modern surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles support this thesis. Modern technology has enabled the Soviet Navy to become one of the most mobile and effective naval forces in the world. The application of the strategic-mobility doctrine by the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean Sea presents the United States with a great threat to Middle Eastern peace and stability.

1198
Shwadran, Benjamin. THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Current history, v. 52, Feb. 1967: 72-77, 116. D410.C82, v. 52

Divides Soviet interests and objectives in the Middle East into three categories: geographic and strategic determinants, ideological revolutionary expansion, and realistic adjustment to given conditions. The analysis clearly indicates that practical rather than ideological factors have determined Soviet policies in the region. While history and Western blunders have worked to the Soviets advantage, their success has been small, largely because they have applied measures in terms of their own needs and experiences rather than those of the Arab States. They have avoided backing moves toward a unified Arab world because Soviet influence in it would be impossible and they have opposed open hostilities lest they involve the U.S.S.R. Kremlin leaders are willing to supply arms to foster tension in the Middle East, but believe they can achieve the Soviet Union's aims there without risk of war.

1199
Valkenburgh, P. EUROPEAN SECURITY. Christian peace conference, no. 22/23, Jan. 1967: 30-31, 34-35.
P&GP RR

Reviews the causes, historical and contemporary, of the problem of European security. To the historical causes belong the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; contemporary causes are new technological breakthroughs in weaponry and the anticipated proliferation of nuclear weapons. Valkenburgh agrees with the Soviet Union that there are four kinds of proliferation: production "in other countries than the Big Five;" possession by acquisition; control over nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states; and the "stationing of nuclear weapons on foreign territory." The United States considers only the first two forms of proliferation. The author stresses the incompatibility of West German political goals with those of other NATO members. He suggests among other things a collective security system for all the European nations (save the Soviet Union) through gradual transformation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; acceptance of IAEA control in the nuclear area; and intensification of talks between the great powers on disarmament and world security.

1200
Winkler, Arno, and others. [THE "FORMED SOCIETY" AS WEST GERMAN IMPERIALISM'S STRATEGY AGAINST BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY] Die "formierte Gesellschaft" als strategische Konzeption des westdeutschen Imperialismus gegen die bürgerliche Demokratie. Staat und Recht, v. 16, Mar. 1967: 486-500. LL

The policy of the ruling circles of the West German monopoly capital and their Kiesinger/Strauss-government aims at introducing now a period of increased expansion after the preceded period of complete restoration of the might of the German imperialism. Result are their strivings after an accelerated pace of realizing the plan on the formation of the West German society proclaimed by former Federal Chancellor Erhard at the 13th Federal Party Congress of the CDU. This plan is the strategic conception to develop a complete system of closely connected economic, political, juridical, military, and ideological measures which taken as a whole have the aim to erect the open dictatorship of the monopolies of the armament industry and militarists. By so-called new technics of governing, by the further limitation of the rights of the Federal Parliament, by the far increased participation of the West German countries and communities in the state-monopolist system of rule, but especially by the numerous attempts to equalize the Trade Unions and other democratic organizations with the policy of the ruling circles of the monopoly capital the whole West German population and all the economic potencies of the Federal Republic shall be mobilized for the realization of the revenge-seeking policy of the West German imperialism. This monopolist plan of formation is therefore a high danger to peace and security of the peoples.

Its realization must be prevented by the organized struggle of the democratic forces in West Germany. (Abstract supplied)

1201
WORLD'S NEXT DANGER AREA. U.S. news & world report, v. 62, Apr. 17, 1967: 62-64.
JK1. U65, v. 62

A potentially explosive power struggle in North Africa threatens to involve the United States. At the root of the trouble are a Soviet decision to increase military and economic aid to Algeria and a French decision to cut off economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia. The Russians have supplied arms to Algeria far in excess of its self-defense or internal security needs. Algeria has the third strongest military force in Africa, and its nearest neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, are frightened. They look to the United States for security. The United States is reluctant to get involved despite Algeria's potential threats to the pro-Western regime of King Hassan and to the U.S. naval base in Morocco, and the more remote concern that Algeria's Soviet-supplied light bombers and missiles might inflict damage on the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Soviet entrenchment in Egypt and possibly Algeria will give them the warm-water maritime outlet they have sought for centuries. Some U.S. and European officials belittle the Soviet threat in this area and compare Soviet aid to its bad investment in the Congo. They feel that Algeria's Boumédienne is accepting Soviet aid to lessen his nation's dependence on France, that he will not give up his hard-won independence to the Russians, and that his present anti-American sentiment will pass with time. The three North African nations have much in common despite their political rivalries. All were better off economically under French rule, and each is being kept afloat by massive outside assistance. France maintains traditional ties and the means to keep its former colonies from chaos through its technicians, teachers, and other experts. Yet if France fails to act, the danger of U.S.-Soviet confrontation will continue to grow.

## 2. Disengagement, Neutralization, Etc.

1202
Bowser, Hallowell. DENUCLEARIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA [editorial] Saturday review, v. 50, May 20, 1967: 32. Z1219.S25, v. 50

After 4 years of painstaking negotiations all the nations of Latin America but Cuba have unanimously approved a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons on their continent. The first such treaty applying to a populated area of the world, it will go into effect when 11 nations ratify it. The treaty places all peaceful nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection system. On-site inspections of suspected treaty violations can be ordered immediately. The treaty raises some problems for the nuclear powers: the United States wants to exclude the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; France and Great Britain have questions about their territories in the area; and the Soviet Union wants to await action by the other nuclear powers before announcing its intentions. U.N. consideration of the treaty in September will provide an opportunity for encouraging Latin American states to implement it quickly, for mobilizing international opinion behind it, and for urging the nuclear powers to actively support it.

1203
Eder, Linda. LATIN AMERICA BANS THE BOMB. Nation, v. 204, Mar. 20, 1967: 371-372.
AP2. N2, v. 204

The Treaty of Tlatelolco signed on February 14 by 21 Latin American nations is the first pact to ban nuclear weapons from an inhabited area of the world. While the nuclear powers and the press have belittled the importance and effectiveness of the treaty, it remains, despite its weaknesses, a significant first that may provide impetus for regional action elsewhere. Although this was not the first attempt at regional agreements on nuclear arms, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America succeeded in only 2 years where others have failed completely. The importance of an agreement in an area inhabited by more than 250 million people should not be underestimated. Until the last week of negotiations the principal obstacle to agreement was the determination of the more advanced nations, like Brazil and Argentina, to reserve the right to engage in nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. Such a proviso would have undermined the treaty's effectiveness, since no meaningful distinction is possible between explosions for peaceful and belligerent purposes. The American statement on the treaty cautiously endorses it on the understanding that it bans all nuclear explosions until future advances in technology permit peaceful explosions that are not adaptable for weapons use.

1204
Farer, Tom. INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS; A MODEST PROPOSAL. Columbia law review, v. 67, Feb. 1967: 266-279. LL

American foreign-policy makers never have regarded violent revolutions favorably, and have encouraged only those that substantially advance U.S. national interests. During the past two decades the United States has favored support of social progress and economic prosperity as a means preferable to revolution for alleviating tensions throughout the world. Recently the danger of nuclear war has forced the two great powers to tolerate limited conventional wars while preserving their mutual nuclear deterrence. By escalating the Vietnamese War, however, the United States has seemingly shown willingness to accept the risk of a nuclear war. Its action has been based on the theory that the Soviet Union desires East-West détente even at the expense of refraining from national liberation wars. Although the theory is plausible, the escalation has created a situation which raises the very important question of how to prevent conflicts that could provoke a world cataclysm. The only correct solution would be to provide the international community with the capability to restrict the participation of third parties in civil wars. Presently no rules govern such intervention. The United States bases its action on the "legitimacy" concept of international law and gives assistance only to legitimate governments. But today governments in countries where revolutions occur are either weak and incapable of administration for the people, or violate basic human rights. The legitimacy concept is thus inadequate. It really should be replaced by a radical preclusion of all intervention, a rule which presently is either unacceptable or unenforceable. Thus in the absence of a better solution a modest proposal, namely the "prohibition of participation in tactical operations," either openly, or by advisers and volunteers, should be considered. The prohibition is consistent

with Washington's policy prior to 1964 and appears to codify contemporary Soviet and Chinese practice. The Vietnamese War shows that violations of such a prohibition are easily detectable. Thus while the world waits for the substantial changes which alone could facilitate effective multinational intervention, this modest proposal might be found useful.

1205
Mahajani, Usha. THE MALAYSIA DISPUTE: A STUDY IN MEDIATION AND INTERVENTION. Australian outlook, v. 20, Aug. 1966: 177-192.
DU80. A947, v. 20

Traces the dispute over Malaysia and its final resolution in the context of Southeast Asian politics. That this dispute was kept on the regional level, with only peripheral involvement of the major powers, "paved the way for a unique pattern of mediation by different international elements." Various agencies attempted to mediate the dispute, all in "neat consecutive order." Although the United Nations intervened for once in a manner distinctly its own as a world body, it was not as effective as member states have been when they have acted collectively in its name. Small-power mediatory roles were larger than in disputes where the major powers have intervened. This does not mean, however, that nonintervention on the part of the major powers guarantees harmony. A balance must be sought in regional disputes in which the superpowers stay out militarily but evidence interest in playing a conciliatory role.

1206
Petkovic, Ranko. INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRIA'S NEUTRALITY. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Feb. 20, 1967: 3-4.
JX1. C6, v. 18

In 1955 Austria became the first permanently neutral state to be admitted to the United Nations without reservation. Its admission followed a reconsideration by U. N. members of a long-term dispute over the compatibility of the obligations arising from neutrality and the system of collective security. After the Second World War Austria had to choose between two alternatives: it could either remain in the sphere of one of the great powers or seek neutrality. By choosing the latter Austria escaped being divided in two and acquired an opportunity to assume an independent role in international affairs. Consequently Austria can now play an active role in the United Nations and East-West relations, where it may help resolve contradictions and foster peaceful coexistence; it can establish political and economic links with West Europe; it can help to strengthen European unity and cooperation; and it can instigate cooperation in the Danube basin. Today Austria is active in many international and European organizations and will probably be the first neutral country to join the Common Market. Its neutrality has already been beneficial in several ways: it eliminated the Austrian problem and implemented the Allied obligations adopted at the Moscow Conference of 1943; the withdrawal of Allied occupational forces that followed neutrality brought about disengagement in the area and thus relaxed international tension; and the experience has served as a guide to the solution of other dangerous conflicts (for example in Laos). Today, "the permanently neutral Austria, unattached to any military alliance, represents an important factor in stimulating an all-European policy," and the neighboring countries see in it a constructive partner in development and cooperation. Neutralization has served not only the interests of Austria but also the interests of the international community. This lesson could be applied elsewhere, particularly in Vietnam.

1207
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Zentralkomitee. WHAT KIND OF GERMANY IS IT TO BE? Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild [1966] 61 p. illus. (Documents on the national policy of the GDR, 4/1966)
JN3971. 5. A98S63, 1966

Contents. --Open letter of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party Germany (third letter). --Open reply of the SPD to the open letter of the SED of 25 March 1966.

Documents the controversy between the East German "Socialist Unity Party Germany" (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party about Germany's future. Both parties underscore their divergency of views on the problem of German reunification. The SED accuses West Germany of refusing to recognize East Germany as a separate, independent state, of claiming the sole representation for all Germany, and of harboring aggressive plans against the East. It asks the SPD if the latter would favor the renunciation by the two German states of "all control of nuclear weapons;" "concrete disarmament measures" to be initiated in Germany; recognition by the German Federal Republic of the existing borders in Europe; German reunification through achieving détente between the two German states and subsequent negotiations. The SPD contends that contrary to the SED's allusions it advocates "general disarmament under international law and measures for a general limitation of armament." It rejects East German allegations of the aggressiveness of West German plans, points out suppression of freedom in East Germany, and asks if the SED is "ready to cease playing with war" with regard to the problem of Berlin. It also questions the SED's intentions with regard to German reunification.

1208
[WEST GERMANY: PHILOLOGICAL WAR] Allemagne occidentale; guerre philologique. Perspectives, v. 23, Feb. 11, 1967: 1-2. HC10. P4, v. 23
Separately paged.

Obviously the term "Pan-Germanic" is equivocal and differently understood in East and West Germany, because as soon as West German Minister of Pan-Germanic Affairs Wehner took over his recently established office his counterpart in East Germany changed the name of his office to Ministry of West German Affairs. He obviously wanted to emphasize that East Germany wants cooperation and unification of two German sovereign states, whereas West Germany considers the East as merely its own rebellious province. Minister Wehner seemed to favor cooperation in the form of a joint economic community, a joint declaration on renunciation of violence, and a joint committee to enforce the Potsdam agreements. East German Prime Minister Ulbricht recently made a similar proposal. Finally Wehner discussed the possibility of an "Austrian solution" to the German reunification problem. Apparently Bonn would accept the existence of the Communist German State if it were independent from the Soviet Union, demilitarized and liberalized, i. e. internally democratic and open to the outside world. This concept, originally formulated by the philosopher Jaspers, seems to be somewhat ahead of

the official views. Seemingly West German Chancellor Kiesinger finds it interesting but not ripe for execution. And while the Chancellor must respect the conservative views of his political party, his personal opinion seems not to differ substantially from his Minister's views.

## D. OUTER SPACE

1209
Bayer, Richard. [AIRSPACE NEUTRALITY WITH REGARD TO MODERN WEAPONS] Die Neutralität im Luftraum unter Berücksichtigung moderner Waffen. Osterreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1966: 376-382.
P&GP RR

Contends that the problem of distinguishing between airspace and outer space has not yet been solved, either from the standpoint of natural science or international law. Yet international law obligates a neutral country to be prepared to defend its airspace as well as possible. Bayer considers that obligation, discussing the means by which neutrality of airspace can be violated and the countermeasures a neutral state can undertake. He thinks, for instance, that the ascent or descent of satellites, intercontinental missiles, or spacecraft through neutral airspace does not violate neutrality.

1210
Clemens, Walter C. ARMS CONTROL FOR OUTER SPACE. Disarmament, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 5-11.
JX1981.P7D5, 1966

Complex technological, military, political, and economic considerations have left both Washington and Moscow undecided about the desirability or feasibility of exploiting outer space for military purposes. Both superpowers judge bombardment systems in space superfluous, expensive, and dangerous, since both have sufficient land- and sea-based missiles and bombers "to provide as persuasive a deterrent as is humanly attainable." Yet, some U.S. strategic analysts fear that qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Soviet missile force may soon reduce or destroy U.S. superiority. They argue that weapons in orbit may be necessary to provide an invulnerable second-strike capability or to penetrate antiballistic missile defenses. Further, a missile shot from orbit gives less warning time. However, aside from their superfluity orbital bombs are accident prone, difficult to control, costly, and politically destabilizing. The superpowers would risk little by extending their ban on weapons of mass destruction to all direct military applications of outer space. While some argue their limited utility makes an agreement unnecessary, it is safer and cheaper for adversaries to reassure one another in this way than to suddenly find themselves with an unwanted military space system that defies disarmament once it exists. Manned and unmanned space vehicles can play an important role in supporting military activities through early warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and command and control, and both Washington and Moscow agree that such activities cannot be abolished short of general and complete disarmament. However, assuming that world peace rests in part on confidence in stabilized deterrence, more effective reconnaissance, which can strengthen confidence, is "welcome from the standpoint of arms control." On the other hand, while it can help arms control, it can also facilitate the planning and waging of war. The military utility of outer space is open to question, but all space powers must ensure their rights to free passage in outer space and equal rights on the celestial bodies.

1211
Goldberg, Arthur J. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENDORSES OUTER SPACE TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Jan. 9, 1967: 78-84. JX232.A33, v. 56
Statements "made in Committee I (Political and Security) and in plenary session."

The American Ambassador to the United Nations' statements on the occasion of its adoption of the treaty on outer space. To Committee I he places the treaty in the context of "peace-building agreements," cites the businesslike manner in which the negotiations were conducted, and outlines the arms control and peaceful cooperation provisions of the treaty. In his brief statement before the plenary session, Ambassador Goldberg praises the treaty as "an important step toward peace." A General Assembly resolution concerning the treaty is reprinted.

1212
Levine, Bruce. WEAPONS PROHIBITION IN SPACE VS. DISARMAMENT. Minority of one, v. 9, May 1967: 10-11. AP2.M55985, v. 9

The much-advertised recent treaty banning the military uses of outer space has in fact a limited value in slowing the arms race. Up to now no country "has found in space an opportunity to significantly enhance its military capability." Obviously offensive space-based systems would be too expensive and less effective than ICBM delivery systems. Defensive systems also seem impractical because the enemy's weapons can be destroyed better from the ground. Washington feels that neither offensive orbital-bombardment nor defensive antisatellite systems present much promise in terms of technological feasibility or cost-effectiveness. The Soviet Union seems to share the American view that the present military capability of both is adequate enough to hit any target. Thus it seems that the outer space treaty, though excellent propaganda, prohibits weapons systems the two superpowers consider strategically worthless.

1213
Nelson, Bryce. THE SPACE TREATY: A STEP IN EASING U.S.-SOVIET TENSIONS. Science, v. 154, Dec. 16, 1966: 1430-1431.
Q1.S35, v. 154

Soviet-U.S. agreement on a treaty guaranteeing that space will be used for only peaceful purposes represents the first substantial arms control arrangement since the ratification of the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty. It is the culmination of several overtures on the part of the Johnson administration toward better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Along with the direct provisions of the space treaty Washington and Moscow reap certain common dividends--increased international prestige and some insurance against the unsettling volatility of Communist China. Specifically the newest arms control agreement prohibits the use of space for military purposes and the deployment of nuclear weapons or "any other kinds of weapon of mass destruction" in the space environment. Installations and equipment on celestial bodies are subject to inspection by any of

the signatories with "reasonable advance notice of a projected visit," a condition attached to the inspection provision as a U.S. compromise to meet Soviet demands. Orbiting vehicles are not subject to inspection, and reconnaissance satellites, manned orbital laboratories, and intercontinental ballistic missiles are excluded from coverage in the treaty. The United States has declined to open its entire space tracking network to Soviet entry. Scientific missions into space are to be freely exercised by all nations with emphasis on international cooperative efforts. Once the treaty has been ratified a nation can submit its withdrawal notice only after the treaty has been in effect for a year, with the withdrawal taking place a year from the time of notice. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom must be included among the five nations required to ratify the treaty for it to go into effect. Little opposition is expected in the United States, where the Senate will probably move for ratification. The ease of obtaining Soviet-U.S. agreement on this treaty is explained in part by the fact that military activities in space are very expensive and hence unattractive.

1214
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: ASSEMBLY ADOPTS THREE RESOLUTIONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Jan. 1967: 35-46.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: a resolution on the outer space treaty; a decision that a conference on the peaceful uses of outer space be held in Vienna September 1967; and "guidelines for the future work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space." The article describes deliberations in this committee and the Assembly and gives the full text of the treaty.

1215
Reintanz, Gerhard. [THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL USE OF SPACE] Der internationale Vertrag über die friedliche Nutzung des Weltraumes. Staat und Recht, v. 16, Mar. 1967: 470-486. LL

Considers the treaty on the peaceful use of outer space a result of patient Soviet efforts, which started in 1958 and have been opposed or obstructed by the United States. The article contains commentary on the treaty's "most important" provisions.

1216
Rusk, Dean, and Arthur J. Goldberg. SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG URGE SENATE APPROVAL OF OUTER SPACE TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Apr. 10, 1967: 600-612.
JX232.A33, v. 56

Statements made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1967. Secretary Rusk praises the treaty as balancing the rights and obligations of nations that are involved in space and those that are not and the provisions of immediate importance and those needed for the future. The treaty also provides for arms control measures important to U.S. security. Ambassador Goldberg outlines the major provisions of the treaty and cites its advantages to the United States in terms of arms control, international order and peaceful cooperation, U.S.-Soviet relations, and protection of the interests of nonlaunching powers. He describes the history and highlights of the treaty's development and the resolution of the principal issues involved in the negotiations, such as access to installations on celestial bodies, limitations on specified military activities on celestial bodies, requests by launching powers for tracking facilities, liability for damage resulting from space launchings, and unconditional return of astronauts who land on foreign territory or the high seas.

1217
Shepherd, L. R. NEEDED FOR THE 1970'S: INTERNATIONAL SPACE CONTROL AGENCY. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 4, Nov. 1966: 56-59.
TL501.A688A25, v. 4

The peaceful uses of outer space will be guaranteed only when an international agency exists specifically for this end. In 1963 the United Nations resolved that all nations must be free to explore outer space in a peaceful manner and in accordance with the principles of international law. In the absence of a formal treaty, those nations most actively engaged in space activities have conformed to the principles of the U.N. resolution. The question remains whether this resolution--or even a treaty--is sufficient to deter hostile or military activity in the space environment. In projecting ahead a decade or two one can foresee a time when many nations will have a considerable number of orbiting vehicles in space and will have established permanent manned stations. A permanent station, while operating legitimately and without implying national appropriation of a part of space, would introduce the problem of "territoriality--that is to say, a certain volume of space around it into which an unauthorized entry should be forbidden." Territorial exclusion zones would have to be set up but would not exclude international collaboration on space activities. Suspected military activities by these permanent stations would require delicate treatment. Military satellites now in operation seem to contradict the principles of the U.N. resolution. One can foresee a need to regulate the activities of unmanned satellites and manned space flights, the extent of territorial airspace allocated to each nation, and the establishment of lunar bases. Ideally lunar stations or bases would be internationally owned and operated. An international body should be established to exercise control so that the rights of space-oriented nations and the whole community of nations may be protected. Patterned on the International Atomic Energy Agency, the functions of the control agency would have to be clearly defined and favorably accepted by most of the international community.

## E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

### 1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

1218
AEC REVAMPS SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION. Washington atomic energy report and the atomic energy guideletter, v. 13, May 8, 1967: 1-2.
HD9698.U5W3, v. 13

The Atomic Energy Commission has recently established an Office of Safeguards and Materials Management to develop and coordinate Commission safeguards policies for both domestic and international programs, including on-site inspections of materials distributed

abroad under bilateral agreements. A new Division of Nuclear Materials Safeguards under the Director of Regulation will administer safeguards for material held by licensees, including that which is Government-owned. An Advisory Committee on Nuclear Material Safeguards will be established to provide technical advice to the Commission.

1219
Carter, Luther J. TEST DETECTION: DECOUPLING THEORY VERIFIED, BUT DOES IT MATTER? Science, v. 155, Jan. 27, 1967: 438-440. Q1.S35, v. 155

While a comprehensive test ban remains an objective of U.S. arms control policy even though the Soviet Union appears uninterested at this time, U.S. research in test-detection such as the recent Project Sterling experiment invites a rethinking of this policy. Tending to verify the theory that it is possible to decouple underground nuclear tests to avoid detection, Project Sterling's results have become very popular among those who oppose an extension of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty. Rep. Craig Hosmer argues that a comprehensive ban will be a "national security trap" and that no inspections can adequately safeguard against cheating. Arms control experts in the Government contend that the decoupling theory has been known for some time. Rand Corp. scientists said as far back as 1959 that "the seismic signals from an underground blast can be reduced by a factor of as much as 200 or more if the nuclear device is suspended in the center of a sufficiently large cavity." While Project Sterling verified that a nuclear blast could take place in such a cavity and go undetected as far away as 150 miles, the cost and engineering problems inherent in excavating and using such a cavity raise serious doubts as to whether decoupling is worth the risk of cheating on a test ban agreement. Cavities can be formed by nuclear explosions, but the heat retention is long-lasting. For many nuclear-weapons scientists, the data that might be obtained from low kiloton tests like Project Sterling would not be significant. The larger tests, which would provide better technological data, would be difficult to decouple. It appears that Project Sterling has not in any way affected the arguments put forth by proponents of a comprehensive test ban.

1220
Crivelli, R. L. AUSTRALIA AND THE I. A. E. A. Atomic energy in Australia, v. 9, Oct. 1966: 20-26. QC770. A8428, v. 9

Outlines the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in safeguarding the use and production of fissile material, and the agreements between the Agency and Australia in this area. Much of the article is devoted to the Agency's work in fostering scientific cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

1221
Field, E. C., and C. Greifinger. GEOMAGNETIC FLUCTUATIONS DUE TO IMPULSE SOURCES WITH APPLICATIONS TO HIGH-ALTITUDE NUCLEAR BURSTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 72, Jan. 1, 1967: 317-329. QC811.J6, v. 72

The response of the ionosphere-exosphere system to a bomb-like hydromagnetic source and the resultant time-dependent ground-level magnetic fluctuations are examined theoretically in this paper, with emphasis placed upon gaining an understanding of the time behavior of the ground-level signal. The methods of calculation are also applicable to certain magnetic fluctuations of natural origin. An analytic treatment is used, whereby the problem is reduced essentially to finding the poles and residues of previously derived hydromagnetic transmission coefficients. Conditions corresponding to high magnetic latitudes are used, but some conclusions corresponding to more general conditions are drawn. Bomb-induced ground-level magnetic fluctuations are interpreted in terms of a broadband excitation of ionospheric and exospheric resonant oscillations. Even for broadband sources, which excite all of the many resonances, the signal rapidly becomes dominated by the lowest characteristic frequencies. Thus, for a wide range of source functions, the frequency content of the transmitted signal would be determined largely by the resonant properties of the propagation medium. Two examples of this are the magnetic fluctuations measured after the Argus and Starfish high-altitude nuclear tests. For hypothetical high-latitude bursts detonated in or above the lower ionosphere, the ground-level signal is predicted to be nearly left-hand circularly polarized in the daytime and to exhibit nearly the polarization of the source at night. For many situations of practical interest, the enhancement of the lower ionospheric ionization density by bomb X rays is a very important consideration. (Authors' abstract)

1222
Gellert, Leslie. THE IAEA: TEN YEARS OF SLOW BUT SOLID PROGRESS. F. A. S. newsletter, v. 20, Mar. 1967: 5-6. Q11.F422, v. 20

The possibility of international acceptance of a nonproliferation treaty has focused nations' attention on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in enforcing nuclear safeguards. The present IAEA safeguards system, which took many years to develop, concentrates mainly on the supervision of nuclear materials placed under its control and of materials being used in Agency-safeguarded facilities. The Agency hopes to develop procedures for safeguarding plants that reprocess used reactor fuel, but at present it must either supervise the actual processing or accept an agreed amount of substitute fissionable material to come under safeguards. To insure that nuclear materials are used as intended and fully accounted for, the IAEA reviews the design of facilities and equipment, requests reports and operating records, and conducts on-site inspections--its most important and most sensitive activity. The frequency of regular inspections of a facility depends on the amount of fissionable material involved, the largest requiring "access at all times." Inspectors expect cooperation from local authorities in performing their duties. If trouble arises, either the Director General or the state involved can take the problem to the IAEA Board of Governors. In serious cases of noncompliance the Board notifies Agency members and the U. N. Security Council and General Assembly. The Agency has no enforcement power; its main sanction is to terminate its aid and to encourage the supplier state to do likewise. Application of Agency safeguards has expanded rapidly in recent years, but they still cover only a small percentage of the world's peaceful nuclear activities in three major categories: IAEA grants of materials and other aid to states; enforcement of safeguards upon request of the parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements; and safeguards application, if requested, to a State's independent activities. A wide new range of activities will be involved if the Agency

safeguards peaceful programs under the proposed nonproliferation treaty. Such regional agreements as the Latin American nuclear-free zone will also expand the Agency's responsibilities.

1223
Hines, C. O. ON THE NATURE OF TRAVELING IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCES LAUNCHED BY LOW-ALTITUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 72, Apr. 1, 1967: 1877-1882. QC811.J6, v. 72

The nuclear explosion of October 30, 1961, over Novaya Zemlya, resulted in major perturbations of the F-layer critical frequency, even at very great ranges from the explosion site. These perturbations have been interpreted in terms of long-period gravity waves, and more recently in terms of shorter-period acoustic-gravity waves. It is shown here that the new interpretation is unsatisfactory, while the old is perfectly consistent with the observations if allowance is made for the obliquity of energy propagation. The results have some bearing on natural traveling ionospheric disturbances as well. (Abstract supplied)

1224
NUCLEAR NARKS. Economist, v. 222, Mar. 25, 1967: 1114-1115. HG11.E2, v. 222

The knottiest problem blocking agreement on a nonproliferation treaty is verification. Many nations, including the Soviet Union, have traditionally maintained that a nuclear arms program operating under the guise of peaceful atomic industry can be easily detected by ordinary intelligence methods. Recently the Russians have dropped their demands for a treaty consisting solely of unverified pledges and supported the Polish and Czech proposals to allow International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspections of their installations if the West Germans agree to do likewise. Inspection of German nuclear activities by Euratom, the Soviets claim, is inadequate to uncover secret nuclear development. The Russian shift has placed the United States in an uncomfortable situation. The 1965 U.S. draft treaty asked nations' cooperation in facilitating the application of IAEA or other international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities and transfers of fissile material or nuclear equipment between signatories. Euratom saw this provision as a direct threat. To many West Germans the U.S. plan was totally unacceptable, first because of possible leaks of industrial secrets to the Russians or Americans, second because it would stimulate a shift of nuclear activities from the other five to "uninhibited France," and finally because it would destroy Euratom and its contribution to the European Economic Community. Italy too objected to enlarging France's privileged position, noting that sites which the French designate as military are already off limits for Euratom inspectors. The Americans began to talk of a transition period, during which Euratom would inspect its members using IAEA standards, but Washington maintained that ultimately a single international system was essential. The IAEA is neither Communist controlled nor indiscreet. It has conducted inspections for several years without friction, industrial espionage, or other difficulties.

1225
Prawitz, Jan. A CODE OF ETHICS FOR URANIUM. Disarmament, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 12-15. JX1981.P7D5, 1966

Safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities are not used for any military purpose can effectively serve various disarmament goals. Rigid application of safeguards to all transfers of nuclear materials, for example, would achieve a result approaching nonproliferation. Such safeguards would even affect the existing nuclear powers, primarily through preventing nuclear material from being supplied for weapons purposes but also indirectly through forcing a partial separation of national military and peaceful nuclear activities. "A code of ethics for uranium"--an agreement by nations not to sell or otherwise transfer any nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, or certain specialized equipment or materials to any other country except under safeguards--is needed. All suppliers must rigidly adhere to the code. To assure a standardized and uniform application, a single system must be used, such as that of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Using several systems, even if more or less integrated into cooperative agreements, would allow loopholes. If suppliers cooperate to bring manufactured facilities in line with the safeguards requirements, and if scientists define a concentration limit for fissile isotopes in uranium and plutonium below which the material would not be considered weapons grade, safeguards will be cheaper, more effective, and more agreeable to everyone. Verifying that nuclear explosions for excavation or other peaceful purposes do not serve military ends is a critical problem requiring strict definitions of "military purpose" and "nuclear weapons." Clearly a system of uranium ethics will take place before the expected rapid increase of plutonium stocks in nonnuclear countries begins is highly desirable. Once the nontransfer principle is established, additional safeguards can be added in order to achieve complete nonproliferation, production cutoff, and nuclear disarmament.

1226
Romaniecki, Leon. THE ATOM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. Polish perspectives, v. 10, Feb. 1967: 3-9. DK401.P7947, v. 10

Since 1963 the Soviet Union and other Socialist nations have actively supported the development by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] of a system of safeguards to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ease the threat of proliferation. The Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to consider using the IAEA control system to enforce the proposed nonproliferation treaty, Poland has declared its readiness to submit its atomic installations to IAEA control if the German Federal Republic did likewise, and Czechoslovakia has made a similar proposal with the same stipulation. Unfortunately the IAEA is far from universally accepted. One reason for this is the presence of regional organizations such as Euratom whose interests overlap with military blocs and which have their own internal systems of control. Primarily through U.S. aid in the form of information, technology and financial subsidies, Euratom has evolved into an organization with a highly developed nuclear technology capable of producing weapons. Euratom is subject to internal rather than international control, and West Germany plays an important part in the organization. The lack of uniform international controls is increasingly serious considering that plutonium, which is useful in making nuclear weapons, is produced through the operation of peaceful atomic reactors. The urgency that states without nuclear weapons submit their reactors to IAEA control and the importance of the Polish proposal to insure the inclusion of West German

facilities are thus obvious. Even the best systems of controls will be ineffective if nations transfer nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through military alliances. A "watertight nonproliferation treaty" is urgently needed.

1227
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES CRITERIA AND RELATED MATTERS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 533 p.
TK9360.U55

Hearings on the Atomic Energy Commission's proposed standards for contractors performing uranium-enrichment services. Such related measures as policy on the lease and sale of uranium and safeguards against its diversion to unauthorized uses are also discussed.

## 2. Enforcement

1228
Grumme, J. von. [EURATOM CONTROL] Die EURATOM-Kontrolle. Neue Technik, Nouvelles techniques, New techniques, v. 8, Dec. 1966: 365-368. illus.
TJ212.N4, v. 8

Of all multilateral control systems designed to prevent nuclear materials under their jurisdiction from being diverted to military uses the oldest and the most thorough is that of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]. Its main features have been stipulated by the Euratom Treaty, which makes the Commission--Euratom's top executive body--responsible for ascertaining that all relevant ores, their products, and fissile materials are employed by their respective usufructuaries for specifically declared purposes. According to the Treaty the Commission is also responsible for all special control measures needed to enforce guarantees given by the Community to a third party. All nuclear establishments on Euratom territory must reveal to the Commission their basic technical characteristics. Each nuclear establishment is to report regularly (at least quarterly) to the Commission the actual stock and balance of its nuclear materials. Data thus obtained and their on-the-spot verification by the Commission's own inspectors allow the Commission to maintain a reliable central system of accountability with regard to all nuclear materials on Euratom's territory. The organization and methods of Euratom's control system are designed to be effective without adversely influencing the efficiency and legitimate purposes of nuclear establishments. In cases of violation of its rulings the Commission may use sanctions, stretching from a warning, to withdrawal of nuclear materials, to temporarily taking over an establishment's administration. In the manner of other international control systems Euratom's does not preclude the existence of nuclear military programs on its territory. Its control of declared peaceful uses of nuclear energy is, however, exemplary for all other international systems of that kind.

1229
Seaborg, Glenn T. WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR POWER--PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, Jan. 16, 1967: 90-97.
JX232.A33, v. 56

"Based on a lecture . . . delivered in London on October 24, 1966, before the British Nuclear Energy Society."

Delineates the world's need of and possible uses for energy from nuclear power. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, outlines nuclear power's advantages, current trends, and economic requirements. He projects future uranium prices and reserves, forecasting that it is "readily possible to more than double the energy which can be extracted from a pound of uranium by going to reactors with higher conversion ratios than the currently available light water and advanced gas-cooled reactors." A significant point, Seaborg asserts, is the "plethora of fissionable material" that will be extant as more and more power reactors are used. If present trends continue, in the year 2000 there will be 4 million kilograms of plutonium in the world. Since it would be unrealistic to use this as a rationale for totally halting the use of nuclear fuels, international cooperation and control under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency must be employed.

# F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1230
Glagolev, Igor S. REDUCING MILITARY EXPENSES--A SOVIET VIEW. Disarmament, no. 12, Dec. 1966: 1-3, 15.
JX1981.P7D5, 1966

The Soviet Government believes that reduction of military expenses--whether on the basis of international agreements or as a policy of mutual example--would have immense impact on efforts toward world peace. Countries that most rapidly reduced their armaments would gain greater economic advantages than those that acted slowly. During 7 of the past 10 years the Soviet Union has either reduced or maintained at the same level its military expenditures. Other countries, particularly Socialist countries, have followed suit, but NATO countries have continued to increase their military expenditures. Mankind has now reached a "nuclear barrier," where nuclear armaments must be checked if world-wide annihilation is to be prevented. The problem of control is by no means the insurmountable barrier depicted by the Western nations. Numerous facilities for international information exist; in any case its availability has never given cause for raising or lowering military expenditures. Nor is the production of antimissile defense systems an insurmountable obstacle to reducing armament expenses. Recent increases result from American expenditures for "new military formations and the stockpiling of weapons," not from Soviet antimissile defenses. While many qualified scientists have already recognized the economic advantages of transferring resources from military to peaceful purposes, the bourgeois press in the West continues to threaten the people with recession and unemployment if economic conversion is attempted. Obviously conversion must be well planned, but it is bound to lead to favorable results. Experiments in Russia have shown that conversion of financial resources, manpower, and equipment to peaceful purposes can open extensive opportunities for increasing productivity, raising the standard of living, and promoting scientific and technical development.

# G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1231
McWilliams, Wilson. ENDING THE COLD WAR. Commonweal, v. 85, Jan. 6, 1967: 363-365.
AP2.C6897, v. 85

Although neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has abandoned its ideological objectives, both have unwillingly conceded that today it is impossible to transform the world according to their idealistic conceptions. Thus now their policies are based on a deliberate compromise between contradictory goals, just as "peaceful coexistence" is their compromise between cooperation and conflict. Except for their agreement on the settlement of the India-Pakistan conflict, no example of active cooperation between the United States and Russia can be cited. On Germany and Vietnam no agreement is possible owing to ideological differences between the two great powers individually and their military alliances as well. Besides, neither a German peace treaty nor a settlement in Vietnam is able to solve the other (and greater) problems in Europe and Asia. High hopes have been held for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which seemed possible after the United States abandoned its proposal for a NATO multilateral nuclear force. But enforcement of the treaty and protection of the nations that renounce nuclear weapons from those that do not pose almost insurmountable problems. Perhaps China would accept a no-first-use treaty, but the United States might not sign one without a guarantee against frequent American involvement in guerrilla wars. A no-first-use treaty has many advantages. It is only a statement of "understanding" which fits into contemporary international policy and would not require the great powers to severely limit their foreign policy. But the most promising among possible agreements seem to be the ones that would have only a "symbolic impact on world politics," such as Russia's recent proposal to reactivate the Military Staff Committee under Article 47 of the U. N. charter. The lowered tensions of the cold war would be manifest in this plan. A further step could be made in the enforcement of the U. N. resolution depriving South Africa of its mandate in South-West Africa; if Russia were invited to contribute at least a token force along with the others it might replace passive acquiescence with active joint cooperation among the great powers.

1232
**OBSERVANCE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE.** UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, Dec. 1966: 55-63. JX1977. AIU564, v. 3

Reports on the Nov. 30, 1966, U. N. General Assembly resolution calling for "strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and the right of peoples to self-determination." The article gives the full text of the resolution, outlines the contents of the three drafts synthesized by the present resolution, describes general debate in the Assembly on the subject, and gives explanations of the votes of several delegations.

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